


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THESIS

THE CUBAN INTERVENTIONARY FORCES: THE
GROWING STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL THREAT
TO THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

by

Timothy J. Doorey

December 1986

Thesis Co-Advisors:

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Cuba's growing military, paramilitary, and intelligence presence in the Caribbean Basin, combined with the expanding military power of the Soviet Union and Soviet-backed Nicaragua in the same region, pose a serious and growing threat to U.S. security interests in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the Third World.

This thesis will examine specifically Cuba's capability and intent to jeopardize United States' security interests by analyzing the motives, resources, and tactics of the Cuban interventionary forces.

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The Cuban Interventionary Forces: The Growing Strategic
and Regional Threat to the United States and NATO

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., Temple University, 1979

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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December 1986

ABSTRACT

Over the past twenty-seven years, Cuba has transformed its military forces from an ill-equipped, untrained band of guerrillas into the second most powerful military in the Caribbean Basin. Today, the Cuban armed forces are equipped with numerous modern fighter-bomber aircraft, warships (including attack submarines), tanks, and other lethal weaponry. Unlike other recipients of Soviet arms, Cuba has proven its capability and willingness to maintain and operate this sophisticated military equipment around the world, even in combat environments. This has been demonstrated in Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| I. | INTRODUCTION ----- | 11 |
| II. | HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS ----- | 20 |
| | A. THE EARLY YEARS (1959-1974) ----- | 20 |
| | B. A MAJOR INTERVENTIONARY POWER (1975-1986) --- | 29 |
| III. | CUBAN MOTIVES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTIONS ----- | 40 |
| | A. DOMESTIC FACTORS ----- | 42 |
| | B. THE SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONSHIP ----- | 54 |
| IV. | RESOURCES ----- | 62 |
| | A. THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES ----- | 63 |
| | B. INTELLIGENCE AND PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS ----- | 79 |
| | C. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION ABROAD ----- | 90 |
| | D. THIRD WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ALLIES ----- | 93 |
| | E. LOGISTICAL CAPABILITIES ----- | 96 |
| | F. SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA ----- | 98 |
| V. | TACTICS ----- | 99 |
| | A. LARGE-SCALE MILITARY INTERVENTIONS ----- | 105 |
| | B. SUPPORT FOR MARXIST-LENINIST REGIMES ----- | 109 |
| | C. SUPPORT FOR INSURGENTS AND TERRORIST GROUPS ----- | 112 |
| | D. COOPERATION WITH DRUG TRAFFICKERS ----- | 115 |
| VI. | ASSESSMENT OF THE CUBAN THREAT TO UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS ----- | 119 |
| | A. THE STRATEGIC THREAT ----- | 120 |

| | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| B. THE REGIONAL THREAT ----- | 140 |
| VII. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CUBAN INTERVENTIONS ----- | 148 |
| VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ----- | 163 |
| APPENDIX A: "CUBAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION ABROAD --- | 178 |
| APPENDIX B: COMPATIBILITY OF CUBAN WEAPONS WITH OTHER SOVIET THIRD WORLD CLIENTS ----- | 183 |
| APPENDIX C: CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR SOVIET AIRCRAFT AND GROUND WEAPONS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY ----- | 189 |
| APPENDIX D: TYPES OF SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERRED TO CUBA (1960-1985) ----- | 190 |
| LIST OF REFERENCES ----- | 192 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY ----- | 198 |
| INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ----- | 204 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1. CUBAN MILITARY FORCES IN THE THIRD WORLD 1977-1986 ----- | 36 |
| 2. EAST GERMAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE THIRD WORLD 1977-1986 ----- | 37 |
| 3. SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE THIRD WORLD 1977-1986 ----- | 38 |
| 4. CUBAN IMPORTS 1970-1982 ----- | 64 |
| 5. CUBAN POPULATION AND DEFENSE STATISTICS 1960-1986 - | 66 |
| 6. SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE CUBAN ARMY ----- | 71 |
| 7. CUBAN NAVY ----- | 74 |
| 8. CUBAN AIR FORCE ----- | 76 |
| 9. CUBAN AIR DEFENSE ----- | 77 |
| 10. COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH CUBA MAINTAINS OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ----- | 92 |
| 11. MERCHANT MARINE CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIET ALLIES --- | 97 |
| 12. MAJOR SOVIET ARMS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED TO OTHER SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD ----- | 183 |
| 13. MAJOR SOVIET ARMS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST ----- | 184 |
| 14. MAJOR SOVIET ARMS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN ASIA ----- | 185 |
| 15. MAJOR SOVIET ARMS NOT IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN AFRICA AND ASIA ----- | 186 |
| 16. MAJOR SOVIET ARMS NOT IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN MIDDLE EAST ----- | 187 |

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 17. MAJOR SOVIET ARMS NOT IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN ----- | 188 |
| 18. CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR SOVIET AIRCRAFT AND GROUND WEAPONS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY ----- | 189 |
| 19. SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS TRANSFERRED TO CUBA DURING THE PRE-INTERVENTIONARY PERIOD (1960-1971) ----- | 190 |
| 20. SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS TRANSFERRED TO CUBA DURING THE INTERVENTIONARY PERIOD (1972-1985) ----- | 191 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | | |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1. | Strategic Importance of the Caribbean to NATO ----- | 124 |
| 2. | U.S. Merchant Ships Sunk Off East Coast 1941-42 --- | 128 |
| 3. | Strategic Implication of MIG Aircraft Based in Cuba and Nicaragua ----- | 131 |
| 4. | Major U.S. Army Bases and Installations in the Continental United States ----- | 134 |
| 5. | Soviet-Bloc Arms Deliveries to Nicaragua 1980-1984 ----- | 142 |
| 6. | Soviet Arms Deliveries to Cuba 1970-1984 ----- | 171 |

I. INTRODUCTION

The armed forces of the socialist states . . . (are) trained to . . . give fraternal assistance to peoples who are fighting for liberation from class and national oppression. [Ref. 1:p. 220]

The above quote by Marshall Sokolovskiy in 1968 indicates the Soviet Union has long understood the value and validity of using the armed forces of its allies to further its own foreign policy objectives. There are, however, few examples of the Soviets receiving substantial military support from its allies in endeavors outside of the geographic zone of the Warsaw Pact.

The major exception is Cuba. This impoverished Caribbean nation of only ten million people has been at the forefront of military interventions throughout the Third World. Cuban combat troops and military advisors have been deployed in large numbers to Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Syria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and most recently Grenada and Nicaragua. Smaller military training groups from Cuba have served in numerous countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and in the Western Hemisphere. During the Falkland Island's conflict between Argentina and Great Britain, Castro even offered to send Cuban combat personnel to assist Buenos Aires's right-wing military government in resisting Great Britain's counterattack.

Cuba's assistance to nations it finds ideologically worthy is not limited to the field of military training and combat support. Many of Cuba's overseas programs deal with development programs in the Third World. Since the early 1960s, Cuba has been active sponsoring economic and health care programs in select countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Yet, these programs are severely limited by Cuba's meager resources and continued reliance on massive aid from the Soviet Union for economic survival.

It is in the areas of military and security assistance, in cooperation with the Soviets, that Cuban foreign policy has had its greatest impact on the Third World and has most successfully challenged Western interests. Cuba's foreign military actions in the Third World over the past quarter-century have dwarfed the combined efforts of all other Warsaw pact nations, and at times have rivaled the Soviets themselves in the number of men committed in overseas military interventions and missions.

Since capability and intent are the two most important variables in assessing the threat potential of any given nation, this study will examine Cuba's ability and inclination to pose a strategic and regional military threat to the United States, NATO and Third World nations aligned with the West.

This analysis of Cuba's power projection capability will examine the motives, resources and tactics used by the Cuban

regime against Western security interests. Following an analysis of Cuba's ability and motivation to jeopardize U.S. security, I will assess the Cuban threat and discuss prospects for future Cuban military, para-military, or diplomatic interventions in the Third World, and specifically the Caribbean Basin.

A problem inherent in analyzing the threat potential of Cuba is separating Soviet motives, resources, and actions from those of the Havana leadership. Since Cuba is extensively dependent on the Soviet Union for economic, military, and security assistance, it is difficult to determine what constitutes the Cuban threat without active Soviet support. This study will try to concentrate on Cuban motives, resources and tactics while recognizing the crucial role Moscow plays in permitting Havana to conduct its activist foreign policy. Due to space restrictions, the Soviet threat to United States' and NATO's security in the Western Hemisphere will only briefly be covered in this paper.

Before proceeding, important concepts such as the Cuban Interventionary Forces, power projection capability, and the difference between a Soviet client and surrogate must be defined. In this thesis, I shall use the term interventionary forces to describe those forces in the Cuban military, security services or government bureaucracy which are designed primarily for military, paramilitary, or intelligence operations overseas. Some of these agencies have a

dual role allows them to be highly active in foreign operations in addition to their internal security duties in Cuba.

By intervention, I mean Cuba's capability and willingness as a sovereign nation, to influence events abroad through military, economic or political pressure. In the case of Cuba, these interventions usually take place in the Third World, although Castro's intelligence network also operates in Western Europe and Japan. Havana's interventions are directly related to Cuba's physical security because they take place in areas outside of Cuba's geographic boundaries: airspace, or territorial waters (12 nautical miles off). Since Cuba is an island without contiguous borders with any other nation, foreign intervention cannot be mistaken for common border disputes.

This will refer to Cuba as a Soviet surrogate in the sense that Cuba performs certain military services in the Third World that furthers Soviet foreign policy goals. This does not mean that Havana is merely taking orders from Moscow. As we will see in later chapters, Havana's relationship with its superpower sponsor--the Soviet Union--is quite complex. Each nation cooperates in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Yet, the Soviet-Cuban alliance is not a partnership of equals. The Soviet Union maintained an upper hand in the relationship, and has used its power to force Havana into compliance with its

policies (especially through economic pressure). Finally, the terms client and surrogate state, when referring to Cuba, should not be confused with the normative definitions usually associated with these titles. The difference between a Soviet client state and surrogate depends not only on the degree of control exercised by the Soviet Union over a particular nation, but also on the willingness of the Soviet client to actively pursue high-risk military actions which benefit Soviet foreign policy.

According to Rose Gottemoeller of the RAND Corporation,

(A) client state becomes a surrogate when it moves beyond passive political and diplomatic support for the Soviet Union to actively implementing Soviet policies in neighboring countries or around the world. Although often most influential on the regional level, such countries also promote Soviet interests globally. [Ref. 2:p. 1]

As mentioned earlier, Cuba has been the most active Soviet ally in the Third World, conducting military interventions beneficial to Soviet foreign policy that the Soviets were apparently unwilling to perform themselves. Because of the costly nature (in terms of Cuban casualties) of these interventions, the Cubans do maintain a certain amount of veto power over whether or not they will participate in any major military action. This action is initiated by the Cuban leadership, heavily influenced by whether or not a specific operation will further Cuban foreign policy goals. Evidence will show that Havana's interests are the catalyst for all of Cuba's large-scale interventions. Since the Soviet Union's economic and military aid is crucial for

the success of significant Cuban military operation, it also provides with veto power over Cuban-sponsored interventions the Soviets consider not in Moscow's interest. Yet Castro and the Cuban decision-making apparatus can't 30,000 to 50,000 troops to fight in Africa as it did the 1970s.

Analysis of Cuban and Grenadian government documents captured on Grenada in October 1983 provides an interesting insight into the dynamic relationship between Havana and Moscow. It appears that the Cubans were given a major role in building the Grenadian revolution. Havana had managed to convince the U.S. Union that Grenada was strategically important, and a worthy investment. Given Cuba's limited economic resources, it is likely that Moscow financed the construction of the new international airport in Grenada, with labor provided by Cuban workers. The Cuban government acted as a broker between the Grenadian government and other communist and radical states; Grenada has similar military agreements with the Cubans, Soviets, and Koreans. These governments promised to supply the Grenadian regime with \$37.8 million in military equipment, with supplies being routed through Cuba. One secret agreement led for the Cubans to provide Grenada with 40 military advisors--27 on a permanent basis, the others for short periods. The documents prove that the Havana-Moscow relationship, at least in terms of its Grenada

policy, was a well-coordinated effort in which the Cubans played a major role in developing strategy and implementing policy, while Soviet-bloc countries provided the necessary economic and military resources. [Ref. 3:p. 6]

Cuba's commitment and leadership role in building and protecting Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Caribbean Basin was confirmed during the month of October 1983. In that month, an internal power struggle caused the death of Grenada's Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, most of his cabinet, and scores of innocent civilians. When the United States conducted a joint operation with other Caribbean forces to restore order in Grenada, it was the Cuban forces (approximately 700 men, most of them reservists) who offered the strongest resistance. This was the first time that the United States military had ever engaged Cuban forces in combat. The tenacity of the Cuban resistance in the face of a superior force surprised the American forces.

One outcome of the Grenada operation is that the United States can no longer dismiss the Cuban military threat as insignificant (if it ever did). Given the fact that over 3,000 Cuban military personnel are believed to be operating in Nicaragua, one can only imagine the difficulty United States' forces would have in neutralizing that country if the situation should demand it. The Cuban armed forces has at its disposal hundreds of advanced combat aircraft and helicopters, three attack submarines, two blue-water

frigates, two amphibious landing ships, dozens of smaller missile and torpedo attack boats, mine-warfare ships (mine-layers and mine-sweepers), an impressive network of air-defense radars and surface-to-air missiles, and 13 divisions (some of which are tank or mechanized divisions). These numbers have been increasing in recent years. These forces, operating from an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" straddling the Caribbean's sea lanes, pose a serious challenge to the United States' defense strategy.

Nor is the Cuban threat limited to the geographic boundaries of the Caribbean, Cuba and Nicaragua. Over the past quarter-century, Castro has cultivated working relationships with numerous radical regimes, guerrilla groups, and terrorist organizations throughout the world. This system of revolutionary allies provides Cuba with material and manpower resources far greater than those available in Cuba.

Another threat to Western security is Cuba's recent cooperation with Latin American drug traffickers. In return for protection and intelligence support, Cuba receives badly needed hard currency, assistance with arms smuggling, and the satisfaction of knowing that Havana is contributing to the demise of Castro's number one enemy--the United States.

To facilitate all of these operations, Havana has developed an elaborate intelligence and paramilitary network throughout the Caribbean Basin, Europe, the Middle East,

Africa and, according to most accounts, within the United States and Canada.

This thesis will attempt to detail the present and potential threat posed to the United States and NATO regional and strategic security interests by these Cuban Interventionary Forces.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

A. THE EARLY YEARS (1959-1974)

Cuba's ability to conduct overseas military operations has been demonstrated repeatedly over the past 27 years. In the 1960s, Castro sponsored small guerrilla groups in Latin America, in what became known as the foco theory. This strategy emphasized rural-based insurgency supported by peasants or the "foco." While the Cuban effort was widespread, not one of these groups was successful. Castro was forced to abandon these efforts after a decade of failure, Soviet economic pressure as a result of Moscow's reluctance to support Castro's revolutionary vision, and almost complete diplomatic isolation in the Western Hemisphere.

Having failed in its initial strategy in Latin America, Havana directed its revolutionary energy toward Africa. With decolonization underway, and anti-imperialism a major theme throughout that continent, the Cubans found a more receptive environment in which to carry out their revolutionary struggle. The Cuban forces in Africa soon became active in setting up military training camps for Soviet-backed governments. Cuba's first permanent overseas military mission was most likely established in Ghana in 1961 [Ref. 4:p. 14]. There, the Cubans built a small

guerrilla-instructed West African rebels
in late 1946 Nkrumah, Ghana's leftist
leader, overthrew a military coup [Ref. 4:p.
14] Cuban a similar guerrilla training
came to Nigeria from 1962-1965, until a
coure leader, Ben Bella. [Ref. 4:p.
14]

ionary commitment of combat troops
over the summer of 1963, when a border
dispute between Nigeria broke into open warfare.
Cuban had been enroute to Algeria when the
ship was diverted in Algeria with a cargo
of tanks and technicians. Two more Cuban
ships, military a battalion of tank troops
arrived along with additional troops and
technical airlift, Cuban Britannia airliners.
[Ref. 4]

was and military advisors when it
became apparent that military equipment would be of
little use with four hundred Cuban combat
personnel. However, the Cubans were
sparing directly when a ceasefire was
signed. Despite the ceasefire, the
Cubans remained until the end of 1963,
training Algerians and maintenance of the 40

tanks and other military equipment provided by Havana.

[Ref. 4:p. 15]

Although the Cuban arms transfer to Algeria was a small scale operation, it demonstrated a certain degree of cooperation and coordination between Moscow and Havana. It is unlikely that Cuba would have transferred 40 tanks to Algeria without assurances from Moscow that they would be replaced. This is especially true considering the transfer took place less than a year after the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Cuba must have felt particularly vulnerable to an attack from the United States. [Ref. 4:p. 16]

Cuban military involvement in Africa remained at a high level throughout the 1960s, usually in the form of supporting guerrilla groups and militia training programs for friendly regimes. Che Guevara headed a number of Cuban delegations to Africa to set up Cuban advisory missions in Congo-Leopoldville (later Zaire), Cong-Brazzaville, and Algeria, in order to train guerrillas fighting the Portuguese in Lisbon's remaining African colonies. In Angola, the primary recipient of Cuban aid was the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola forces (MPLA), in Mozambique the Marxist FRELIMO movement, and the PAIGC movement in Portuguese Guinea. [Ref. 4:p. 18]

By 1966, the Cubans became disillusioned with their efforts to train African guerrillas. Unfavorable conditions, including rebel corruption and cowardice, had

soured Cuba's interest in active support. Obviously, the objective conditions proved to be unsuited for the Castro-Guevara type of revolutionary warfare. Understanding that they would have to wait for better conditions, the Cubans turned their talents toward protecting "progressive" regimes, such as in the Congo (Brazzaville). In the Congo, the Cubans served as the Presidential Guard for Congolese President Massamba-Debat, and helped organize his militia. The Cubans proved to be very successful in protecting their African allies from military coups. Similar coups had toppled two of their best friends in Africa: Ben Bella in Algeria, and Nkrumah in Ghana, and the Cubans decided it was necessary to protect their revolutionary gains before promoting insurgencies elsewhere. Havana was well suited for the bodyguard role. The Cuban experience of combating counter-revolutionary movements at home taught the Castro regime what was necessary to stay in power despite widespread antipathy at home and abroad. Havana soon became known in Africa as the supplier of the Praetorian guard for friendly regimes, and concentrated on this type of military training mission well into the 1970s. [Ref. 5:p. 209]

In the early 1970s, Cuban and Soviet power projection interests converged in the Third World for the first time since the Algerian action in 1963. Beginning with the Czech arms deal to Gamal el-Nasser's Egypt in 1955, the Soviets actively supplied arms and military assistance to the

frontline Arab states in their wars against Israel. Initially, Cuba showed little interest in either the Arab-Israeli conflict itself, or Soviet efforts to win Arab support in that region of the world. In fact, Havana took positions seemingly contrary to the Soviet position. For example, the Soviets and Eastern Europeans severed diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War. In an act of defiance, Cuba waited until the 1973 Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers to break diplomatic relations with the Jewish State. Castro changed his position as a result of intense Soviet economic and Arab diplomatic pressure. By 1973, Havana's economic independence from Moscow was on the decline. Cuba became a permanent member of the Soviet-Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or CEMA in 1972, thus fusing the Cuban economy with that of the Soviet Union and other members of the Eastern bloc. In addition to pressure from Moscow, Castro (still interested in becoming the leader of the Third World revolutionary struggle) was repeatedly stung by Arab verbal attacks in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM). While some of the attacks questioned Cuba's independence from the Soviet Union, and its right to continue to be a member of the NAM, the Arab states were obviously more concerned about Havana's lack of interest in the struggle against Israel. [Ref. 6:p. 157] Following the 1973 NAM conference in Algiers, Havana soon became a major champion of Arab causes in Third World

forums. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Castro would be able to prove Cuba's commitment to the Arab world by fighting against Israel. Prior to taking on an experienced military force such as the Israelis, Castro gained invaluable combat experience for his troops in South Yemen.

South Yemen proved in 1972 to be the first example of what Hosmer and Wolfe call "Cooperative Intervention" by Soviet and Cuban military forces.¹ The secretary-general of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen's (PDRY) ruling party, Abd Al-Fattah Isma'il, visited Havana at Castro's request in October of that year. It is believed that the PDRY's leadership asked Castro to help the PDRY in assisting the Dhofari rebels which were fighting in neighboring Oman. Castro apparently agreed to help the PDRY, because Isma'il, on his departure from Cuba, stated that "our revolution can count on the firm support of the Cuban revolution." [Ref. 4:p. 27] Isma'il also criticized Soviet aid to the PDRY by saying that Moscow's assistance compared unfavorably with the "much more extensive" Cuban aid [Ref. 4:p. 27]

Despite Isma'il's criticism, the Soviets were heavily involved in building the PDRY's military forces. Tons of advanced military equipment arrived in South Yemen from the

¹Hosmer and Wolfe first used this term to describe Cuban-Soviet coordination in Angola in 1975-1976. It also applies to the Syrian and PDRY interventions. See: Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts, Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1983.

Soviet during the previous six months. A major effort was to train the PDRY's military to operate and maintain Soviet equipment. Thus, by April of 1973, 200 Cuban advisors arrived to provide guerrilla training to both the PDRY's army and the Dhofar guerrillas. The CSO set up a popular militia, similar to the militia that had been so successful in training in Africa, to prepare PDRY's party leadership. [Ref. 4:p. 27] Cuban personnel arrived two months later to train Yemen and maintenance crews to fly and service the Soviet aircraft supplied by Moscow. In addition, Cuban security personnel were provided to the PDRY's government to set up an internal security apparatus. [Ref. 4:p. 27]

Military assistance to the PDRY was tripled following the Shah of Iran's intervention with 1200 airborne troops on behalf of the government of Oman in late 1973 [Ref. 4:p. 27]. During that augmentation of Cuban soldiers, some were sent to Aden aboard the Cuban ship Vietnam Heroine transiting to Aden, the ship also brought some troops to Mogadishu, Somalia. This was the first deployment of Cuban military advisors to that strategic location. [Ref. 4:p. 27]. Back in South Yemen, Cuban military personnel reported on the PDRY's Island of Perim, which controls the entrance of the Red Sea, in late 1974 [Ref. 6:p. 27]. The Cuban advisors in the PDRY numbered between 600-700 in the spring of 1976, when it was reduced to

200. The reasons for the reduction of Cuban military personnel were probably linked to Havana's pressing commitments in Angola, or possibly to the PDRY's decision to stop supporting the Dhofar rebels in early 1976. [Ref. 7:p. 26]

Cuba again played a major military role in the Middle East by supporting Syria during and shortly following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Castro, under pressure from the Arab members of the Non-Aligned Movement, realized that by supplying combat personnel to Syria he would not only quell Arab criticism, but increase Cuba's stature in Moscow's eyes and throughout the Third World. Havana's total contribution to Syria consisted of between 500 to 700 tank troops. Israeli estimates place the number of Cubans fighting with the Syrians in the thousands, which amounted to two brigades. This discrepancy is probably due to the small size of Cuban armored brigades compared to Israeli, U.S., or even Soviet armor brigades. The Cuban tank crews were moved from Damascus to the Golan Heights after the October War. There, the Cuban troops, untested in tank warfare, fought with Syrian crews against the Israelis in the February-May 1974 "War of Attrition" on the Golan Heights. According to Israeli sources, the Cubans lost 180 killed and 250 wounded, where the Israelis lost 68 dead and 178 wounded. [Ref. 7:p. 37]

After the October War, Cuba also sent pilots and technicians to Syria as advisors. The Cuban advisors

assisted the Syrian Air Force in absorbing (incorporating numerous and sophisticated military equipment) new MIGs and other combat aircraft sent by the Soviets to replace the Syrian war losses. This was the second time that Cuban pilots had assisted an Arab country absorb complicated MIGs. South Yemen, a few months earlier, was the first. [Ref. 8]

The Cuban forces remained in Syria until February 1975. The majority of them were withdrawn following consultations between Havana and Damascus in January 1975 [Ref. 9:p. 12]. There are two reasons why the Cuban forces were withdrawn. First, their services were no longer required by the Syrian military. The second reason was Havana's desire to have these highly trained forces available for future service in Africa.

In the Cuban deployments to Algeria (1963), the PDRY (1973-76), and Syria (1973-75), the Cuban military training teams were almost identical in size. Each consisted of four to five hundred troops with specialization in tank and aircraft operation. A number of Cuban technicians were also involved to maintain the Soviet equipment. The major difference with the two latter deployments was that they brought no major military equipment with them. This suggests that the Soviet equipment had either already arrived in country or was in the process of being delivered by the Soviets.

B. INTERVIEWER (1975-1986)

When in Angola in 1975 represented a massive overseas military commitment. As previously supported the MPLA faction in Angola 1961/75 Angola was on the brink of civil war that had developed after the quick withdrawal following the fall of the Salazar regime. Factions fought each other for control. On the one hand, Neto's Marxist MPLA, Holden Roberto's later Jonas Savimbi's UNITA faction. The war was fueled by an arms race between the Soviets, with Holden Roberto's FNLA and 150,000 tons of military equipment from Zaire between June and August 1974. was able to train and equip thousands of troops with Soviet assistance. Reacting to the fact the Soviets decided to resume arms shipments in October of 1974, after the Presidential dispute [Ref. 2: p. 13]. Soon after accumulated MPLA's stockpiles of weapons caused by the largely ill-equipped

In 1975, many advisers began to arrive in Angola. During the same period, the situation, in quantity and quality, of arms shipments decreased. By summer, Angola

was involved in a full-scale civil war. Eventually, South African forces, in an attempt to secure the Cunene River dam that provides water and electricity for Namibia, and in an attempt to influence the outcome of the Angolan Civil War conducted a summer invasion of Angola from the south. [Ref. 2:p. 12]

With aid from China, Zaire and the United States, the FNLA faction was able to move within 20 miles of Luanda, the MPLA's last major stronghold. According to Hosmer and Wolfe, the MPLA asked the Cubans for combat troops after a similar request was refused by the Soviets. In the four months between November 1975 and February 1976, Cuban troops and Soviet equipment turned the tide of battle in the MPLA's favor. [Ref. 2:p. 13]

The Cuba intervention was critical in preventing the Marxists from losing the Civil War, but also displayed their weakness when confronted by a trained adversary. In mid-December, the Cubans lost a three-day battle to the South Africans about 150 miles south of Luanda. According to Hosmer and Wolfe, this defeat almost caused the Cubans to withdraw from Angola [Ref. 2:p. 14]. In the end, the Cubans were saved by political developments, rather than by their military prowess. The United States Congress ended all U.S. support for the FNLA. The South Africans and Chinese saw this as a sign that they would have to match the MPLA guerrillas, Cuban troops, and Soviet equipment by

themselves, something that they were unable or unwilling to do for an extended period of time. This development forced the South African forces to withdraw from Angola in January 1976 [Ref. 2:p. 14]. Despite the difficulties encountered by the Cuban units in fighting the formidable South African forces, the Cubans displayed considerable resourcefulness in transporting over 20,000 troops to Angola, albeit with massive Soviet assistance. Havana's effort continued uninterrupted until the MPLA was firmly in power by the spring of 1976. [Ref. 10] Some of the external factors which contributed to the Soviet-Cuban success in Angola included both Chinese and U.S. decisions to stop aiding the FNLA faction, and friendly African nations such as Algeria, Mali and the Congo providing the Soviets and Cubans with critical aircraft basing rights and other logistical support [Ref. 2:p. 14].

In 1977, the Soviet-Cuban "cooperative intervention" forces again were tested in a distant Third World conflict. The Angola success emboldened Castro and the Soviets to intervene on behalf of Ethiopia, which was being invaded by another Soviet client state--Somalia. While the regional conflict was difficult to explain in Marxist-Leninist terms, Moscow saw it as an opportunity to increase their influence in this strategic region at the expense of the United States. The Kremlin originally hoped to act as a mediator in the conflict, and thus maintain its basing rights in

Somalia (elly the strategic naval base at Berbera) while simusly gaining access to important Ethiopian facilities. Cuban decision to send thousands of combat troops to t the Ethiopian forces was taken when the Soviet-Cubancing act between the two nations failed. As with tbla experience, the Soviets provided large quantitiesrms that could not be absorbed into the Ethiopian forces. Shortly before the Soviet-Cuban interventie Ethiopian military was losing badly in the war againsSomalis in the disputed Ogaden region. At the time cconflict, the Somalian Army had one of the largest iries of tanks, artillery, and armored personnel rs in Africa. Ironically, this equipment was supplithe Soviet Union, and it had emboldened the Somalis tde the Ogaden region with its mechanized forces. [l:pp. 61, 69]

On Oct9, 1977, the Soviets ended their shipments to the inent Somalian regime. Somalia responded by expelling and Soviet advisors. Many of these expelled Cuban advtravelled directly to Addis Ababa to help their newbian friends absorb the military equipment arriving ie Soviet Union. However, the aid mission alone wasicient to expel the Somali forces from the Ogaden. hiopian armed forces fighting against the Somalis iOgaden were described as "beleaguered and semimutinend Castro eventually had to send between

12,000-18,000 combat troops to assist the Ethiopians in evicting the Somali invaders. [Ref. 2:p. 18]

At first, Castro denied that the Cubans were involved in much more than a training mission. In a speech given in March of 1978, Castro described the Cuban involvement as the following:

Initially we decided to send a few dozen, maybe a few hundred advisors to teach the Ethiopians how to handle Soviet weapons. . . . If the Ethiopians had had a little more time they would have learned how to handle all those tanks, artillery pieces, and other modern weapons! We, along with other Socialist countries, would have contributed to training personnel. But the critical situation created by the invasion in late November led the Ethiopian government to make an urgent request that we send tank, artillery and aviation specialists to help the army to help the country, and did so . . . [Ref. 5:p. 228]

Only after the Somali invasion had been repulsed did Castro publicly indicate the extent of the Cuban involvement, including the combat use of Cuban pilots, artillery, tanks, and motorized infantry units [Ref. 5:p. 228].

The Cuban troops did refrain from direct combat with the Eritrean guerrillas fighting the Ethiopian government in the northern part of the country, with the possible exception of flying close air support missions [Ref. 2:p. 18]. The Soviets, like the Addis Ababa government, must fear the Eritrean insurgency as a serious threat to Ethiopia's territorial integrity and would have supported a direct Cuban combat role as a means of protecting their investment. Castro's self-imposed restraint in not allowing the Cuban forces to play a larger combat role in the civil war could

welltrate Havana's independence from Moscow, and
Castro not to be seen as a Soviet puppet in the
Third

ing their military successes in Angola and
Ethiopia Cubans continued to sharpen their skills by
supporting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and aiding the new
Marxist government of Grenada in consolidating power. In
Nicaragua Castro managed to unite the various Marxist-
Leninist factions prior to the revolution. Cuba also
assisted the Sandinistas in building a broad-based alliance
in Nicaragua, with non-Marxist sectors such as the business
community and anti-Somoza press, to topple the Somoza
regime. After the Sandinistas achieved power, the Cubans
provided military and security service advisors, over
3,000 to assist the Sandinistas in "consolidating" the
Revolution and building a modern armed force. Numerous
sources indicated an extensive Cuban military presence
(many large quantities of Soviet-supplied arms) in
Nicaragua before the Contra insurgency became a serious
threat to the Sandinistas. [Ref. 12:pp. 9-20] Considering
the types of tanks, APCs, helicopters, transport air-
craft and artillery sent to the Sandinistas over the past
five years and given Havana's past history of supporting
revolutionary allies militarily, it is likely that the Cuban
was playing a major role in Nicaragua's war against
the United States and Costa Rican-based Contras.

Events in Grenada proved to be more difficult to control than Havana's efforts in Africa, the Middle East and Nicaragua. Despite a last minute effort to salvage the New Jewel Movement's revolutionary government, Cuba's presence in that strategically located island involvement was terminated by the joint U.S.-Caribbean nations' intervention in 1983.

By the end of the 1970s Cuba had indeed become a major world military power despite the fact that Cuba was smaller in area and population than the state of Pennsylvania. To date, the Cuban Armed Forces have engaged in seven major military operations in countries thousands of miles from Cuban bases. These operations are in addition to the numerous military training teams Havana has dispatched to Third World allies to assist them in absorbing Soviet military hardware.

A quick comparison with Warsaw Pact countries clearly demonstrates the size and scope of the Cuban effort in furthering world socialism. Of all the nations in the Soviet Bloc, Cuba has consistently been the most militarily active in supporting Soviet efforts in the Third World. Havana has sent more military advisors and combat troops overseas than either East Germany or the Soviet Union (see Tables 1, 2 and 3). For example, the Soviet's most supportive Warsaw Pact ally, East Germany, with a population of over 16 million, has never exceeded 2,500 advisors overseas

TABLE 1

CUBAN MILITARY FORCES IN THE THIRD WORLD 1977-1986

| COUNTRY | 77-78 | 78-79 | 79-80 | 80-81 | 81-82 | 82-83 | 83-84 | 84-85 | 85-86 |
|--------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| ANGOLA* | 15,000 | 25,000 | 20,000 | 19,000 | 19,000 | 18,000 | 25,000 | 19,000 | 20,000 |
| BENIN | - | R | R | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| CONGO | R | R | R | - | - | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 |
| ETHIOPIA | R? | 16,000 | 17,000 | 16,500 | 14,000 | 13,000 | 11,000 | 3,000 | 5,000 |
| PDRY | R | R | R | - | 750 | 800 | 300 | 300 | 500 |
| NICARAGUA | - | - | - | - | 200 | 2,000 | 1,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| MOZAMBIQUE | R | R | R | - | 500 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 |
| IRAQ | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2,000 | - |
| LIBYA | R | - | R | - | - | - | - | 3,000 | - |
| GRENADA | - | - | - | - | 50 | 300 | 30 | - | - |
| ALGERIA | R | - | R | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| GUINEA | R | R | R | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| SIERRA LEONE | R | R | R | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| TANZANIA | R | R | R | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| ZAMBIA | R | - | R | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| UGANDA | R | R | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| SOMALIA | R | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| TOTALS | 15,000 | 41,000 | 37,000 | 35,500 | 34,500 | 35,600 | 38,830 | 31,800 | 30,000 |

R = Reported Presence of Cuban Military Personnel.

*NOTE: The International Institute for Strategic Studies showed between 15-20,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola in 1976-77. In 1986, 6,000 Cuban civilians were also in Angola in addition to the 20,000 combat troops.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1975-1986, London (published annually)

TABLE 2

EAST : MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE THIRD WORLD 1977-1986

COUNTS

| | 78-79 | 79-80 | 80-81 | 81-82 | 82-83 | 83-84 | 84-85 | 85-86 |
|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| ANGOLA | - | 1,500 | R | 800 | 450 | 450 | 500 | 500 |
| ETHIOP | - | - | R | R | 250 | 550 | 550 | 550 |
| PDRY | - | - | R | 100 | 325 | 75 | 75 | 75 |
| MOZAMB | - | - | R | - | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| IRAQ | - | - | - | - | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| LIBYA | - | - | - | 1,600 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 |
| ALGERIA | - | - | R | R | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 |
| GUINEA | - | - | - | - | 125 | 125 | 125 | 125 |
| SYRIA | - | - | R | R | 210 | 210 | 210 | 210 |
| TOTALS | | 1,500 | ? | 2,500 | 2,270 | 2,320 | 2,370 | 2,370 |

R = Repsence of East German Military Personnel

NOTE: the East German Armed Forces numbered 174,000 conscripts). The breakdown of forces was Army: Navy: 15,000; and Air Force 39,000.

Southern International Institute for Strategic
 Studies, The Military Balance 1975-1986,
 London (published annually)

TABLE 3

SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE THIRD WORLD⁷-1986

| COUNTRY | 79-80* | 80-81 | 81-82 | 82-83 | 83-84 | 84-86 |
|--------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| AFGHANISTAN* | | 55,000 | 55,000 | 95,000 | 105,000 | 115,000 |
| ALGERIA | | - | - | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| ANGOLA | | - | 200 | 200 | 200 | 500 |
| CONGO | | - | - | 200 | - | 100 |
| CUBA** | 7,500 | 7,600 | 7,800 | 7,900 | 7,900 | 7,900 |
| ETHIOPIA | 1,200 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,250 | 1,200 | 1,500 |
| FDRY | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,000 |
| NICARAGUA | - | - | - | - | - | 50 |
| MOZAMBIQUE | - | - | 400 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| IRAQ | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 500 |
| LIBYA | 1,000 | 1,750 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,400 |
| LAOS | - | - | - | 500 | 500 | 500 |
| MALI | - | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| PERU | - | - | - | - | - | 160 |
| SYRIA | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 1,500 |
| NORTH YEMEN | - | - | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 |
| OTHER AFRICA | - | - | - | - | 900 | 900 |
| VIETNAM | 4,000 | 4,500 | 5,000 | 5,000 | 7,000 | 1,500 |
| INDIA | - | - | - | - | - | 200 |
| KAMPUCHEA | - | - | 300 | 300 | 300 | 200 |
| MAURITANIA | - | 200 | 200 | 200 | - | - |
| SEYCHELLES | - | - | 100 | - | - | - |
| TOTALS | 104,100 | 101,750 | 114,700 | 125,700 | 125,700 | 129,910 |

NOTE: The International Institute for Strategic Studies began reporting Soviet military forces in 1980-81. IISS also considered Soviet forces in Mexico abroad. This study will not include those forces in Angola which numbered 75,000 from 1983-85.

** The number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba varies due to the number of civilian advisors in the country. In 1985-86, the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported there were 8,700 Soviet personnel in Cuba (1 brigade of 2,800) plus 2,800 Soviet military advisors and some 3,100 technicians.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1986, London (published annually)

in any given year (see Table 2). Even the Soviet Union, with a population of over 260 million, has sent only 143,000 troops and advisors to areas outside of the Warsaw Pact, with the number dropping to 32,000 if Afghanistan is excluded (see Table 3). Cuba, with a population of only 10 million, has sent as many as 41,000 troops and advisors overseas, and has as many as 30,000 overseas as late as 1985 (see Table 1).

What motivates this small Third World nation to undertake such risky and costly military operations? What is the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union in these "cooperative interventions?" How did Cuba's military and intelligence organizations develop such a capability in less than a decade? Most importantly, what future operations are the Cubans capable and willing to perform in furthering Soviet and Cuban foreign policy goals? The following chapter on Cuban motives for conducting military interventions will attempt to answer these questions.

III. CUBAN MOTIVES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

Over the past quarter-century, Cuba has consistently advocated a militant, "anti-imperialist" foreign policy in the Third World. This policy has been successful in a few countries, but has experienced many failures elsewhere in the Third World, especially in the Western Hemisphere. Despite the setbacks suffered by revolutionary Cuba in pursuit of this policy, Havana has yet to abandon its support for armed struggle as a viable means of achieving power. In terms of duration alone, Cuba's commitment to revolutionary warfare is almost unsurpassed in the Third World. Castro's revolutionary credentials, though tainted by increased reliance on Moscow's aid and approval, still attract many international revolutionaries in search of training, asylum and assistance. Should any of these revolutionary forces come to power, as in the case of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Havana's support continues in the form of Cuban soldiers acting as a modern Praetorian guard to protect the fledgling Marxist regime from "counter-revolutionary forces," and as military advisors to build up the host nation's armed forces and security services.

The reasons that a small, impoverished island-nation like Cuba conducts such an ambitious and aggressive foreign policy are a mixture of domestic political imperatives and

Cuba's special relationship with the Soviet Union as a superclient and military surrogate. Cuba's motives and willingness to commit its troops and resources to conflicts not directly related to its security is rarely understood by most Western scholars and policy-makers.

The three theories usually given to explain Cuba's eagerness to engage in large military interventions are:

- 1) Cuba is an independent actor merely pursuing its own foreign policy designs, with Soviet economic and military assistance allowing them to have the freedom to do so;
- 2) The Cubans are Soviet mercenaries, reluctantly taking orders from Moscow; and
- 3) The Cubans and Soviets are pursuing their objectives simultaneously, with the Cubans providing manpower and the Soviets paying the bills, but each with veto power as to where the interventions may occur.

The third theory is the most widely accepted by Cuban scholars. Edward Gonzalez from the RAND Corporation refers to this relationship as Cuba's "Paladin" or "Hired Gun" role [Ref. 13:pp. 145-167]. Independent of the Soviet-Cuban relationship, Castro has many reasons to conduct an aggressive and militant foreign policy, especially in areas where it conflicts with the power and influence of the United States. These domestic factors will be discussed first before addressing the twenty-seven year Cuban-Soviet relationship.

A. DOMESTIC FACTORS

Western scholars of Cuban politics have discovered a complex and dynamic relationship at work between Havana and Moscow that permits each nation to pursue its own objectives in the world arena with a minimal amount of friction [Ref. 14:pp. 64-68]. Obviously, Cuba is unable to perform large-scale interventions in the Third World, as it did in the last decade, without Soviet economic and military support. Yet Cuba is not simply following orders from the Soviets. According to Gonzalez, Castro's foreign policy consists of sets of minimum and maximum goals. The minimum goals include: enhancing his power base within Cuba; assuring his regime's security vis-a-vis the United States by political and military means; increasing Cuba's limited autonomy within the parameters of an economically dependent state; and receiving sufficient economic aid to promote the island's development. These minimum goals are understandable and differ very little with those of other nations in Latin America and the Third World. [Ref. 15:p. 168]

On the other hand, Gonzalez notes that Castro's maximalist foreign policy objectives are not only offensive and aggressive in nature, but also place Cuba and the United States on a collision course in the Caribbean Basin. Gonzalez claims that these Cuban maximalist objectives, which have been well-articulated over the past decade by various members of the Cuban leadership, are the following:

- To promote if not lead the Third World struggle against "imperialism" in order to erode the global power and presence of the United States.
- To extend Cuba's own influence and presence first in Africa, and then in the Caribbean and Central America, through active diplomatic, political, technical and military-security presence in these areas.
- To promote through armed struggle, coups, or other means the rise of radical-Left or Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Caribbean Basin that will form a core of revolutionary states closely allied to Cuba.
- To transform Cuba--militarily as well as politically--into a second-order power and world-class actor through the acquisition of Soviet weapons and other collaborative ties with the USSR, thereby off-setting the island's small population of 10 million and its limited economic development and lack of material resources. [Ref. 15:p. 167]

Gonzalez believes that Cuba's maximum policy objectives have tended to make for an interventionist imperative--now codified in Cuba's 1976 constitution--since it occurs at the expense of improved relations with the United States. [Ref. 15:p. 167]

The 1976 Cuban Constitution is a strong indication that Cuba's revolutionary policy of the 1960s is alive and well. it also illustrates the degree of influence exercised by Fidel Castro's "megalomania" in Cuban ideology and foreign policy. The 1976 Constitution states that Havana's foreign policy goal is the elimination of all "imperialist" (i.e., U.S.) political, economic and cultural influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Constitution specifically mentions Cuba's commitment to "proletarian

internationalism," support for "wars of national liberation," and the building of world socialism.²

The primary pillar of Cuba's foreign policy is "anti-Americanism" for both ideological and practical reasons. From the early days of the Cuban Revolution, the United States has been a barrier to Castro's political ambitions in the world. Castro has successfully used anti-Americanism to stir up nationalist feelings in the Third World. He exploits this anti-Americanism to further Cuban foreign policy interests, sometimes at the expense of the Third World nations' economic and political development. Anti-Americanism also serves to distract the Cuban population from their own hardships. The regime constantly reminds the Cuban people of the historical frustration caused by their giant neighbor to the north, and the sacrifices made by past Cuban patriots to free Cuba of American domination. This legacy, therefore, justifies the sacrifices demanded by the Cuban government of Cubans today, whether it be fewer consumer goods or dangerous military service abroad.

Besides Castro's personal vision of Cuba as the vanguard of armed revolution in the world, there are bureaucratic forces within Cuba which also support a foreign policy based on armed interventions. These forces have gained influence and momentum in the Cuban decision-making process as the

²For a complete translation of the 1976 Cuban Constitution see Lester A. Sobel (editor), Castro's Cuba in the 1970's, Facts on File, New York, 1978, pp. 167-185.

cubation are institutionalized. Since the early whetitutionalization process gained momentum, factions have become the dominant political hierarchy. The three groups view, and the limited resources of the Cubanment, describes the three factions as the "stas, tas," and "pragmatists." [Ref. 14:]

listal followers of Fidel Castro, some of the early days of the guerrilla strainistista dictatorship. This group consists of members of the 26th of July Movement political elite, who have been rewarded with important positions in the Cuban government are considered to be the most influential group (to date). This is due to Fidel's personal domination of the Cuban government's decision process. Most importantly, the policy of the fidelistas is tilted toward the armed revolution throughout the world, but especially in Latin America and Africa. Their goal is to enhance Cuba's image as a revolutionary vanguard nation. They believe that World interventions will not only cause damage, but will also solidify (and further) their privileged position within the

Cuban government and probably result in increased subsidies from the Eastern Bloc and other "revolutionary" states such as Libya, Iran and Algeria.

The second most powerful group in the decision-making apparatus is the raulistas. The raulistas are members of the professional armed forces and military services. As the top ranking officer in the Cuban Armed Forces or FAR, Fidel Castro's brother, Raul Castro commands the allegiance of officers in the security services and the professional military. This group also supports activist foreign policy, including armed intervention. Their motives vary slightly with those of the fidelistas in that they are more interested in improving the professionalization and experience of the armed forces than in spreading revolution in the Third World. The raulistas are indebted to the Soviets for continued support in the form of economic aid, modern arms, and advanced military technology. The raulistas therefore tend to be more supportive of Soviet objectives in the Third World, especially when this helps them to improve the fighting capability of the professional Cuban military. The armed interventions in Angola, the PDRY, and Nicaragua, not to mention the conflicts and military training missions performed by Cubans throughout the Third World, have succeeded in making the Cuban Armed Forces a major military force. Raulista power extends to Cuba's domestic scene as well [Ref.

14:pp. 68-78] Today, Cuba is by far the most militarized society in Latin America. One out of every twenty Cubans serves in the military or performs a security function. By comparison, one percent of the population of the United States serves in the regular armed forces. Cuba's military effort is relatively 10 or 20 times greater than any other nation in this hemisphere. High ranking Cuban officers occupy many important positions in the Cuban bureaucracy. [Ref. 16:p. 1108] For the raulistas, Cuba's overseas military interventions provide the Cuban armed forces and security services with invaluable combat experience. These Third World conflicts have allowed the Cubans to operate and maintain sophisticated Soviet-made hardware in actual battle conditions, thus allowing them to test and revise doctrine and tactics. An added benefit is that the weapons, ammunition, and fuel used in these conflicts does not come out of the Cuban inventory. This means realistic fighting conditions without the high economic cost normally associated with high intensity combat or training.

The third group, the pragmatists, are made up of technocrats who are more concerned with building Cuba's economy than engaging in costly military overseas interventions. The pragmatists' influence in the Cuban government is, not surprisingly, tied to the performance of the Cuban economy. Needless to say, their influence has waned considerably. Specifically, the drop in sugar prices in the mid-1970s

preceded the drop in influence exercised by the pragmatists. Conversely, the fidelistas and raulistas were able to pursue their objectives thanks to generous amounts of Soviet aid which kept the Cuban economy afloat. The logic behind the pragmatists' decline was simply that during the last decade, the economy has performed poorly while the military and fidelistas have triumphed in Africa, Nicaragua, and until 1983, Grenada. Today, the fidelistas and raulistas control almost 80% of the important decision-making positions in the Cuban government [Ref. 14:p. 73]. However, recent reports have shown the pragmatists may be regaining some of their lost power in an effort to bolster Cuba's poor economic performance. I will address this development later in the thesis.

As the Cuban Revolution became more institutionalized, Fidel Castro was forced to share power with other members of the Government's bureaucratic elite. This is especially true in the field of economic planning and management. Despite the limitations imposed on Castro by the institutionalization process, Fidel continues to play a decisive role in the direction of Cuban foreign policy. In the 1970s, Castro emphasized the benefits of supporting armed struggle over the possibility of improved relations with the United States. (The latter policy is likely to be advocated by more moderate pragmatists, who would by trying to limit military spending and improve the Cuban economy through

trade and investment from the United States.) In late 1975, after Cuba's intervention in Angola was underway, Castro declared that "there never will be relations with the United States" if the "price" had to be Cuba's abandonment of its "solidarity" with anti-imperialist movements in the Third World [Ref. 15:p. 167]. This point should not be underestimated. Castro sees himself as the first successful revolutionary leader in the Western Hemisphere and maintains ambitions to be the leader of the Third World. In Fidel's view, the foundations of the Cuban government's legitimacy is its commitment to revolution in the Third World. Even twenty-seven years after the beginning of the Revolution, the Cuban government feels obligated to maintain the revolutionary mythos. Following a trip to Havana in 1977, Congressman Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, III, stated that "Castro's revolutionary image comes right out of Central Casting." [Ref. 17] Revolutionary Cuban mythology claims that Castro and his guerrillas defeated the well-equipped Batista army with little or no outside help, and implies that Cuba could perform similar miracles throughout the Third World. ³ Revolutionary Cuban folklore continues to depict the Cubans as the guerrilla elite of the world, and promotes the image of Cuban soldiers as the spearhead in the

³For an accurate account of the role of Castro's guerrillas in Cuban Revolution, see Jaime Suchlicki, Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, Charles Scribner's & Sons, 1974, pp. 162-174.

liberation of all of the Third World's oppressed peoples, especially in Africa and Latin America.

Cuba's unique position as the only declared communist state in the Western Hemisphere has long been a cause of great concern to United States' decision-makers. In 1961, Castro claimed that "he had always been a Marxist-Leninist, and would be until the day he died." [Ref. 18:p. 180] Scholars around the world continue to debate the ideological development and present orientation of Fidel Castro. Is Castro a true communist? Or is he merely an opportunist following a particular ideology to assure his primary benefactor, the Soviet Union, of his commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideals? Moreover, how does Castro's ideological orientation affect his perceptions of the world, and the validity of promoting revolution? The evidence of Castro's affinity to Marxism-Leninism is vague and contradictory. Castro has done little to advance revolutionary thought in Latin America in terms of Marxist ideology. Jaime Suchlicki details in his book, Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, the ideological development and transformation of the young Fidel Castro in the decades prior to, and following, his rise to power. According to Suchlicki, Fidel Castro was far from being a Marxist before he came to power in Cuba. Instead, Castro "belonged to Cuba's vague populist political tradition." Earlier, great Cuban patriots such as Jose Marti and Eduardo Chibas had called for an end to political

corruption and the development of a unique and nationalistic identity, but within a democratic framework. [Ref. 18:p. 182] Castro, on the other hand, was "strongly influenced by falangist and fascist ideas while in high school and Marxist-Leninist ideas while at the University of Havana." This background convinced him to break with several fundamental aspects of the teachings of Marti and Chibas. Suchlicki writes:

While Marti and Chibas had envisioned reforms in a democratic framework in a nation politically and economically independent from the United States, they both advocated friendly relations with the "northern colossus." Castro did not. He was anti-U.S. since his student days when he distributed anti-U.S. propaganda in Bogota. As Castro and part of the Cuban revolutionary leadership perceived it, the possibility of a repetition of earlier U.S. interventionist policies in Cuba was a major deterrent to achieving profound socioeconomic changes in the island and the consolidation of Castro's personal rule--and Castro was committed to both of these goals. Perhaps because of his anti-Americanism, and particularly his conviction that a major revolution with himself in absolute control could not be undertaken within Cuba's political framework and in harmony with the United States, he broke with the Marti-Chibas tradition and led a totalitarian and anti-American revolution. [Ref. 18:p. 182]

Marxist-Leninism was a convenient tool for Castro to gain the political support of the Cuban people and more importantly the economic and military assistance of the Soviet Union, while justifying his own position as the sole leader of the Cuban Revolution.

Other scholars have also found it difficult to corroborate Cuba's Marxist-Leninist credentials. Sheldon Liss, a well-known diplomatic historian, recently examined Marxist thought in Latin America and found the Cubans to be

only minor contributors. Slightly over ten percent of Liss's book, Marxist Thought in Latin America, was devoted to Cuba. [Ref. 19] This is a paltry amount considering the Cuban regime has claimed to be a Marxist-Leninist state since December of 1961. In fact, the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) was an afterthought of the Cuban revolutionaries rather than a vanguard party. Liss notes:

Revolutionary Left critics have accused the Cubans of turning from theory as a guide to action, to action as a means of building theory, and have noted that living intellectuals did not play a major role in the early stages of the revolution. [Ref. 19:p. 270]

Liss's criticism doesn't stop there. He later writes, that from a theoretical perspective, the success of the Cuban revolution meant that "Castro and his comrades proved Marx, Engles, and Lenin wrong" [Ref. 19:p. 239].

Jorge Dominquez claims that, "the Cuban Revolution is still difficult to explain from a Marxist-Leninist perspective and that no such serious analysis by Marxist scholars exists." [Ref. 20:p. 107]

While we may never know the depth of Fidel Castro's belief in Marxism-Leninism, an entire generation of Cubans have been indoctrinated with Marxist-Leninist teachings. It is difficult to ascertain what effect this has had on the Cuban population's attitude toward fighting overseas in the name of "proletarian internationalism" or enduring economic deprivation at home. The Mariel exodus of 130,000 Cubans to Florida in 1980 indicates that apparently a significant

section of the population does not accept this ideology.

Cuba's commi to the Soviet interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ogy, whether genuine or feigned, allows Castro to easily pursue activist goals that he would likely pursen if he had not declared that the Cuban Revolution ided by Marxism-Leninism. The first and most obviousfit that Cuba achieved by such a declaration was cties with the Soviet Union. Following the Bay of invasion and the Organization of American States (Cade embargo of Cuba, it was clear to Castro that only w could guarantee Cuba's security, keep the island'smy alive with massive aid, and build the Cuban militarye level of a regional power.

The second motg force was Fidel Castro's ambition to make Cuba a mafor in the world revolutionary movement, with himsel the helm. Castro's adherence to Marxism-Leninism a him to conceal his personal ambitions behind the of "proletarian internationalism." This fundamental 1st conviction states that national interests must be side for the interests of the world communist movemente principle of "proletarian internationalism" was gisly used by the Soviets during the Brezhnev years tq the real motives behind Soviet interventions in Clovakia in 1968 and the Third World in the 1970s. By; this principle as a justification

for Cuban military activities in areas distant from Cuban territory and security, the Cuban regime can confront United States' interests globally.

Having the necessary ideological and institutional motives to justify Castro's dream of worldwide revolution and the demise of the United States is by itself insufficient to make that dream a reality. Other nations, wealthier and more fanatic, such as Libya and Iran, have similar revolutionary motives (although not Marxist-Leninist), yet their missions abroad have achieved less impressive results than Cuba. Ironically, this is because Cuba's geographic, demographic, and resource limitations forced Castro to augment his resources and coordinate his ambitions with his principle benefactor and defender--The Soviet Union.

B. THE SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONSHIP

In Rose E Gottemoeller's study, Transforming Clients into Surrogates: The Soviet Experience, the author describes Cuba as "an almost ideal surrogate" of the Soviet Union [Ref. 2:p. 2]. She believes Cuba maintains all of the conditions required for a strong client relationship and more. The conditions are:

1. Proximity of Cuba to a major opponent of the Soviet Union.
2. Cuba's reliance on the Soviet Union for strategic goods.

3. A declared Marxist-Leninist regime firmly in control of Cuba.
4. Existence of well-developed economy and professional military establishment. [Ref. 2:p. 2]

Besides these four conditions, two additional factors contribute to Cuba being more of a surrogate than just a Soviet client.

The first condition is Cuba's regional and international leadership aspirations, which permit Havana to align itself with Moscow in order to realize its own ambitions. This alliance is necessary for Cuba to augment its military and political power.

The second condition stems from Cuba's position as a privileged ally of the Soviet Union. As Cuba performs its "internationalist" duty in a way that benefits Soviet strategic policy, it is rewarded with increased Soviet economic and political aid. [Ref. 2:p. 4]

The economic stranglehold Moscow has over the Cuban economy is quite impressive. Cumulative Soviet economic aid to Cuba from 1961 to 1982 increased significantly. In 1970, the total amount of nonrepayable aid and trade subsidies was \$3.568 billion. By 1975 the figure had increased to a total of \$7.099 billion. By 1982, the amount of aid Cuba received from the Soviets climbed to \$29.246 billion. The amount of Soviet economic aid to Cuba continues to grow along with Havana's massive debt to Moscow and other members of the Soviet bloc. [Ref. 21:pp. B1, 28]

urn for their investment in Cuba, the Soviets
restrategic base less than 90 miles from the United
Staong with a trained military willing to support
actviet military actions in Africa, the Middle East
andAmerica. Cuba continually supports Soviet policy
in orld forums, and assists the Soviets in espionage
act against the United States and its allies. Havana
hasroven to be a valuable ally in Moscow's ceaseless
eff steal United States and Western military
tec[Ref. 22:pp. 25, 35].

ons between Havana and Moscow were seriously
strn the 1960s. The initial euphoria of Castro's
trier Batista, followed by the successful defense of
theion in 1961 against the CIA-backed Bay of Pigs
invtempt, gave the Cuban leadership a false sense of
powsecurity. However, after the humiliating experi-
enceaving the Soviet Union withdraw its strategic
misrom Cuba following the October 1962 Cuban Missile
Crishtout even consulting the Cuban regime, Cuban-
Sovitions began to strain.

early to mid 1960's, in an effort to demonstrate
Cubaendence from Soviet doctrine and control and to
revithe Cuban Revolution, Castro attempted to spread
his revolution in Latin America and Africa without
Sovistance or approval. In Cuba, Castro continued to
isol-Moscow members of the government, while abroad,

he described the pro-Moscow communist parties in Latin America and elsewhere as "pseudo-revolutionaries" because of their adherence to the strategy of "peaceful roads toward Socialism." Castro, Guevara and the other activists revolutionary leaders in Cuba wanted to promote revolution in several Latin American nations simultaneously, using armed rural guerrilla tactics, thus creating an uncontrollable situation for the United States and the Latin American regimes in power. The long established pro-Moscow communist parties in these countries were almost completely bypassed by the Cuban strategy. Castro's revolutionary strategy immediately placed Cuba on a collision course with Soviet foreign policy. According to Jiri Valenta:

Castro was in favor of a "genuinely revolutionary road," criticized the Soviet Union for dealing with capitalist governments in Latin America. In adhering to Ernesto "Guevara's concept of guerrilla/peasantry insurgency, Castro's strategy in the Caribbean Basin and elsewhere in Latin America in the 1960's, contradicted and even challenged the Soviet doctrine allowing for diversified roads to socialism. The Soviets in the late 1960's were unwilling and unable to sponsor Castro's call to create "one or two," and even "four or five more Vietnams" in the United States in Latin America. As a result, S-Soviet relations in the late 1960's were unsatisfactory and at times strained almost to the breaking point. [Ref. 23:p. 201]

After the success of the Guevara mission in Bolivia in 1967, the U.S. decided to pressure Cuba economically until it modified its dangerous behavior. Oil supplies from the Soviet Union to Cuba were significantly reduced, bringing the Cuban economy to a virtual standstill. Because of Moscow's economic pressure, and confronted by ten years

of promoting revolutionary activity in the Third World without success, Castro finally reached an understanding with the Soviets in the early 1970s. A few years later, when Moscow was expanding its influence in Africa and the Middle East, Soviet and Cuban objectives in the Third World merged. Most importantly, Cuba showed increased willingness to become a full and active partner in military interventions. The cooperation achieved between the Soviets and Cubans in the Angolan intervention signaled that the Soviet-Cuban relationship had matured. Thus, not only had Cuban and Soviet interests in the Third World converged; both nations had the necessary (and complementary) resources to make the interventions practicable. That is, Cuba was allowed to be a second rate military power in areas which coincided with Soviet strategic interests.

As Gottemoeller points out:

The Soviet Union had built up its airlift and sealift potential since the 1960s and had acquired experience in using both in the Middle East. In general, the Soviets seemed to have a better developed conception of the logistics and command and control requirements. [Ref. 2:p. 15]

For the Cuban's part, she notes:

The Cubans complemented the Soviet command and support structure with an armed force that had trained on Soviet equipment. Annual Cuban imports of arms from the Soviet Union had tripled between 1970 and 1975, and the Cubans made use of the new arms and material to modernize their army. [Ref. 2:p. 15]

Ironically, as the Cuban armed forces were expanded and modernized with new Soviet equipment, their need inside Cuba

decreased. Considering the post-Vietnam isolationism in the United States, Watergate, and the policies of the Carter Administration, the threat of United States invasion or military attack against Cuba grew increasingly remote. The unwillingness of the United States to become involved in Third World conflicts also emboldened the Soviets to intervene in conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. However, the Soviets thought it better to use effective surrogates in order to mask their own involvement and minimize the chances of superpower confrontation.

The Soviets also needed the Cuban Expeditionary Force for more practical reasons. The history of Soviet involvement in Africa and the Middle East has neither been wholly successful nor consistent (in terms of the methods it has used to win allies), with Moscow's experience in Egypt from 1955 to 1974 serving as a classic example. The Soviets realized that they needed other methods of influencing client states. By using racially acceptable, culturally adept, and ideologically committed surrogate forces such as the Cubans, the Soviets hoped to build Marxist-Leninist infrastructures in place of personalist regimes common in the Third World.

As far as active participation in Third World conflicts, the Soviets have shown a reluctance to get too deeply involved militarily, preferring instead to provide arms and small advisory contingents to their chosen faction. In

Angola, this would have been insufficient to achieve the desired objective--securing the Marxist-led MPLA's control of the country. At the start of the Angolan civil war, the MPLA was not only poorly trained and ill-equipped, it was numerically inferior to the other two factions and definitely no match for the experienced South African forces invading from the south. Soviet arms and advisors had to be augmented by a large competent combat force capable of utilizing this equipment along with modern military tactics. In Angola, the Cuban combat forces proved to be the linchpin that filled the void.

Six years earlier, in 1969, the Soviets were placed in a similar dilemma when they supported the Nigerian government during the Biafran conflict. Unwilling to provide the necessary military personnel to operate new MIGs sent to Lagos, the Soviets searched for competent surrogates. When it became obvious that the Nigerians were unable to fly and service the advanced MIG aircraft without outside help, Egyptian pilots were brought in to assist them. The result was inept Egyptians pilots bombing civilian targets. [Ref. 24:p. 8] Hence, after experiences like the Nigerian Civil War in 1969 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Soviets were in need of a competent ally willing to commit their military forces to train, service, and, if necessary, fight with Soviet-supplied arms for Third World client states. The Cubans later proved to be an ideal choice.

The combination of Soviet willingness to supply and support surrogates in Third World conflicts, and Cuba's ability and enthusiasm to operate, maintain and fight with advanced Soviet equipment overseas, allows Castro to pursue his maximalist foreign policy objectives in what is known as "cooperative intervention." Today, Cuba is allowed to pursue its strategic interests within the parameters of what the Soviets consider the interests of international socialism, i.e., fulfilling Moscow's strategic vision.

The Soviet-Cuban relationship has existed for the past twenty-six years. Today, both sides understand each others' goals and tactics, and level of tolerance. While Castro has tested the Soviets patience a number of times, he has not transcended the parameters of what the Soviets consider their "strategic interests" since 1967. Castro realizes that, because Cuba depends so heavily on Soviet economic aid to its economy afloat, the Soviet Union can force Havana to "operate within the parameters set by the Kremlin." [Ref. 25:p. 225]

IV. RESOURCES

Havana's commitment to spread revolution throughout the Third World does not, by itself, constitute a major threat to the strategic interests of the United States. Other radical Third World nations such as Vietnam, North Korea, Iran and Libya also despise the West, specifically the United States, and have tried to challenge Western interests globally. Luckily for the West, these same nations have been singularly limited in what they can do in pursuit of these objectives by geographic isolation, poverty, poor leadership, and most importantly, limited military resources. Simply stated, these radical regimes do not have, to date, the capability to further their "anti-imperialist" goals on a global basis. Cuba, as a Third World nation, requires substantial resources to implement its military and paramilitary strategy in order to conduct major military operations abroad. Confronted with limited natural resources and a population of less than ten million, Cuba must carefully structure its military, paramilitary and intelligence services in order to overcome those limitations. This section will briefly cover some of the more important organizations used by the Cubans to perform Third World interventions--with particular emphasis on the Cuban Armed Forces and security services.

Like most communist nations, a disproportionate amount of Cuban wealth and population is allocated to the military and security services. Today, Cuba is the most militarized nation in the Western Hemisphere. Overall, 2.3% of the Cuban population is in the regular armed forces and approximately one out of every 20 Cubans performs a security related mission. Neighboring Mexico, with seven times Cuba's population, maintains a defense force only one half the size of the Cuban armed forces. [Ref. 16:p. 1108]

The effort to change the Cuban Armed Forces from a small home defense force to a major military power with a global interventionist capability has been a long and costly program for the Cuban Government--not to mention their Soviet sponsors.⁴ A brief look at Table 4 shows the increase in arms transfers and the cost of this transformation.

A. THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES

In addition to the massive military aid supplied to Cuba from the Soviet Union, the Cubans have, with Soviet training, developed their armed forces so that such military aid could best be utilized. Advanced military hardware does not automatically translate into effective military capability, as Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Israel's other foes have

⁴For an in-depth study of the growth of the Cuba Armed Forces see Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Armed Forces and Foreign Relations," in Blasier and Mesa-Lago (eds.), Cuba in the World, Pittsburgh University Press, 1979, pp. 53-86.

TABLE 4

AN IMPORTS 1970-1982
(million current value)

| Year | Total Imports | Arms as % of Total Imports |
|------|---------------|----------------------------|
| 1970 | 1310 | 1.5 |
| 1971 | 1390 | 2.2 |
| 1972 | 1300 | 5.4 |
| 1973 | 1780 | 3.9 |
| 1974 | 2690 | 2.2 |
| 1975 | 3767 | 1.9 |
| 1976 | 3879 | 3.4 |
| 1977 | 4362 | 2.3 |
| 1978 | 4751 | 7.4 |
| 1979 | 5089 | 5.1 |
| 1980 | 6409 | 4.1 |
| 1981 | 6602 | 12.1 |
| 1982 | 6916 | 14.1 |

NOTE: ¹The US¹ied nearly 100% of all arms,
with otrsaw Pact members also contributing.

Source: RGottemoeller, Transforming Clients in
Sus: The Soviet Experience, Rand,
N-SDP, 1985, p. 24

discovered oveyears. In the early 1960s, the Cuban armed forces wrgely a militia force composed of the National Revolvy Militia (MNR) and the Committees for the Defense oRevolution (CDR). Following the ill-fated Bay of Pasion in 1961, Castro was able to convince the Sovind the Cuban people, of the need for a large convent military. Consequently, Havana strengthened t^h and air force at the expense of MNR, and transferre^ost capable MNR leaders and soldiers to the regular arrile the emphasis in the early 1960s was

and defend foreign attack, these forces were essential in increasing Castro's control over various parts of the country. The result of Cuba's militarization is a chain of command throughout Cuban society and what Dominguez calls the "Civic-Soldier." Castro (the most insignificant bureaucratic structure), military officers (both fidelistas and raulistas), and majors, thus providing the Cuban military with could be a tremendous source of manpower if it is needed diverted from civilian tasks to operations.

Cuban forces are known collectively as the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), or Revolutionary Armed Forces. Missions of the Cuban Armed Forces are to defend the territory, to maintain internal security, provide aid and/or combat assistance to friendly forces or groups, i.e., power projection and military capability.

FAR's total manpower is estimated at 161,500 including an army of 130,000, a navy of 13,500 and an air force of 18,000 [Re: 147]. Cuba's reserve capability is estimated with nearly all Cubans receiving some military training. A brief glance at Table 5 shows the growth of the military over the past twenty-five years. The three armed services within the FAR are organized in various types of warfare specialty. While

TABLE 5

CUBAN POPULATION AND DEFENSE STATISTICS 1960-1986

| YEAR | POPULATION | TOTAL ACTIVE ARMED FORCES | ARMY | NAVY | AIR FORCE* | EST. DEF. BUDGET |
|-----------|------------|------------------------------|---------|--------|------------|------------------|
| 1985-86 | 10,150,000 | 161,500 | 130,000 | 13,500 | 18,000 | \$1.577 BN |
| 1984-85 | 10,000,000 | 153,000 | 125,000 | 12,000 | 16,000 | \$1.357 BN |
| 1983-84 | 10,000,000 | 153,000 | 125,000 | 12,000 | 16,000 | N.A. |
| 1982-83 | 9,900,000 | 127,500 | 100,000 | 11,500 | 16,000 | \$1.252 BN |
| 1981-82** | 9,800,000 | 227,000 | 200,000 | 11,000 | 16,000 | \$1.271 BN |
| 1980-81 | 9,900,000 | 206,000 | 180,000 | 13,000 | 16,000 | \$1.126 BN |
| 1979-80 | 9,870,000 | 184,000 | 160,000 | 9,000 | 20,000 | \$1.100 BN |
| 1978-79 | 9,750,000 | 159,000 | 130,000 | 9,000 | 20,000 | N.A. |
| 1977-78 | 9,580,000 | 150,000 | 130,000 | 9,000 | 20,000 | \$0.764 M |
| 1976-77 | 9,420,000 | 173,000 | 140,000 | 9,000 | 20,000 | N.A. |
| 1975-76 | 9,290,000 | 117,000 | 90,000 | 7,000 | 20,000 | N.A. |
| 1974-75 | 9,110,000 | 116,500 | 90,000 | 6,500 | 20,000 | N.A. |
| 1973-74 | 8,850,000 | 108,500 | 90,000 | 6,500 | 12,000 | N.A. |
| 1972-73 | 8,550,000 | 108,000 | 90,000 | 6,000 | 12,000 | N.A. |
| 1971-72 | | 105,000 | 90,000 | 6,000 | 12,000 | \$ 290 M |
| 1970-71 | | 109,500 | 90,000 | 7,500 | 12,000 | |
| 1965-66 | | 116,000 | 90,000 | 6,000 | 20,000 | |
| 1960-61 | | 40,000 | 40,000 | N.A. | N.A. | |

* Includes air defense forces

** Reservists on active duty were included this year
(60,000 in the army)

N.A. Data not available

Sources: The New York Times and the IISS The Military Balance

the Cuban army will always be the backbone of the FAR, the navy and air force have been equipped with modern ships and combat aircraft since the early 1970s. The following is a detailed look at the development of the three major branches of the Cuban armed forces. The primary source for this information is International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance from 1970 to 1985.

1. The Cuban Army

The army has consistently consumed about 4/5ths of the FAR's manpower. Beginning in 1970, the Soviets began to supply large quantities of tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) to the Cuban Army to transform the army from an infantry force to a semi-mechanized force. The PT-76 light tank and the T-55 medium tank were first introduced into the Cuban inventory in 1970, along with over 200 APCs transferred the same year. By 1985, the Cuban army was composed of 1 armored division, 3 mechanized divisions along with 13 infantry divisions. The infantry divisions are usually manned at about 60% of their full strength, with the other 40% coming from the reserves. All Cuban combat units, divisions, battalions, etc., are smaller in the number of men assigned than similar American or Soviet units. This requires the Cubans to modify Soviet tactical doctrine in order to conform to the smaller units. Combat tactics will be discussed in the following chapter.

The Soviet Union continued gradually to build up the Cuban armed forces throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Following Havana's active military role in Africa in the mid-1970s, Moscow drastically increased its shipments of sophisticated weapons to Cuba. For example, Soviet tank and APC transfers to Cuba remained at a low yet steady level until 1977, when the Soviets first delivered 50 T-62 medium tanks to the FAR. In 1978, 200 more APCs were delivered to Havana along with 15 FROG surface-to-surface missiles, and an unknown number of ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns and SA-7 Grail SAMs. The timing of these deliveries, occurring before and after Castro's major military interventions in Syria, the PDRY, Angola and Ethiopia, may indicate that the Cuban armed forces were unable to absorb the equipment in the intervening years because too high a percentage of their armored forces were deployed overseas. The Cubans were already being supplied indirectly by the Soviets in the Middle East, Angola and Ethiopia. It should be remembered that Cubans training and fighting in Africa and the Middle East were doing so with equipment supplied by Moscow to the local regime. Cuban stocks of arms and ammunition are not affected by Havana's military ventures overseas. After these interventions were accomplished, the Soviets resumed supplying major quantities of arms directly to Havana. The new deliveries in 1977-78 may have been a Soviet reward for services rendered. [Ref. 2:p. 19] Another explanation for

Cuba not receiving substantial shipments of Soviet arms in the 1970s may be that Soviet arms stockpiles, airlift and sealift could not support simultaneous efforts in the Middle East (1973-74), Africa (1974-78) and to Cuba. In the mid to late 1970s, Cuban officials publicly acknowledged the new weapons deliveries in speeches. In his report to the Cuban Communist Party Congress in December 1975, Fidel indicated that the FAR would be supplied with a "considerable amount of even more modern combat equipment characterized by increased firepower, maneuverability and automation." [Ref. 27:p. 25] Raul Castro, the highest-ranking officer of the FAR, declared less than a year later that the Cuban armed forces were being outfitted with "new and modern arms which will be viewed by our people for the first time." [Ref. 27:p. 25]

In the late 1970s and 1980s, Cuba became one of the leading recipients of Soviet arms. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has placed Cuba eighth in the world among the 20 largest Third World major-weapon importing countries during the 1979 to 1984 reporting period. Havana received 3.7 percent of the total Third World weapons imports during that period. [Ref. 28:p. 351]

The history of Soviet military transfers to Cuba is a strong indicator of Havana's ability to absorb and maintain large quantities of advanced Soviet hardware. It also symbolizes Moscow's confidence in the Cuban political

leadership, and the professionalization of the Cuban Armed Forces. This is critical for these transfers to continue. Unlike many other Third World recipients of Soviet military equipment, Cuba is unable to pay for any of this lavish military aid. Given this, it seems clear that the Soviets transfer advanced military equipment to Cuba with the belief that Castro will use it to further Cuban foreign policy objectives within the parameters of Soviet strategic interests.

This accommodation between Moscow and Havana seems to be working well in the 1980s. The Cuban defense budget grew by 26% from 1984 to 1985. [Ref. 29:p. 36] Only massive Soviet economic and military aid could make such a growth rate possible. See Table 6 for a list of Cuban ground equipment.

2. The Cuban Navy

The Cuban navy consists of 13,500 officers and sailors, of which 8,500 are conscripts. Although the Navy is considered primarily a coastal defense force, it has recently acquired a blue-water capability. The Navy's most lethal assets are the three new-construction Foxtrot-class submarines transferred by the Soviets to Cuba from 1979 to 1982. These diesel-electric submarines are far more capable than the German World War II models which were so successful in interdicting Allied shipping in the Caribbean in 1942. Besides their ability to carry 22 torpedos, the Foxtrots can

TABLE 6

SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE CUBAN ARMY

TANKS: 325 T-34, 350 T-54/-55, 160 T-62; light tanks: 55 PT-76

APC'S: 75 BRDM-1/-2; 50 BMP; 500 BTR-40/-60/-152

ARTILLERY: 1,400: incl M-1942 76mm, 85mm, 100 SU-100 SP, 122mm, M-46 130mm, D-1, D-2, ML-20 152mm

MOBILE ROCKET LAUNCHERS: BM-21 122mm, BM-14 140mm, BM-24 240mm

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES: 65 FROG-4/7

MORTARS: M-43 120mm

ANTI-TANK WEAPONS: 600: M-1943 57mm, M-45 85mm, T-12 100mm, 57mm RCL and Sagger and Snapper guided missiles

MISC: 60 JS-2 heavy and T-34/85 main battle tanks

Source: The Military Balance: 1985-1986,
International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1985

also carry up to 44 naval mines and numerous combat swimmers for covert mining and demolition operations far from Cuban shores. The Cuban navy recently received two new Koni-class frigates from the Soviets. While these frigates are mainly used for anti-submarine warfare, they also have a limited shore-bombardment, anti-surface, and anti-aircraft capability. The newly constructed Koni frigates have 2,000 nautical mile range, which would allow them to support Cuban operations in Africa and the entire Caribbean Basin. The Navy has numerous missile and torpedo patrol craft, including at

least 18 OSA missile boats, the same type of craft which proved effective in combat in both the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, and in the current Iran-Iraq war. Even so, it is unlikely that these missile patrol boats would engage in blue-water operations outside of Cuban territorial waters. However, since the Soviets have transferred these OSA-class crafts to many Third World clients, it is conceivable that Cuban crews could use indigenous OSA PTGs if the client nation requested assistance from Havana. The Cuban Navy has a small but increasingly effective amphibious warfare capability, spearheaded by its acquisition of two Polnocny-class LSM landing ships. The Polnocnys are each capable of carrying 180 tons, five tanks, or 250 combat troops [Ref. 30:p. 116]. These ships are also armed for supporting an amphibious assault. Havana's mine warfare threat must also be taken into consideration, since the offensive and defensive mine warfare capability of the Cuban Navy has increased considerably since 1978 [Ref. 31:p. 1064]. The Cubans are able to contribute to Soviet mining operations distant from its shores with its merchant ships, surface warfare craft, and its Foxtrot submarines. In the Caribbean Basin, areas where this capability could pose a serious threat to United States' strategic interests are the Panama Canal and U.S. ports in the Gulf of Mexico [Ref. 32].

Recent unconfirmed reports claim that in 1985-86, the Cuban Navy received two more Sonya-class minesweepers

and four Stenka-class patrol boats from the Soviet Union [Ref. 29:p. 36]. If true, this would be the first transfer by the Soviets of the Stenka-class ships to the Cuban Navy. Bulgaria, who received three Stenka-class patrol boats in 1977, is the only other recipient of this Soviet-built fast attack craft. The Soviets have 90 more Stenkas in their inventory. [Ref. 33:p. 79] The Cuban Navy also operates numerous intelligence and support ships for Cuban and Soviet naval operations in the Caribbean (see Table 7).

3. The Cuban Air Force

The Cuban air force and air defense forces incorporate all air defense forces other than those engaged in the immediate air defense of the Army and Navy. There are collectively known as the Defensa Anti-Aerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria, or more commonly DAAFAR. DAAFAR operates and maintains a variety of modern Soviet aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft guns not only in Cuba, but also in a number of Third World countries. Havana's air force is believed to have a sufficient number of skilled and professional pilots and support personnel to fly and maintain various types of Soviet combat fighter-bombers, helicopters, transport, and training aircraft. Cuba's ground-attack and helicopter pilots currently receive extensive training and combat experience in Angola, Ethiopia, the People's Democratic of Yemen, Nicaragua and numerous other smaller conflicts. With the Soviet transfer

TABLE 7
CUBAN NAVY

Personnel: 13,500, (8,500 Conscripts)

| Ship Type | Number |
|----------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| <u>Submarines</u> | |
| Foxtrot-class (SS), diesel/attack | 3 |
| Whiskey-class (SS), diesel/attack (used for training) | 1 |
| <u>Surface Combatants</u> | |
| KONI-class (FF), frigate | 2 |
| <u>Patrol Craft (large)</u> | |
| SO-1 | 5 |
| KRONSHADT | 2 |
| OSA-1 (4 STYX surface-to-surface missiles each) | 5 |
| OSA-II (4 STYX surface-to-surface missiles each) | 13 |
| KOMAR (2 STYX surface-to-surface missiles each) | 5 |
| <u>Fast Attack Craft (Torpedo)</u> | |
| TURYA | 9 |
| P-6 | 4 |
| P-4 | 4 |
| <u>Fast Attack Craft (Patrol)</u> | |
| ZHUK | 25 |
| Coastal Patrol Craft | 12 |
| <u>Mine Warfare</u> | |
| YEVGENYA | 10 |
| SONYA | 2 |
| <u>Amphibious Warfare</u> | |
| POLNOCNY (LSM) | 2 |
| T-4 (LCM) | 7 |

Source: The Military Balance: 1985-1986,
International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1985

of the MIG-21 in 1965, Cuba became the first Latin American nation with a supersonic fighter-bomber aircraft [Ref. 34:p. 216]. Since the early 1970s, the Air Force has been modernized, and now consists of over 250 combat aircraft, with 53 MIG-23s recently added to the inventory. The Cuban air defense forces also received SA-3 and SA-6 systems to upgrade their extensive air defense coverage. Besides operating, maintaining, and training select Third World allies in the proper use of this equipment, the Cuban air defense system is a formidable barrier to punitive strikes by United States' air forces. It is likely that Cuba's air defense network would cause serious losses for American aircraft trying to neutralize Cuban bases and military installations early in any conventional war (see Tables 8 and 9).

The United States and its regional allies should be concerned by the threat posed by the Cuba Air Force's ability to interdict shipping and provide close air support to advancing ground forces. In May of 1980, Cuban MIGs sank a Bahamian Coast Guard Boat, "The Flamingo" in Bahamian territorial waters without provocation. Four of the Flamingo's crew were killed. [Ref. 35:p. 11] The combat range of the Cuban Air Force has been greatly expanded following its acquisition of three squadrons of the advanced MIG-23 fighter-bomber.

TABLE 8
CUBAN AIR FORCE

Personnel: 18,000 including air defense forces (11,000 conscripts)

| Number/Squadron Type | Aircraft Type | # of Aircraft |
|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------|
| 3 Fighter-Ground Attack | MIG-23BN (Flogger F) | 36 |
| 1 Fighter Ground Attack | MIG-17 | 15 |
| 1 Interceptor | MIG-23E | 15 |
| 2 Interceptor | MIG-21F | 30 |
| 3 Interceptor | MIG-21PFM | 34 |
| 2 Interceptor | MIG-21PFMA | 20 |
| 8 Interceptor | MIG-21BC's | 100 |
| 8 Helicopter | MI-4 | 60 |
| | MIG-8 (20 Armed) | 40 |
| | MI-24 Hind D | 18 |
| 4 Transport | IL-14 | 16 |
| | AN-2 | 35 |
| | AN-24 | 3 |
| | AN-26 | 22 |
| | YAK-40 | 4 |
| Civilian Airline | IL-76 | 1 |
| | IL-62 | 10 |
| | TU-154 | 5 |

Source: The Military Balance: 1985-1986,
International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1985

TABLE 9
CUBAN AIR DEFENSE

| Number of Sites | Number/Type of Weapons |
|-----------------|------------------------------|
| 37 | 28/SA-2 9/SA-3 12/SA-6 |

In addition to the above, the following antiaircraft weapons exist in the Cuban inventory:

1,500 antiaircraft guns, including:

- ZU-23
- 37mm
- 57mm
- 85mm
- 100mm (towed)
- ZSU-23-4 (23mm)
- M-53 (Twin)/BTR 60P (30mm)
- SA-7 (MSL)
- SA-9 (MSL)

While the Cuban Air Force maintains a sufficient number of medium-range transports for Caribbean operations, it lacks an adequate long-range airlift capability. Cuba's transport aircraft consist mainly of AN-2, AN-24 and AN-26 passenger aircraft with a limited paratroop capability. These smaller transports are capable of ferrying Cuban combat troops with only light infantry weapons and mortars. For large-scale interventions such as the 1975 Angolan expedition, Cuba must depend on the Soviet military airlift (VTA) for air transport, Soviet merchant ships, or its own merchant marine, to move heavier equipment such as artillery, tanks, APCs, and large numbers of troops.

DAAFAR, like the Army and Navy, is organized into three air defense zones, Western, Central, and Eastern. The Western Air Zone, which includes Havana, is the most important zone and is believed to contain two interceptor, two fighter-bomber, one fighter/ground attack and two transport squadrons. All of the DAAFAR's training elements are believed to be located in the Western Air Zone. The Central Air Zone contains four interceptor squadrons, four fighter-bomber squadrons, one fighter/ground-attack and one transport squadrons. Little is known about the Eastern Air Zone, but given the fact that the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo is located in eastern Cuba, a large number of combat aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles and guns are probably stationed in the Eastern Air Zone. [Ref. 36:p. 217]

In terms of education, morale, and training, the officers and enlisted in the Cuban Armed Forces are the best in Latin America. The Defense Intelligence Agency's Handbook of the Cuban Armed Forces, describes the Cuban soldier in the following terms:

The Cuban soldiers are literate and well trained in their specialty. They are politically indoctrinated, well disciplined and loyal. They are accustomed to simple living conditions. [Ref. 37:p. 2-11]

Officers are characterized as:

. . . educated, highly motivated, heavily indoctrinated, well trained and accustomed to nonpretentious living conditions. Those who are in their twenties probably have attended military schools since their teenage years, and they are used to an atmosphere of unquestioned obedience. The officer is probably a member of either the Union of Young Communists (UJC) or its parent organization, the

Cuban Communist Party (PCC), and is a respected member of the community. [Ref. 37:p. 2-12]

In summary, for a nation its size, the Cuban Armed Forces' ability to fulfill its mission of home defense and support for select clients in the Third World is excellent. In conventional warfare, the Cuban capabilities are impressive and constantly improving. Adrian English, a specialist on the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces for Jane's, summarizes the Cuban military in these terms:

While the old pre-revolutionary Cuban Army and Navy were among the most militarily unimpressive forces in Latin America, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias constitute the most formidable armed force in the region . . . providing an effective deterrent to any temptation to armed intervention in Cuba itself, even by a major power such as the United States and with a proven combat record in recent post-colonial wars in Africa and elsewhere. [Ref. 38:p. 150]

B. INTELLIGENCE AND PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

Besides the uniformed personnel in the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, or FAR, the Cubans have an extensive intelligence and paramilitary apparatus. Havana maintains a number of clandestine services which are responsible for intelligence and propaganda operations, in addition to supporting actively Havana's revolutionary allies around the world. Most Third World dictatorships have intelligence services to uncover and crush internal opposition to their regimes. Cuba's intelligence service is unique in that its mission, besides internal security, is to work worldwide and operate closely with Soviet bloc intelligence services.

Jeffrey T. Richelson, a noted scholar of both Western and Soviet bloc intelligence organizations, notes that the Soviet use of the Cuban intelligence services to augment the capability of the Soviet intelligence agencies is consistent with Soviet practices around the world. [Ref. 39:p. 205]

The Cuban Intelligence services provide Moscow with more than just increased resources devoted to intelligence collection and covert operations in the Western Hemisphere. The Cuban services are sometimes able to operate in countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia which are diplomatically off limits to the Soviets. The Soviets have also employed the Cuban services to perform certain "dirty jobs" such as assassination and drug smuggling, which allows Moscow to deny involvement should the perpetrators be apprehended. [Ref. 39:p. 206]

In return for helping the Soviets, the Cubans have received the necessary equipment, training and contacts to transform the Cuban intelligence services from a small organization dedicated to domestic surveillance into a major intelligence network active worldwide. Today the Cubans maintain three separate intelligence and security organizations operated by the Ministry of the Interior, one security service within the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and two services under the direct control of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee.

The Ministry of the Interior, headed by its new director, General Jose Arbantes Fernandez, operates the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI--Direccion General de Inteligencia), the Department of State Security (DSE--Departamento de Seguridad del Estado), and the Directorate of Special Operations (DOE--Direccion de Operaciones Especiales). The main Cuban intelligence service responsible for foreign intelligence collection is the DGI. The DGI's director, Jose Mendez Cominches, replaced the previous DGI chief, Manuel Pinero Losada, in 1971. This change of DGI directors was part of a major reorganization of the DGI, which greatly increased Soviet control and influence of DGI operations. [Ref. 39:pp. 210-211]

The DGI has six divisions divided into two categories: the Operational Divisions and the Support Divisions. The Operational Divisions are the Political/Economic Intelligence Division, the External Counterintelligence Division, and the Military Intelligence Division. The DGI's Support Divisions are the Technical Support Division, also known as the M-1 Division, the Information Division, and the Preparation Division. [Ref. 39:p. 211]

The DGI's Political/Economic Intelligence Division, like the KGB, is divided into four sections: 1) Eastern Europe, 2) the United States, Canada and Mexico Section, 3) Western Europe, and 4) the African, Asian and Latin American Section. The External Counterintelligence Division of the

DGI operates against Cuban exiles (primarily in the United States), and against foreign intelligence services. The DGI's Military Intelligence Division operates against the armed forces of the United States, NATO and other select nations. Given the high priority the Soviet Union places on acquiring Western military technology, it is likely that this unit is active in the theft of NATO military secrets and hardware. There exists documented evidence of DGI agents operating out of Cuban embassies in Western Europe, especially against the armed forces of Great Britain, Spain, France and Italy.

The Technical Support Division makes it possible for the DGI to function like any other major intelligence service. It provides the sophisticated communications and espionage equipment, including microfilm processing, codes, and facilities for the production of false passports and other documents. The Information Division processes and analyzes the enormous volume of information collected by the DGI's field agents and technical collection assets. Little is known of (or can be said about) the functions of the Preparation Division at the unclassified level. [Ref. 39:p. 211]

Overall, the quality of the DGI's operations are believed to be quite impressive. According to another author and expert on the KGB, John Barron, the KGB considers the DGI one of its most important and trustworthy satellite

services: "The Cubans are best at influence operations, both in the United States and the Third World, and their analyses of the United States are outstanding." [Ref. 40:p. 383] The DGI's success in the United States is understandable since (according to DGI defectors) it is believed that there are up to 3,000 DGI agents operating in the United States. Their missions, according to former DGI agent Mario Esteves Gonzales, include spying on fellow exiles and running vast quantities of drugs into the United States. [Ref. 41:p. 27] While the actual number of DGI agents in the United States may be smaller than the estimates given by DGI defectors, a number of independent sources have documented widespread DGI activity in this country. Many DGI agents in the United States, like Esteves, are trained in sabotage, and could turn their skills on strategic targets located anywhere in the United States.

The DGI has worked closely with the KGB (since the beginning of Soviet-Cuban relations), if not directly under the Soviet intelligence organization since 1970. Orlando Castro Hidalgo, a former DGI agent in Paris until his defection in 1969, explained that one of the conditions imposed on Castro in the late 1960s was DGI subservience to the KGB, making the KGB-DGI relationship similar to those of other Eastern bloc intelligence agencies [Ref. 42]. In 1970, KGB Colonel Viktor Simonev took control as the unofficial director of the DGI, personally approving all of the DGI

operational plans and budgets. Since that time, the DGI's operational budget and number of agents have increased substantially. [Ref. 43:p. 9] The cooperation between the KGB and DGI prevents duplication of effort and maximizes efficiency. In 1983, Arnaud de Borchgrave testified before Congress that the Soviet KGB and Cuban DGI operate freely in the United States, and that "the DGI regards internal security in the U.S. as a joke." [Ref. 44] The DGI is also believed to be responsible for the training of guerrillas and terrorists from around the world, and particularly, those from Colombia and Central America.

As large and as sophisticated as the DGI is, it only represents one of five Cuban intelligence services which operate overseas. The largest Cuban intelligence organization is the Ministry of the Interior's Department for State Security (DSE). Modeled after the KGB, the DSE's principal mission is to monitor and crush any domestic opposition to the Castro Regime. Yet the DSE is also active abroad. The DSE counterintelligence responsibilities allows it to penetrate Cuban exile groups in the United States, Europe, and Latin America. The DSE's expertise and success in keeping the Castro government secure from internal dissent has been shared with other fledgling Marxist regimes in Africa and most recently Grenada and Nicaragua. These regimes, in an effort to build up their security services as quickly as possible, invited large numbers of the Cuban specialists as

soon as they arrived in power. Jiri Valenta, a Sovietologist familiar with the workings of the Sandinistas' internal security apparatus, claims that the Cubans oversee nearly all counterintelligence operations in Nicaragua [Ref. 45:pp. 11-12].

One Cuban intelligence organization within the Ministry of the Interior is a conventional military force, the Department of Special Operations or DOE. Commanded by Central Committee member Brig. Gen. Pascual Martinez Gil, the DOE is an elite special forces detachment composed of at least two battalions of MININT special troops (totaling an estimated 1,000 men). The DOE battalions are usually the first troops deployed to support a Cuban ally in any intervention. The DOE troops are highly motivated, well educated and selected from the best of both the armed forces and the Ministry of the Interior. The DOE has operated extensively in Africa (they were among the first Cuban troops to enter Angola in 1975) and Latin America. During the final Sandinista offensive against the Somoza regime, Cuban military advisors from the DOE fought alongside the FSLN and maintained direct communications with Havana. A number of these advisors were wounded and were returned to Cuba via Panama. [Ref. 35:p. 6]

The mission of the DOE's estimated 1,000 commandos is best described in a 1983 Rand Corporation study by Edward Gonzales:

Cuba's institutional outreach in support of revolutionary movements and regimes in the Caribbean Basin has been further enhanced by the professionalization of the FAR and the creation of the Special Troops Battalion in the Ministry of Interior (MINIT). . . . The Special Troops Battalion within MININT is under Fidel Castro's personal command. It serves as an all-purpose elite force capable of being dispatched abroad in a crisis situation. . . . The Special Troops Battalion could also be used to back a pro-Cuba faction in an internal power struggle in a friendly Basin country. [Ref. 14:p. 15]

The Ministry of the Interior also controls Cuba's Border Guard Troops (TGF). While it is unlikely that many of these 3,000 troops would be deployed overseas in a military role, they could provide valuable training for the border guards of friendly Marxist regimes in Africa and Nicaragua, much like the DSE advisors.

The Ministry of the Interior is controlled by a mixture of fiedlistas and raulistas. With the ouster of Ramiro Valdes as Minister of the Interior in 1985 (long considered the third-ranking official in the Cuban government after Raul Castro, and possible successor to Fidel), the raulistas managed to increase their influence in both the Armed Forces and the MININT. However, the new Minister of the Interior, Division General Jose Abrantes, is considered fiercely loyal to Fidel, and therefore an important fidelista. [Ref. 46:p. 53] As mentioned previously, both the fiedlistas and raulistas are supportive of an interventionist foreign policy, and the recent changes in the MININT should not cause much of a change in Cuba's current strategy.

Cuban interventionist policy does not rely entirely on the Cuban armed forces or organizations subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. Since the early 1970s, the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party has played an increasingly active role in "scouting" Third World countries for revolutionary opportunities. The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) acts as a broker for revolutionary or radical regimes. The Department of Foreign Relations (DGRE) and the America Department (DA) are the organizations used by the Central Committee to carry out its policies. The DGRE maintains contact with communist parties and other leftist organizations around the world. The America Department is theoretically a section of the DGRE but, due to the importance Cuba places on contacts with revolutionary regimes and groups in the Western Hemisphere, the DA is in fact an independent service. The director of the America Department is former DGI director Manuel Pinero Losada, another member of the Central Committee. The DA maintains strong ties with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, guerrilla groups throughout Central and South America and, until October of 1983, the Grenadian Government under Maurice Bishop.

The America Department has been instrumental in helping Latin American guerrilla groups overcome their internal factionalism in order to build a united front. As early as 1977, prior to the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, the America Department's Armando Ulises Estrada

engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the Sandinistas guerrillas and Havana. Castro promised the guerrillas increased support (in the form of arms and advisors) contingent on guerrilla cooperation. After the Sandinistas came to power in July of 1979, the chief of the Cuban America Department/DGI operations center in Costa Rica, Julian Lopez Diaz, was named Ambassador to Nicaragua. Lopez's Assistant in Costa Rica, Andres Barahona, was redocumented as a Nicaraguan and placed in charge of the new Sandinista intelligence service, the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE). [Ref. 35:p. 6] The America Department was also deeply involved in assisting the Grenadian Revolution prior to the joint U.S.-Caribbean intervention in October of 1983. Cuba's former ambassador to Grenada, Jose Torres Rizo, a member of the America Department, provided the Grenadian regime with detailed reports on how to suppress dissent on the island, including the Catholic Church. Numerous documents captured by U.S. forces were signed by the director of the America Department, Manuel Pinero Losada, testifying to the role of the America Department in building, and protecting, the Grenadian Revolution. It is important to remember that Pinero was removed from his job as director of DGI in 1971, at a time when the Soviets were increasing their control of the DGI. Pinero's position as director of the America Department possibly indicates

that the DA enjoys slightly more autonomy from Soviet oversight and control than the DGI.

The Cubans, like the Soviets, also run an enormous propaganda machine to assist them in political influence operations, disinformation, forgeries, and the establishment of pro-Cuban front groups. For example, the Cuban news agency Prensa Latina broadcasts over 2,500 news dispatches on two national and twelve international radio circuits daily. These news broadcasts are available in Spanish, Portuguese, English and French. The actual dispatches can be obtained from one of Prensa Latina's 36 branch offices around the world. No government in Latin America can equal the broadcasting service of Radio Havana. Cuban propaganda attempts to discredit states and individuals allied with the United States, or opposed to Cuban efforts in Central America. [Ref. 47:p. 2]

Another favorite influence and propaganda tool of the Cubans is the Cuban Institute for Friendship Among Peoples (ICAP). This organization claims to have chartered 113 local Cuban friendship societies throughout the world. Besides influencing idealistic students in Europe, North America and the Third World, ICAP engages in talent scouting for future Cuban recruitment of guerrillas, terrorists, or propagandists. [Ref. 47:p. 3]

C. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION ABROAD

Since the early 1970s, the Cuban government has managed to increase drastically the number of nations with which it maintains full diplomatic relations. This has been Havana's goal since its diplomatic isolation by the Western Hemisphere during the 1960s. Castro has worked hard to assure Cuba's neighbors that Cuba no longer poses a threat to their security. During the 1960s, Cuba made the tactical blunder of openly supporting nearly all revolutionary guerrilla groups in Latin America bent on overthrowing the established government. By not distinguishing between authoritarian, democratic and dictatorial regimes, Castro successfully isolated Cuba from every country in Latin America, save Mexico. Following Havana's diplomatic isolation, Cuban operations were confined to its own geographic boundaries with the exception of small and usually unsuccessful raids by guerrilla bands. After Che Guevara's failure in Bolivia, Castro realized that an end to Cuba's diplomatic isolation was critical for both economic and strategic reasons. By the early 1970s, this new policy began to bear fruit as many Latin American nations opened diplomatic relations with Havana. The new Cuban embassies proved critical in Cuba's effort to promote revolution in Latin America. Like the Soviet Union, Cuba maintains diplomatic relations with the very same countries that it attempts to undermine. This way Havana is able to maintain

a presence in a country while establishing contacts with "revolutionary" elements within the target nation. In 1981, Colombia suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba for the second time in twenty years. Bogata could no longer tolerate Cuba's support for Colombian M-19 guerrillas and some of Colombia's most notorious drug traffickers. [Ref. 35:p. 11]

Cuba's legal diplomatic presence in Latin America, Africa, Asia, Western Europe, the United States, and Canada, provides the Cubans with an invaluable resource: access to target countries, and communication with revolutionary allies (see Table 10). The Cuban diplomatic presence in these countries is used much the same way Colonel Qhadaffi's Libya uses their diplomatic missions in many of the same countries: for terrorism, espionage, and subversion.⁵ Many Cuban "diplomats" have been expelled from Canada, Britain, France, Spain, and other European countries for espionage and other "non-diplomatic" activities. On July 10, 1975, France expelled three Cuban diplomats for their links to the international terrorist "Carlos." Less than a month earlier, on June 27, 1975 Carlos (Ilich Ramierz Sanchez) killed two French counterintelligence officers and a Leganese informant in Paris. [Ref. 48:pp. 14-19]

⁵Appendix A details official Cuban diplomatic representation abroad, including countries where Cuba maintains a designated military attache. Countries which have suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba are also mentioned.

TABLE 10

COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH CUBA
MAINTAINS OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

North America

Canada
USA

Latin America

Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Brazil
Costa Rica
Dominica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guyana
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
St. Lucia
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

Western Europe

Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Denmark
Finland
France
Greece
Iceland
Italy
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
Vatican City

Eastern Europe

Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany (GDR)
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
Yugoslavia

The Middle East

Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
PLO
Syria
Tunisia
North Yemen
South Yemen

Asia

Afghanistan
Australia
China
Comoros
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Japan
Kampuchea
North Korea
Laos
Malaysia
Maldives
Mauritius
Mongolia
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Seychelles
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vanuatu
Vietnam

Africa

Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde Islands
Chad
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
SDAR (Polisario)
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
ZimbabweSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Directory of
Officials of the Republic of Cuba: A Reference
Aid, CR 85-13573, November 1985, pp. 165-182

While the full extent of Cuban illegal activities operating out of their overseas diplomatic missions cannot be fully described on the unclassified level, it suffices to say that these embassies and consulates lend themselves considerably to overseas interventions.

D. THIRD WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ALLIES

The Cuban Government has developed a highly sophisticated network of contacts with other radical regimes, in addition to its ties with revolutionary, guerrilla and terrorist organizations out of power. Havana is aware of its demographic and economic limitations, and realizes the importance of building alliances with revolutionary movements in order to increase its effectiveness and range. While the Soviet Union finances many of Havana's overseas adventures, Moscow has not shown great interest in supporting Cuban-led insurgencies or terrorist organizations, especially in the Western Hemisphere. What little aid Moscow provides to these groups comes with many strings attached on how it can be used. Castro has naturally been offended by Moscow's attempt to control his revolutionary programs. As a result, he has tried since the early 1960s to build strong ties with radical groups and governments willing to further Cuba's revolutionary vision. Probably the most blatant attempt by Castro to build an alliance of Third World revolutionary groups and nations occurred in

1966, when Cuba hosted the Tricontinental Conference in Havana.

Never before, or since, has such a group of radical states, terrorist organizations, and guerrilla fronts been assembled. Moscow wanted to use the forum to "grapple with the Chinese," and to further its Third World credentials. Castro had other ideas. According to Wayne S. Smith:

The Soviets thus thought they had won most of the marbles. They expected Castro to invite parties and groups sympathetic to Moscow, and once these were included in the expanded organization, Moscow would be in a position to elbow the Chinese aside . . . instead, Castro invited every radical revolutionary group he could think of, including many that were decidedly out of favor with Moscow. The traditional communist parties were largely bypassed. The congress itself, moreover, was turned into a Fidelista circus, with call after call for armed struggle and confrontation with the imperialists on a global basis. . . [Ref. 49:pp. 20-21]

Through the Tricontinental Conference, Cuba sought to enlist the support of North Vietnam and North Korea and create a more aggressive revolutionary internationalism. The Conference explains how Cuba initiated contracts with guerrilla and terrorist groups "beyond the fringe" of the Marxist-Leninist movement. While many of these groups have disappeared, many are still viable threats to the stability of nations such as Colombia and Spain. In the latter case, Cuba's contacts with the M-19 guerrillas go back to the 1960s, while Havana started training Basque terrorists (known collectively by the acronym ETA) as early as 1964. [Ref. 50:p. 9]

While a complete list of all of the terrorist and guerrilla organizations supported and trained by Havana cannot be mentioned here, I will address a few major groups because of their ability to jeopardize American security, property, and citizens abroad, especially in the Western Hemisphere.

In the late 1970s, the Cuban DGI and America Department created the Junta for Revolutionary Coordination (JCR) to act as an umbrella organization for all Latin American terrorist and guerrilla organizations. Members of the JCR believe in the Cuban model of revolutionary warfare and are provided with false documents, arms, training, and contacted with other revolutionary countries and groups. Countries which have cooperated with the JCR in the past include Nicaragua, Libya, Syria, Iraq, the PDRY, North Korea, and Vietnam. Some of the groups with strong JCR ties are the PLO, ETA, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Red Army Faction, and any other organizations willing to sponsor or support JCR members.

According to the testimony of Daniel James (an expert on Latin American terrorist groups) before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, the five major Puerto Rican terrorist organizations were unified by a Puerto Rican member of the DGI assigned to the Cuban mission to the United Nations. The agent, Filiberto Inocencia Ojeda Rios, managed to unite the five groups which have been responsible

for over 260 violent acts in Puerto Rico, and another 100 in the United States. [Ref. 43:pp. 181-206]

In guerrilla warfare, Havana now prefers to unite indigenous guerrilla forces by promising to provide them military support and training if they work as a coalition. This method proved to be highly effective in Nicaragua with the Sandinistas, and to a lesser degree in El Salvador with the FMLN. The Cubans have also tried this method in Guatemala with less spectacular results. [Ref. 35:pp. 6-8] This subject will be addressed in greater detail later when I discuss Cuban tactics.

E. LOGISTICAL CAPABILITIES

A major determining factor in any nation's threat potential is that nation's ability to transport the necessary men and materials to the area of conflict. Even nations with enormous standing armies such as the People's Republic of China, North Korea, or Vietnam are unable to utilize these armies far from their borders due to inadequate logistical capabilities.

Cuba, Vietnam and all of the Warsaw Pact members are a significant distance from prospective areas of conflict in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and most of Asia. The International Institute for Strategic Studies indicates that the airlift capability of all Soviet surrogate forces in and out of the Warsaw Pact is inadequate for long-range power projection missions. The transport aircraft in their

inventories either lack the range or numbers needed to make any large intervention possible. [Ref. 26:pp. 31-36]

As mentioned before, Cuba does have an adequate airlift capability to transport paratroops and light infantry units into the Caribbean Basin, and a limited resupply capacity for forces in Africa.

However, in terms of sealift capability, Cuba is capable of transporting troops, supplies and a limited amount of heavy equipment to conflict areas with developed port facilities. Table 11 below shows how Cuba has attempted to improve its sealift capability since 1977, and how it compares with other Soviet bloc nations and radical regimes.

TABLE 11

MERCHANT MARINE CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIET ALLIES

| <u>NATION</u> | <u>NUMBER OF VESSELS</u> | | <u>GROSS TONNAGE</u> | |
|---------------|--------------------------|-------------|----------------------|-------------|
| | <u>1977</u> | <u>1985</u> | <u>1977</u> | <u>1985</u> |
| Cuba | 294 | 418 (16) | 603,750 | 960,993 |
| Bulgaria | 179 | 193 (20) | 937,458 | 1,248,210 |
| Czech | 12 | 19 | - | 184,266 |
| GDR | 437 | 416 (9) | 1,389,000 | 1,420,000 |
| Hungary | 16 | 21 | 47,943 | 81,536 |
| Poland | 696 | 916 (28) | 2,817,129 | 3,650,615 |
| Romania | 122 | 379 (11) | 777,309 | 2,390,764 |
| USSR | - | 7,713 (489) | - | 23,788,668 |
| Nicaragua | - | 20 (2) | - | 18,604 |
| Vietnam | - | 114 (11) | - | 268,733 |
| North Korea | - | 57 (3) | - | 438,972 |
| Libya | - | 104 (17) | - | 903,821 |

() = Number of oil tankers

Sources: Jane's Fighting Ships 1978-85, and Jean Labayle Couhat, ed., Combat Fleets of the World 1984/85, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1984

F. SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA

While not directly under the command of the Cuban Government, the significant Soviet military presence in Cuba must be taken into account. Moscow's largest electronic intelligence collection facility outside of the Soviet Union is located at Lourdes, Cuba. Approximately 2,400 Soviet military advisors are in Cuba providing training and technical assistance. Temporary Soviet naval combatant deployments to Cuba began as early as July of 1969. This first deployment included a guided missile cruiser, two guided missile destroyers, two submarines (one nuclear-powered), two support ships, one submarine tender, and an oiler. To date, the Soviets have made 25 similar task force deployments to Cuba since 1969 [Ref. 29:p. 36]. The Soviets also maintain two TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft in Cuba on a continuous basis, thus giving the Soviets a constant airborne surveillance capability of the Atlantic and Caribbean. In addition to the advisors and frequent deployments by Soviet warships, submarines and aircraft, a 3,000-man Soviet brigade is stationed on the island to guard the Lourdes facility and serve as a deterrent force against any possible U.S. military action. [Ref. 46:pp. 45-46]

V. TACTICS

The tactics used by Castro in order to achieve his revolutionary goals have evolved greatly over the past quarter-century. Part of this evolutionary change can be attributed to past Cuban failures, while a large part is due to Cuba's increased dependence on the Soviet Union. The relationship between the Soviet Union's strategic objectives and Cuban tactical decisions is still debated by scholars of Soviet-Cuban politics. How these two nations divide their revolutionary responsibilities is obviously a complex and dynamic matter, which varies depending on the geographical area, or country, targeted for revolutionary action. Dr. Jiri Valenta, in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, claimed that the Soviet-Cuban alliance was practiced along the following guidelines:

. . . First, the U.S.S.R. does not necessarily seek to create Leninist regimes at any cost. Second, the Soviet Union seems, in many instances, to prefer that its allies (Cuba in Africa and Latin America, Vietnam in Southeast Asia) "micromanage"--and play a primary role in--the initial development of new relationships with aspiring Leninist forces. [Ref. 51:p. 3]

According to Valenta, the Soviets see Cuba's role as a "junior Soviet partner," who are allowed to use Soviet military and economic aid to pursue policies which ultimately benefit, not just Cuban, but Soviet strategic objectives [Ref. 51:p. 3]. The Cubans are given leeway in

which to carry out their programs in the Third World, especially in the Western Hemisphere, where Cuban forces are less provocative than a large Soviet presence. Cuba has also shown itself to be more racially, culturally, and linguistically acceptable to regimes in Latin America and Africa than their Soviet sponsors. Valenta states:

Finally, the Soviet Union rarely gives explicit instructions to junior partners. Nor does it assign tactical missions. Instead, aspiring Leninist leaders in the Third World are usually at liberty to use their own imagination (with Cuba often acting as broker) to cultivate ties with the Soviets and explore basic Soviet strategic objectives and limits of tolerance. . . . Ultimately, the Soviet Union aims to reduce Cuba's brokerage role and develop direct relations with these regimes. This strategy became apparent in Angola in 1977-78 and may have been a factor in the internal leadership conflict in Grenada in October 1983 . . . [Ref. 51:pp. 3-4]

Our understanding of the Soviet-Cuban partnership in promoting revolutionary regimes is not based on mere speculation. Tons of documents signed by Cuban, Soviet, and Grenadian officials (many marked secret and top secret) were discovered by U.S. forces during the Grenada operation in October of 1983. These documents clearly demonstrate the nature of the Soviet-Cuban relationship in building Leninist regimes. Cuba's autonomy in developing revolutionary situations in Latin America (rather than being a pawn for Moscow's operations) is indicated by the remarks of former Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, who spoke of the growing numbers of anti-American "progressive" forces in the Caribbean Basin. Orgarkov told his Grenadian counterpart in early 1983: "Over two decades ago

there was only Cuba in Latin America; today there are Nicaragua and Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador." The tone of Orgarkov's remarks indicate approval, yet surprise, in the actions and accomplishments of Cuba and its other "junior partners" in the Western Hemisphere. [Ref. 51:p. 4]

The fact that the Soviet Union is not the driving force behind Cuban efforts in the Western Hemisphere is sometimes lost on U.S. policymakers, who fail to recognize the tremendous leeway Castro's Cuba has in developing its own revolutionary strategy. Castro himself stated in a December 1982 speech (reported in the Cuban press) that Cuba is the spearhead for revolutionary action in the Western Hemisphere, not Moscow. Castro gave specific examples of how this relationship operates in the case of Central America:

One of the great lies that the imperialists use concerning Central America is their attempt to impute the revolution in this area to the Soviet Union . . . [The U.S.S.R.] has had nothing whatsoever to do with Central America. . . . The Soviets did not know even one of the present leaders of Nicaragua . . . during the period of revolutionary struggle. The same holds true for El Salvador . . . with the exception of the Communist Party of El Salvador-- . . . not one of the major groups--the Soviet Union did not know the leaders of [most Salvadoran] revolutionary organizations and had no contact with them. The same goes for Guatemala. . . . We Cubans . . . have relations with the revolutionary movements, we know the revolutionary leaders in the area. I am not going to deny it. [Ref. 52:p. 134]

Having established Cuba's predominate role in organizing and supporting revolutionary movements in the Caribbean Basin, and possible in other Third World areas such as

Africa, we will now look into what criteria and tactics Havana employs to fulfill its revolutionary agenda.

It appears that Cuba in the 1980s is more selective in choosing its targets and tactics than ever before. Castro has learned to use all of Cuba's assets to promote his revolutionary ideology from propaganda to conventional military power. With the tacit support of the Soviet Union, Cuba has attempted to increase its influence in the Caribbean Basin and other parts of the Third World through a combination of military and political power.

In the 1960s, the Cuban leadership believed that the proper conditions for revolution were present throughout Latin America. In July 1960, Castro boasted that he would convert "the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of Latin America." The strategy developed by the Cubans to "ignite" this revolutionary time-bomb was called the 'foco' theory, which advocated the primacy of the guerrilla nucleus and struggle. However, the Castro-Guevara foco theory ignored the objective condition of the target country, and was extremely naive concerning the chances of gaining recruits for their peasant armies. Che Guevara's mission and eventual death in Bolivia in 1967 painfully exposed the shortcomings of the Cuban revolutionary strategy in the 1960s.

In the 1970s, Cuba concentrated on building up its conventional armed forces while retaining its ties with the

remnants of the insurgent and terrorist groups it had assisted earlier in Latin America. Cuba also nurtured and expanded its contacts with numerous extremist groups throughout the world, including former delegates to the 1966 Tricontinental Conference.

Cuba's involvement in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s provided the FAR with military experience in combat. Havana also learned how to create local militias to protect friendly "revolutionary" regimes. By the 1980s, the Cuban Interventionary Forces had obtained operational experience in the entire spectrum of conventional and unconventional warfare: from influence operations in the United States and Western Europe to large-scale military interventions in Africa and the Middle East. This background has resulted in the Cuban government developing highly sophisticated tactics for its interventionist strategy.

Cuba's departure from advocating revolutionary warfare in the early 1970s was more a tactical withdrawal than a total abandonment of the utility of armed struggle. With the Allende government in power in Chile, Cuba's role as the Praetorian guard to select regimes in Africa, and the United States retrenchment after defeat in Vietnam, Castro could afford a respite from his revolutionary chores. During this period, which lasted from approximately 1969 to 1973, Castro attempted to revitalize the Cuban economy and to transform the Cuban military, with generous Soviet arms and training

assistance, into the professional armed forces that it is today. Ironically, as the Cuban military grew in size and capability, its need at home decreased for the reasons mentioned above. Both Moscow and Havana were eager to exercise their new power in light of the United States' post-Vietnam paralysis. This time Castro was careful to consult with the Soviet Union, understanding the limits of his power as well as the possibilities for Cuba if it cooperated with Moscow.

As mentioned earlier, geography determines what tactics Havana will use in any intervention, as well as the scope of the operation. Cuban tactics and initiatives are best seen in Havana's operations in the Western Hemisphere. In the Caribbean Basin, Castro has more leeway to decide what tactics and strategy should be employed.

In this section I will briefly address some of the tactics used by the Cuban regime to promote revolutionary struggles, and how Havana defends revolutionary gains after pro-Cuban governments achieve power. The section is divided into four parts. First, we will examine the large-scale military interventions such as the Angola intervention in 1975, the Ethiopia effort in 1977, and the smaller military operations in the PDRY in 1972 and Syria in 1973-74. The second part will deal with Cuban efforts to keep select Marxist-Leninist regimes in power, concentrating on Havana's allies in the Western Hemisphere such as the Bishop regime

in Grenada and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The third part will detail Cuba's new strategy to assist revolutionary guerrilla and terrorist groups out of power, primarily in Central America, along with Nicaraguan assistance. The fourth part will briefly cover Cuba's support for their latest revolutionary ally, drug traffickers in Central and South America.

A. LARGE-SCALE MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

The first opportunities for Cuba to exercise its newly acquired military power occurred in the late 1970s. As mentioned earlier, while Cuba had been active in Africa supporting "progressive" regimes throughout the 1960s, Cuban soldiers were mainly involved in training militia forces rather than combat operations. The Cuban assistance in the PDRY and Syria in 1972 and 1974 provided Castro with an opportunity to test his new forces. Cuba quickly sent hundreds of advisors to both of these countries to train their armed forces in the use and maintenance of advance Soviet military equipment and tactics. These missions differed greatly from Cuba's earlier African efforts. Not only were the weapons more sophisticated than the type of weapons used in earlier Cuban training missions, this time the Cubans were also working very closely with the Soviets and even taking part in combat operations. This was the beginning of what Hosmer and Wolfe call Soviet-Cuban "cooperative intervention." By late 1977, Cuban advisors

and combat personnel were active in large-scale combat operations in Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia (they were later thrown out when Castro sided with Ethiopia), the PDRY, and Syria.

Castro's success as a Soviet partner in Africa boosted Cuba's prestige not only in the Kremlin, but also in the eyes of a majority of the Third World. By 1979, Castro had won his bid to become the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Not content with Cuba's success in Africa, Castro turned his attention toward repeating Cuba's success in the Western Hemisphere. Castro's luck continued in 1979, when the pro-Cuban New Jewel Movement (NJM) came to power in a near bloodless coup on the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada. In July of the same year, the Sandinistas managed to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, albeit with limited Cuban aid. These events shifted Castro's attention away from Africa, even though tens of thousands of Cuban troops were still needed in Africa to protect Havana's revolutionary allies.

Havana's success in its African and Middle Eastern interventions were the result of Havana's position as a valued Soviet ally and superclient. Power projection is a complex, expensive and dangerous operation only attempted on a large scale by a handful of nations in the world. The combination of Soviet willingness to supply and support surrogates in Third World conflicts, and Cuba's ability and

willingness to operate and maintain advanced Soviet equipment, allows Castro to pursue his maximalist foreign policy objectives in a form of "cooperative intervention." The cooperation achieved between the Soviets and Cubans in the Angolan intervention signaled a maturation of the Soviet-Cuban relationship. The exercise was repeated on a smaller, but no less dramatic scale in Ethiopia in 1977. Once the Soviet Union and Cuba decided that the MPLA in Angola and the Mengistu Government in Ethiopia were worthy of Soviet-Cuban assistance, their combined forces were put in motion. The Soviet Union supplies the arms and some technical assistance on a level sufficient to guarantee their clients' survival. This equipment is transported on the Soviet Union's new airlift and sealift capability. The entire operation is made possible because of Soviet logistics and command and control. The Cubans supply the trained manpower and combat forces. Thus, the Cubans complement the Soviet command and support effort with thousands of combat troops which had been trained on Soviet equipment. How the Soviet Union and Cuba were able to transport tens of thousands of troops and tons of war material to Angola, Ethiopia, and other Third World recipients has been detailed by many scholars over the past decade and will not be repeated here.⁶

⁶For a detailed study of the Angolan and Ethiopian interventions see Stephen Hosmer, and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts,

However, it is useful to point out a few major points basic to the success of these operations: First, the Soviets must supply nearly all of the armaments and logistical forces for these operations. Second, Cuba is able to transport thousands of troops, carrying nothing larger than light infantry weapons, for short-term interventions. For interventions lasting longer than six months involving more than a few thousand troops, Cuba must rely on Soviet airlift and sealift support. The third point critical to the success of these operations is that both Moscow and Havana must perceive these interventions to be in both their interests. In the case of Angola, Havana's relationship with the MPLA exceeded that of the Soviet Union's in duration and intensity. Ethiopia was the reverse, but Cuba was able to justify its presence as in line with the Organization of African Unity's Charter. (The OAU gave Ethiopia the right of self-defense from Somalian aggression. The Cubans did refrain from fighting the northern separatists in Ethiopia, although it is likely that the Soviets would have wanted Havana to do so.) Finally, on the battlefield, Cuban tactics are similar to those of the Soviets, with some modifications. Soviet tactical doctrine predominates throughout the Cuban Armed Forces, although the FAR has made some minor tactical modifications in order to operate in different geographical and climatic conditions with smaller

Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1983.

forces than its Soviet counterparts. Because of Cuba's small size and limited resources, the Cubans try to employ guerrilla tactics and maneuver warfare against superior forces whenever possible. Like their Soviet counterparts, the Cubans rely heavily on artillery and rocket barrages to dissolve enemy formations and destroy enemy morale. [Ref. 37:pp. 5-11 to 5-61]

The possibility of another major Soviet-Cuban intervention at the present time seems remote, but cannot be discounted in the case of South Africa, or any other target nation where the perceived Soviet-Cuban benefits currently outweigh risks.

While large-scale military interventions by Cuban troops in Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean Basin has received the most media attention over the past decade, they are just one area in which Cuban forces are actively pursuing Havana's foreign policy goals. Since Cuba is a nation with a population smaller than the state of Pennsylvania, it prefers to use less costly and dangerous strategies and tactics than major military interventions to influence regional politics and support its revolutionary allies in power.

B. SUPPORT FOR MARXIST-LENINIST REGIMES

Having helped their revolutionary comrades achieve power, the Cubans are soon faced with the difficult task of keeping these regimes in power. As mentioned earlier, for a

combination of practical and strategic reasons, Havana is given the basic responsibility for assisting Soviet-Cuban client states in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. forces captured a variety of documents in Grenada which provided a unique insight into the cooperative process between a regime such as that of Maurice Bishop, their Cuban brokers, and other revolutionary allies like the Soviet Union, East Germany, North Korea, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Bulgaria, and Libya.

The captured Grenada documents illustrate how Cuba nurtured the Grenadian regime from 1979 until its representatives were evicted in 1983. First, Cuba increased its presence on the island with hundreds of Cuban advisors and technicians. The Cubans then built up the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) to defend against any possible counter coup. Cuba signed an agreement with the Grenadian government to provide light arms and 40 military advisors. The agreement also provided a number of Grenadian soldiers with military training in Cuba. This secret Cuban-Grenadian protocol was to remain in effect until December 31, 1984, thereby allowing the Cuban armed forces to monitor and control the development of the Grenadian Armed Forces. Cuba's role as a broker between Grenada and the Soviet Union was apparent in agreements signed in Havana in 1980 (a year after the Bishop coup), 1981, and 1982. In these agreements, the Soviet Union, North Korea and other Soviet

clients promised Grenada over \$37.8 million in military equipment. All of these weapons were to be routed through Cuba in order to mask their original source. [Ref. 53]

Moreover, Cuban assistance to the Grenadian regime was more extensive than military aid. Numerous documents were discovered in which Havana's America Department instructed the Grenadian security forces and political leadership in subjects ranging from control of the Grenadian Catholic Church to strategies it should follow in international forums like the Socialist International and the Non-Aligned Movement. [Ref. 3]

It is likely that a similar relationship exists between the Cuban government and the Sandinista leadership, and it is probably more extensive due to Nicaragua's size, position, and greater importance following the loss of Grenada. In Nicaragua, Havana has assisted the Sandinistas in setting up their internal security apparatus, expanding their armed forces, and instructing the Nicaraguans on how to manipulate U.S. public opinion. Defectors from the Sandinista security apparatus have disclosed the level of Cuban involvement in Nicaraguan military and security operations. [Ref. 54:pp. 19-29] A brief glance at Nicaragua's inventory of sophisticated military equipment (all of which is compatible with Cuban arms) testifies to the extent of Havana's presence: over 100 T-54/55 and PT-76 tanks, over 100 armored personnel carriers, numerous combat

helicopters and light aircraft, hundreds of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers, and thousands of light infantry weapons. Unlike the relatively unsophisticated weapons in the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), most of these weapons require extensive maintenance by qualified technicians. A large number of Cuban advisors are also needed in order for the Sandinistas to use these arms effectively. Most of these weapons were absorbed into Nicaragua's 62,000 man army since 1980. It is doubtful that the Sandinista Army could have done so without the aid of the 3,000 Cuban military advisors in Nicaragua.

C. SUPPORT FOR INSURGENTS AND TERRORIST GROUPS

By the late 1970s, Cuba's conventional military forces became overextended in Africa, the Middle East and (later) Nicaragua. As a result, Havana, in an attempt to make low cost revolutionary gains in the Western Hemisphere, increased its support for terrorism and guerrilla warfare. It should be noted, however that Cuba's support for low intensity conflict in the 1980s is much more sophisticated than its efforts in the 1960s. Havana today is much more aware of the value of propaganda, proper military training, and intelligence support.

In December of 1981, the United States' State Department released a report titled "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America." The report claimed that Havana had abandoned its policy of strengthening diplomatic

relations with governments in the Western Hemisphere, and had returned to its campaign of the 1960s of promoting armed insurgency [Ref. 35] The late 1970s did show a dramatic increase in Cuba's interest in subverting its neighbors. The Cuban strategic shift back to armed insurgency in the early 1980s occurred following the Cuban successes in conventional military interventions in Angola and Ethiopia, along with the victories of the Bishop coup in Grenada and the Sandinistas' in Nicaragua in 1979. These developments apparently convinced the Cuban leadership of the renewed viability of the "armed struggle" doctrine, which Havana had shelved after its failed efforts to overthrow governments in Latin America in the 1960s. According to the report, Cuban support for urban and rural insurgency in the 1980s has used the following tactics:

1. **United Traditionally Splintered Radical Groups.** After the setbacks suffered by the Cuban "foco" theory in Latin America in the 1960s, the Cubans learned to unite various revolutionary and radical groups. This policy is clearly stated in Leninist teachings as the best method of achieving power. For practical reasons the Cubans opted only to support, through arms, training and advisors, movements that are capable of putting aside their differences for a common objective.

2. **Encourage Terrorism in Order to Provoke Indiscriminate Violence by Government Security Forces.** Drawing from their own experience in the Cuban Revolution, and from an understanding of how to manipulate public opinion in the United States and Europe, the Cubans are promoting terrorism in order to incite pro-U.S. regimes to strike back indiscriminately. Since many of these armies and security forces are poorly trained and undisciplined, their counter-terrorist or counter-insurgency efforts sometimes become focused on the insurgents' support apparatus rather than the insurgents themselves. The result is civilian casualties and death squadron reprisals. Havana is well

aware of the paralyzing effect this type of violence has on American policy-making. Havana hopes that by promoting terrorism in Central American countries allied with the United States, these target countries will rely on a heavy-handed counterterrorism effort and increased state repression, thus alienating U.S. public opinion and making a coherent bipartisan U.S. policy in Central America more difficult.

3. Provide Liaison Assistance to Terrorist/Guerrilla Groups with Other Radical Regimes (Eastern bloc, Vietnam, North Korea, Libya, Iran, etc.). Recent experiences in Grenada and Nicaragua indicate that the Cubans no longer try to "go it alone" when supporting Marxist regimes or guerrilla groups. As with its support for radical Marxist regimes, Havana has set up an elaborate network in which guerrilla and terrorist groups can tap into the resources of other Marxist and radical patron nations. In this way numerous revolutionary groups can receive training, money, and arms in order to further the scope of their operations. The role Cuba plays as a "broker" for guerrilla and terrorist organizations in Central America is known from numerous documents and weapons captured from El Salvadoran guerrillas which were traced back to Cuba. For example, of the 1,550 M-16 rifles captured from El Salvadoran guerrillas by government forces, 60 percent were traced back to Vietnam. Captured guerrilla documents later indicated that these weapons were part of a shipment of 1,620 M-16s supplied by Vietnam, via Cuba. [Ref. 55:p. 2] Other Soviet bloc nations were also implicated in assisting Cuba in its support for Central American insurgent groups.

4. Train Ideologically Committee Cadres in Urban and Guerrilla Warfare and Tactics. Unlike the 1960s, when the Cuban armed forces were small and inexperienced, the modern FAR and the Cuban Ministry of the Interior is capable of training large numbers of guerrillas, terrorists, propaganda experts and political cadres. This training is not only necessary for the guerrillas to gain victory on the battlefield, but also allows them to consolidate power quickly.

5. Provide Military Aid and Assistance to Groups Showing Signs of Possible Victory and Pro-Cuban Orientation. The Cubans now understand that there are "many roads to socialism." All anti-regime organizations can play an important role in overthrowing the old government and helping the new government consolidate power. Some of these organizations were unacceptable to the Cuban revolutionaries of the 1960s, but the new leadership in Havana now knows how to exploit these groups for its own

purposes. Some of these groups include the Catholic church, trade unions and even the military. [Ref. 35:pp. 3-5]

D. COOPERATION WITH DRUG TRAFFICKERS

Cuba's decision to cooperate with powerful Latin American drug traffickers is probably connected with its support of South American guerrilla movements. When these guerrilla movements needed funds to support their operations in the late 1970s and early 1980s (funds that revolutionary allies such as Cuba were unable to provide in large amounts), they turned to Colombian drug kingpins, who were expanding their power and operations in response to the growing U.S. public demand for cocaine and other drugs. Since Colombia is the nerve center of the Latin American drug industry, and since Cuban relations with the Colombian government have never been warm, Havana must have seen this as a unique opportunity to gain hard currency and increase its influence with the Colombia guerrilla groups, while at the at the same time contributing to the demise of the United States.

One of the Colombian drug dealers Cuba assisted was Jaime Guillot-Lara. Besides being a well-known drug and arms trafficker, Guillot is also a close personal friend of the leader of the M-19 guerrilla group, Jaime Bateman. Guillot was introduced to Cuban officials in Colombia in late 1979 by another drug and arms smuggler, Juan "Johnny" Crump. According to U.S. Congressional testimony in April

of 1983, Guillot and the Cuban officials discussed the use of Cuban waters as an intermediate safehaven on their way into South Florida. Guillot met again with Cuban officials in July 1980. This time the Cuban delegation included Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, a member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party and President of the Cuban Institute of Friendship to the People (ICAP). An agreement was reached in which Cuba would pay Guillot for weapons purchased in Miami and smuggled to the M-19 in Colombia on his return voyages. [Ref. 56:pp. 82-83]

During 1980 and 1981, Guillot moved tremendous amounts of drugs to the Cuban port of Paredon Grande, where they were transferred to smaller vessels on their way to South Florida. According to the testimony of former drug dealer and DGI agent Mario Esteves, some of the dealers receiving these drugs in Florida are DGI agents smuggled into the United States during the Mariel boatlift of 1980 [Ref. 41:p. 27]. While Guillot's ships were in Cuban waters, they were protected by Cuban gunboats under the direct orders of Vice Admiral Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado of the Cuban Navy. [Ref. 56:pp. 82-83]

In November 1981, the Colombian Navy sank one of Guillot's boats, the Katrina, and seized another, the Monarca. The Katrina was returning to Colombia from the United States with 100 tons of weapons and ammunition for the M-19 guerrillas. Guillot was arrested in Mexico, but

was later released after extradition requests for him from both the United States and Colombia were rejected. U.S. officials were told that Guillot had considered taking refugee in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City prior to his arrest. According to a U.S. State Department report, Fidel Castro instructed the Cuban Embassy to protect Guillot. [Ref. 57]

Following Guillot's release, the United States indicated him and 13 others on drug smuggling charges. Among the 13 were four top Cuban officials, including Vice Admiral Aldo Santamaria and Fernando Ravelo, former Cuban ambassador to Colombia. during a Congressional investigation into the matter, Senator Jeremiah Denton, Republican of Alabama, asked convicted drug dealer Juan Crump if these Cuban officials could have been acting on their own without the knowledge of the Cuban government. Crump replied:

For sure it was an action of the Cuban government. Ravelo is an honest man in his own way, he would never do something like that for his own benefit. That means the Cuban government was involved in the thing, it was not personal. [Ref. 56:pp. 84-85]

Another confessed drug smuggler, David Perez, said he had "no doubt the whole Cuban government was very much aware of what we were doing" when his boats were escorted into a Cuban harbor by navy torpedo boats to onload a huge supply of qualude tablets. Perez and his crew dumped the tablets when they were spotted by a U.S. Coast Guard cutter. If he would have sold the shipment in Florida, one-third of his

estimated \$5 million profit would have gone to his Cuban contacts. [Ref. 56:pp. 82-83]

The full extent of official Cuban involvement cannot be discussed on the unclassified level. However, with the limited public information already known, it appears that Havana has decided to play an active role in the multi-billion dollar drug trade. With an estimated 3,000 DGI agents already in the United States, an extensive intelligence apparatus in place throughout Latin America, and active ties to guerrilla movements in the region, Cuba is in an excellent position to assist in drug smuggling.

VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE CUBAN THREAT TO UNITED STATES
SECURITY INTERESTS

Cuba's geographic location, its growing military power, and close relationship with the Soviet Union, when combined with its proven hostility toward the United States, presents an increasing threat to United States' strategic and regional security. Cuba's ideological background and strategic location, in addition to its historical and cultural ties to Latin America, allows it to challenge the United States on both the East-West and North-South axis. Castro's East-West challenge to the United States comes from his military cooperation with the Soviet Union. This is achieved by augmenting Soviet forces in the Caribbean Basin, and permitting Soviet ships, aircraft, troops, and intelligence facilities strategic access to Cuban bases.

Castro is also able to challenge the United States' primacy in the Western Hemisphere by advocating a radical North-South policy against U.S. interests in Latin America. By being the self-proclaimed champion of Latin American interests and historical antipathy toward United States' power in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba has managed to gain influence in regional affairs and conflicts. Castro has very skillfully manipulated Cuba's conflicts with the United States in a way that maximizes Cuba's benefits while minimizing its costs and risks. For example, in the Caribbean

Basin today, revolutionary Cuba has not only managed to survive, it has also managed to raise the costs for the United States in keeping the Caribbean Basin and Latin America secure.

Cuba's power projection threat to United States and NATO security interests exists on three separate levels: strategic, regional, and against Third World allies of the U.S. outside of the Caribbean Basin and NATO's area of responsibility. To date, most of Cuba's military interventions have occurred in the third, and least threatening category. While the Horn of Africa and southwest Africa are important strategic areas, their value is peripheral to U.S. security interests in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, or North Atlantic littoral areas. For that reason, this section will concentrate on the Cuban threat to the strategic and regional security of the United States, NATO, and our Latin American allies.

A. THE STRATEGIC THREAT

Only recently has the Caribbean Basin been recognized as an areas where a strategic threat to the United States', and NATO's, security exists. The Cuban Revolution, followed by the Cuban Missile crisis, had a sobering effect on the United States, which long considered the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as formidable barriers against external enemies. This perception has not only proven naive, but twice in this century has led to an inadequate defense

policy which jeopardized our resupply efforts in support of allies and our own military forces in Europe. Even with the tremendous advance of military technology since the end of World War II, or perhaps as a result of these advances, Caribbean security remains a serious problem for our NATO commitment and inter-American regional security.

Over the last twenty years, the Cuban military has developed into a serious threat, and the presence of Soviet submarines, surface ships and long-range aircraft has greatly complicated military calculations on our once docile southern flank. Nor is the Soviet-Cuban military presence in the Caribbean solely a U.S. problem. NATO's survival depends heavily on unrestricted transit through the Caribbean Sea in times of conflict with the Warsaw Pact. Cuba's increasing capability to harass shipping in the Caribbean makes NATO's policy of limiting the Alliance's area of responsibility (politically sound during the days of decolonization) obsolete, and forces NATO's strategic planners to revise its military strategy in order to maintain credibility.

In order to recognize fully the strategic threat that Soviet/Cuban forces in the Caribbean pose to United States' and NATO's security interests, one must view these threats within a certain context. This thesis makes the following two assumptions.

First, the United States possesses the advantage in both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the Caribbean, especially with regard to the Cuban threat. The scenarios in which Cuba could pose a serious challenge to our interests would be in a regional or cross-oceanic conflict where nuclear escalation would be unwise politically, or where the danger of tactical nuclear weapons leading to a global escalation discourage their use. The United States and NATO must deal with the security threat in the Caribbean with a proportional conventional force, rather than relying on overwhelming nuclear superiority. This limitation has not been lost on the officials responsible for implementing NATO's strategy; as Admiral Wesley McDonald, former US Commander-in-Chief Atlantic, points out, this strategy:

. . . is based on credible deterrence while ensuring an associated war fighting capability on the European continent. The validity of this strategy depends directly on our ability to move large quantities of reinforcement and resupply material across the Atlantic Ocean, to deploy naval forces in support of land and air forces in Europe, and to defend other areas vital to the Alliance. [Ref. 16:p. 1109]


Secondly, the Gulf ports of the United States must be viewed as a continuation of the U.S. eastern seaboard. Caribbean security is tied to our ability to have free access to those ports. The major resupply and reinforcement route to NATO in time of war originates in the Gulf ports and transits north along the east coast before being convoyed across the Atlantic to Europe. The Germans, in the two world wars, understood the vulnerability of this long

life-line and the problems that patrolling thousands of miles of coastline entailed for the United States. Specifically, the U-boats could attack shipping at any point while the United States had to protect the entire area with limited resources (see Figure 1). When viewed in this context, Caribbean security becomes a much greater task than simply conducting bilateral relations between the United States and its small neighbors in the Caribbean.

The importance of the Caribbean to United States security was observed by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan even before the Spanish-American War. Writing in Harper's Monthly in October 1897, Mahan noted the similarities between the Caribbean and the Mediterranean:

. . . their conspicuous characteristics now are their political and military importance, in the broadest sense, as concerning not only the countries that border them, but the world at large . . . [Ref. 58]

Despite Admiral Mahan's warnings, the United States has historically been unprepared for European challenges in the Caribbean, especially by Germany's submarines in the two world wars. In World War I, as Barbara Tuchman points out in her book The Zimmermann Telegram, Germany decided to unleash its U-boats in an unrestricted warfare campaign that would divert America's power away from the European conflict. From early 1917 until the end of the War, Germany's strategy was to weaken the Allies by cutting off, at the source, America's supply of war materials to Britain and France. Germany also wanted to draw the United States



Source: U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America, 1985, p. 5

Figure 1. Strategic Importance of the Caribbean to NATO (60% of Total Resupply/Reinforcement Material in the First 60 Days Sails from Gulf Ports Through the Florida Straits)

into a war with Mexico or Japan, or preferably both. [Ref. 59:p. 66]

Perhaps the most profound observation of the impact that World War I had on United States security in the Western Hemisphere was made by Lieutenant Frederick Korner. Lieutenant Korner was one of the officers on board U-151, which was the first U-boat sent to raid allied shipping on America's Atlantic coast. While covering 10,915 miles in 94 days, his U-boat sank 23 ships totaling 61,000 tons. U-151 was also responsible for the sinking of four other merchant ships caught in the mine fields it had laid in the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays. Lieutenant Korner commented upon his return to Germany on July 20, 1918:

. . . we had shown a skeptical world that even the wide expanse of the Atlantic was not enough to keep us from a superraid to the coast of far-off America. Surely this is a warning of what later wars may bring. For the day will come when submarines will think no more of a voyage across the Atlantic than they do now of a raid across the North Sea. America's isolation is now a thing of the past. [Ref. 60:p. 68]

The Caribbean Basin's strategic importance, and the United States' concern whether it could safeguard the area, again became an issue prior to World War II. The fear of German influence in the Caribbean was paramount in American war planning before the Second World War. At the time of the fall of France in 1940, public opinion polls showed that two-thirds of the American public supported direct military intervention in Latin America to forestall any German threat. [Ref. 61:p. 167] The United States then possessed

bases in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone. Even with this concern, the U.S. failed to learn from its World War I experience and again allowed the German U-boats to wreak havoc on shipping off of its East Coast and the Caribbean during the early years of the Second World War. American officials were worried by the Axis threat to the Caribbean region, especially in countries with large German populations. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, an attack on the Panama Canal by Japanese carrier-based aircraft and amphibious forces also seem a possibility. In December of 1941, following the Japanese and German declarations of war, reinforcements were quickly dispatched to Caribbean bases. The number of air and ground personnel sent in that month was double the number assigned to the area in the previous eleven months. In one year, the Caribbean Defense Command reached a total of 119,000 men, with half of them stationed in Panama. [Ref. 61:p. 177]

Three days before Germany declared war on the United States, Admiral Karl Donitz, head of the U-boat command, was told that all restrictions against sinking American ships were lifted. German U-boats were also authorized to sink allied shipping in American waters. Donitz requested a dozen U-boats to take advantage of the ill-prepared Americans. He received six, of which only five were operational at the moment. The first group was sent to the northeast U.S. coastline, where they sank numerous U.S.

merchant ships. In February, six more U-boats were ready for dispatch to America. Donitz correctly assumed that the Americans would be concentrating their limited anti-submarine forces to the north, where his first five submarines had inflicted heavy damage on U.S. and allied shipping with the loss of only a single submarine. This time Donitz sent his submarines to the Caribbean. By the end of March, Donitz's eleven U-boats had sunk 79 ships in Caribbean, Canadian and U.S. waters. At the end of April, Donitz claimed to have sunk 198 ships in American waters while losing only one U-boat. [Ref. 62:pp. 40-135]

Despite being thousands of miles from their support bases in occupied France, and though confronted by the threat of unopposed hostile air forces, the Germans U-boats managed to inflict substantial damage on the Allies in the Caribbean with only a minor investment of resources. The total number of ships sunk by the end of 1942 climbed to a staggering 336 ships, equaling 1.5 million tons (see Figure 2). In 1943, anti-submarine patrols, and a decline in U-boat activity due to events on the other side of the Atlantic, sharply reduced shipping losses in the Caribbean; to 35 ships in 1943 and only 3 in 1944. [Ref. 61:p. 178]

The only German submarine capable of the mission at the time was the Type VII. This submarine carried enough fuel for a six-week voyage, fourteen torpedoes and deck guns, and was capable of 17.5 knots surfaced and 7.5 submerged. This



Source: Admiral Wesley McDonald, "Atlantic Security--
The Cuban Factor" In Jane's Defense Weekly, 22
December 1984, p. 1109.

Figure 2. U.S. Merchant Ships Sunk Off East Coast
1941-42

information is important when we consider the enhanced capability of the Cuban and Soviet diesel submarines, not to mention the soviet nuclear attack submarines. [Ref. 62:p. 209]

Nor was the strategic threat to the United States during World War II limited to submarine warfare. The Germans had such contempt for America's ability to guard its own coast that, in June of 1942, they decided to land eight saboteurs on the U.S. mainland--four in New York and four in south Florida. (This attempt has been later referred to as the Amagansett Incident because the first group was delivered by U-boat to Amagansett, Long Island.) The attempt failed because a member of the group, a German-born American citizen caught in Germany during the War, betrayed the others. Nonetheless, the group had managed to bring enough money and explosives with them to engage in sabotage operations for two years. [Ref. 62:pp. 254-266]

The U-boat contribution to the overall German war effort during the two world wars was immense. In the First World War, the Germans managed to sink 4,837 ships (11 million tons). In World War II, the number of ships decreased to 2,828, but the tonnage increased to 14.5 million tons. [Ref. 60:p. 164] These historical figures should cause alarm to anyone who dismisses the present-day submarine threat as insignificant. It also points out the continuing

trend of fewer and larger ships being used to transport important resources such as crude oil and other strategic minerals. Today, a few hundred ships lost to submarines, mines or aircraft could cripple an allied war effort.

One must also realize that the U-boat threat was eventually countered in part by unopposed anti-submarine aircraft flying out of bases in friendly Caribbean countries, most notably Cuba. Today, Cuba is a hostile country which would not only deny the U.S. base rights, but could also be a source of fighter-bomber aircraft capable of threatening our anti-submarine aircraft, surface ships, and allied merchant shipping (see Figure 3).

These historical lessons have not been lost on the Soviet Navy. When confronted with the fact that NATO had 450 to 500 destroyers, frigates and corvettes available to safeguard merchant shipping in time of war, Admiral Gorshkov, the former Commander of the Soviet Navy, pointed out that 2,500 to 3,000 escorts were deployed in the Atlantic in 1943 to oppose about 210 operational German U-boats. Today the Soviet Navy has 180 attack submarines of which 40 percent are nuclear powered. The Soviets also have little need to protect the sea lanes for their own merchant ships in time of war, since they are self-sufficient in strategic minerals and supplies. [Ref. 63:p. 52]

In the 1980s, unlike in the past when the United States needed only to be concerned about the military forces of



Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power Fourth Edition, 1985, p. 120

Figure 3. Strategic Implications of MIG Aircraft Based in Cuba and Nicaragua (Combat Radius of MIG-21 and MIG-23 Aircraft)

far-off Germany and Japan, the United States faces a hostile government with considerable military strength less than 90 miles from the Florida coast. Even more worrisome, Cuba's geographic position now provides a friendly base for Soviet military aircraft, ships, and submarines. Most importantly, it supports the largest and most elaborate Soviet intelligence collection and analysis facility outside of the Soviet Union. The Lourdes installation near Havana would greatly enhance the Soviet's ability to locate and track U.S. naval combatants and merchant ships in the Caribbean. Soviet, or Cuban, submarines could then attack these targets at a time and place of their choosing.

In terms of conventional island defense, limited offensive operations, and extensive intelligence and sabotage operations, Fidel Castro has transformed Cuba into the strongest nation in Latin America.

The Soviets must realize the strategic importance of the Caribbean from studies of the two world wars. To Soviet planners, the Caribbean is an area in which they can tie down American strength with only a minimal investment of resources, in a manner similar to Germany's strategy forty years earlier.

For their part, the Cuban Armed Forces are continuing their arms build-up of Soviet weapons at a faster rate than any Warsaw Pact member [Ref. 28:p. 354]. And despite the setback of losing Grenada's international airport in 1983,

the infrastructure in Cuba and Nicaragua will continue to provide Cuban, Nicaraguan and Soviet air and naval assets with excellent operating facilities throughout the Caribbean Basin.

The combination of Soviet and Cuban assets in the Caribbean greatly complicates U.S. supply efforts to NATO allies in times of crisis or conflict. NATO forces must keep the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) open in order to sufficiently resupply allied forces in Europe. Many of the major U.S. Army units which are destined for NATO are located in the central U.S. with insufficient rail transport to take them to the eastern seaboard. Their only practical route is by rail or ship south towards the Gulf ports.

The map below indicates the location of major Army bases in the central United States. Obviously, components of NATO's strategy needs to be revised if naval convoys are expected to travel to Gulf ports, successfully transit the Caribbean with only a limited number of armed escorts, and then attempt to run a gauntlet of Soviet submarines in the Atlantic Ocean in time of war (see Figure 4).

In 1983, the United States Navy conducted a large-scale exercise in the Caribbean to test our ability to meet these requirements. The force totaled 43 warships and prompted Captain John E. Moore, editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, to comment that the exercise stretched the U.S. Navy assets "desperately tight. . . . The U.S. Navy simply does not

have enough ships; NATO does not have enough ships." [Ref. 64:p. 5]

A combination of Soviet and Cuban submarine assets in the Caribbean prior to the outbreak of hostilities would pose a serious ASW problem to the U.S. Navy's already limited resources, at a time when they may be needed elsewhere in the Atlantic.

Soviet deployment of some anti-SLOC submarines closer to the U.S. shoreline would oblige the United States to pull back its antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces from Europe and tie them down on the Eastern shore and in the Caribbean, giving the Soviets a freer rein in the European theater. [Ref. 65:p. 186]

It is at this level that our NATO allies may be able to fill the gap on either side of the Atlantic. Through NATO augmentation of ASW assets in the Caribbean, or by freeing U.S. assets in the North Atlantic, the United States would be able to dedicate more ASW capable ships in searching for Soviet/Cuban submarines in the Caribbean. The Soviet Union already challenges our critical east coast and Caribbean shipping lanes. The Soviets regularly deploy modern attack submarines to those areas, especially the U.S. east coast. For example, a VICTOR-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), experiencing propulsion problems off of the coast of Florida, surfaced, and was eventually towed to Cuba for repairs by a Soviet auxiliary unit in early 1984.

The growing Soviet-Cuban military challenge in the Caribbean Basin must force NATO to update its strategy of the 1950s in order to meet the realities of the 1980s. Some

NATO members, other than the United States, understand the challenge that a global Soviet presence presents to NATO, and advocate a more active role for the Alliance outside of NATO's traditional boundaries. For example, Geoffrey E. Pattie, a Conservative Member of Parliament, wrote in 1984:

. . . the tides of global events since 1949, along with the expanding outreach of Soviet conflict strategy, have thrown into sharper relief the intertwined nature of those strategic, economic and political interests within a heightened potential of proliferating conflict. The least that is incumbent upon the Alliance is a greatly improved consultative process--one that also features tightened interaction among the relevant components of the member governments. The process, however, has to be a two-way street: while those NATO members with the ability to act in specific circumstances abroad must shoulder the responsibility of consulting their allies to the maximum extent practicable, the latter cannot then stand apart with the pretense that the given action has nothing to do with them . . . [Ref. 66:p. 39]

The above statement is especially timely as the Reagan Administration tries to convince other NATO members of the threat posed by Nicaragua's military and political alliance with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The United States' policy of placing increased pressure on the Sandinista government is designed to reduce Nicaragua's military ties with the Soviets and Cubans. As such, it is an effort to prevent the already serious Soviet-Cuban threat from spreading to other parts of Central America and South America. While the current strategy may be open for debate, NATO must understand that limiting the Sandinista/Cuban/Soviet build-up in Nicaragua is in NATO's long-term interest. Some members of NATO have actually taken concrete measures to improve NATO's

security in the Caribbean. In November 1984, a West German frigate, two Dutch combatants, and a British and Canadian ship participated with twenty-five U.S. warships in the Composite Training Unit Exercise 1-85 off the coast of Puerto Rico [Ref. 67].

NATO strategists must appreciate the incremental threat that a hostile Cuba, with Soviet support, presents to United States and NATO security interests in the Caribbean. Summarizing the potential strategic threats posed by a strong Soviet-Cuban presence in the Caribbean Basin, the following are of primary concern to U.S. and NATO policymakers:

1. **Hostile Intelligence.** Besides Moscow operating in Cuba the largest electronic intelligence collection facility outside of the Soviet Union, we must assume that both the KGB and the DGI have networks of agents in the United States to report on the movement of U.S. military forces and/or merchant shipping. Our resupply efforts to NATO would be jeopardized if Soviet and Cuban submarines were aware of the location of our merchant and naval forces, and their operating schedules.

2. **Surface, Air, and Submarine Warfare.** The Cuban Navy and Air Force, combined with Soviet submarines, long-range aircraft, and deployed surface ships have the ability to harass merchant shipping and, if opposed by the American Navy and Air Force, these Soviet and Cuban forces could tie down anti-surface and anti-submarine assets many times their strength, assets which will be sorely needed in the North Atlantic.

3. **Mine Warfare.** In addition to the U-boat sinkings, the Germans were able to inflict serious damage on allied shipping through the use of mines. Even the American coast was mined by the German submarines in both world wars despite the great distances the German U-boats had to travel. A credible threat of mine warfare would cause a logjam of American merchant shipping. Many insurance companies would either raise their rates or refuse to insure ships travelling through minefields, which would be

a major factor on the United States' ability to resupply forces in a crisis situation short of full-scale war. The present tensions with Libya and Iran could involve such a resupply scenario. Today, the Soviet inventory of sea mines is well over the half-million mark. Considering the capability that Soviet nuclear and conventional submarines have to lay mines along the U.S. east coast and Caribbean, and our given inability to quickly and effectively sweep these sophisticated weapons, mine warfare must be considered as a serious threat. The offensive and defensive mine warfare capability of the Cuban Navy increases Castro's ability to assist Soviet mining operations, especially with its three new diesel attack submarines.

4. **Sabotage and Unconventional Warfare.** There are numerous high-value targets in the Caribbean such as oil platforms and terminals, communication relay stations, port facilities and even the Panama Canal. These targets could easily be damaged or destroyed by small groups of saboteurs or guerrillas. In El Salvador alone, small guerrilla forces have caused over \$1 billion in damage in the past five years [Ref. 54:p. 33]. During a major conflict, it is unlikely that the United States would have sufficient forces to guard all of these targets from attack.

The unknown factor in any assessment of the Cuban/Soviet strategic threat is obviously the likely behavior of the Cuban government during periods in which direct American military intervention is likely. Castro's options range from open belligerency against the U.S. to switching sides. Admiral McDonald states that the complexity of the decision-making apparatus in Cuba, particularly Castro's sometimes irrational behavior, forces NATO to consider the worst case scenario. [Ref. 16:p. 1110]

Sophisticated hostile forces on Cuba, located in the middle of our vital shipping lanes, pose a serious threat to NATO as well as to U.S. security interests. Presently, we do not have enough resources to deal with a Caribbean threat while simultaneously fighting a European war. This

situation will get even worse if Nicaraguan airfields and ports become operational for Soviet/Cuban forces. NATO's Caribbean strategists must learn the historical lessons of the last two world wars, while dealing with our present-day threats to this region.

NATO and the United States need to come to a consensus with regard to an adequate defense policy in the Caribbean Basin, in peacetime and in war, with a possible formal commitment to defend NATO's interests in that region if they should become threatened. Such an announcement by NATO would likely cause the Soviets and Cubans to reevaluate their position and possibilities in the Caribbean, specifically in Nicaragua and Central America. A joint policy would allow for a more comprehensive strategy towards deploying NATO's air, naval and land-based assets, and simplify command and control in what is now considered a peripheral zone of NATO's responsibility. It would also improve coordination and sharing of U.S. and European intelligence data, thus making infiltration, sabotage and terrorist operations more difficult for Spetznaz, KGB and DGI personnel.

How successful NATO is in dealing with the out-of-area threats will determine the viability of the Alliance into the next century. As William T. Tow states:

NATO's ultimate survival may well rest on the Europeans' future inclinations for moving beyond parochial reliance on strict constructionists rationales and stale policy ambiguities to search for more enlightened, if more risky,

incentives for security cooperation with the United States. . . [Ref. 68:p. 856]


In conjunction with local Soviet forces, the Cuban threat to United States and NATO's security interests is a major challenge to the United States. Cuba's ability to incite and facilitate regional conflict also represents a threat to the United States and her regional allies. This is even more difficult to deal with because of its indigenous and complex nature, and the inability of United States policy makers to even recognize the problem, let alone to arrive at a consensus for dealing with it over the long term. A closer look at Cuba's regional agenda and efforts in the Caribbean Basin is useful in order to understand the enormity of Castro's challenge to United States security interests over the next decade.

B. THE REGIONAL THREAT

Cuba's ability to threaten regional stability far exceeds its military, economic and political resources. To compensate for its lack of resources, Cuba has used the massive social-economic problems in Latin America for political advantage since the early days of the Cuban Revolution. Through clever manipulation and propaganda, Havana has successfully made inroads into Latin America by claiming that the United States is responsible for many of the region's problems. In order to turn the propaganda war into a guerrilla war, Castro has recruited an unusual

assortment of allies in the Caribbean Basin and South America. As we have seen, members of this alliance include nationalists, Marxist guerrillas, terrorist groups, liberation theologians, drug traffickers and any other group or individual willing to support Cuba's strategy. While many individuals and countries have clearly rejected Castro's call to arms, the Cubans have succeeded in a few areas over the past decade.

Since 1979, with the Sandinistas' victory in Nicaragua and the Bishop coup in Grenada, Cuba has been able to expand its military presence into areas within the United States' regional security zone. While Castro's commitment to these countries may seem small at first glance, it represents a major challenge to regional stability. For example, Soviet bloc arms transfers to Nicaragua have made that country a major military power by Central American standards (see Figure 5). The Sandinista Armed Forces, while presently lacking large numbers of sophisticated aircraft, could eventually augment Cuban forces in the region. It is believed that a number of MIGs in Cuba are actually Soviet transfers to Nicaragua awaiting the proper political climate for re-transfer to Managua [Ref. 69]. The increase in Nicaragua's military power, in addition to Central American insurgencies backed by Cuba and Nicaragua, has spawned a regional arms race that none of the debt-ridden nations can afford. This



Source: U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean, p. 25, March 1985

Figure 5. Soviet-Bloc Arms Deliveries to Nicaragua 1980-1984 (in metric tons)

has in turn further complicated the social-economic and political problems at the root of the region's troubles.

Havana's challenge to United States' security interests is much more serious than Cuba's small gains in the Caribbean Basin would normally warrant. As the authors of one recent assessment of the Cuban regional threat indicate:

. . . the projection of power involves the creation of a system, the whole of which is greater than the sum of its parts. The creation of alternative staging posts, "coaling stations," and intelligence outposts multiplies leverage, both military and political. A sub-system of the Soviet system in the Caribbean has vastly greater implications than implied by the cumulation of assets created. Thus it may be congenial to Soviet objectives to have bases in Cuba from which to harass and encroach upon the United States. But were Nicaragua to become as much integrated into the Soviet system as Cuba, not only would there be a multiplication of Soviet influence and opportunities, but presumably of Cuba's too. It is this which explains why the elimination of Cuban and Soviet influence in Grenada was correctly seen in Washington as more important than the minuscule size of Grenada would suggest. [Ref. 70:p. 20]

Obviously, Cuba's regional strategy suffered a serious setback with the loss of Grenada in 1983. The new international airport in Grenada would have been a major asset in Castro's regional and global interventionist policy. The airport would have allowed Cuban troops, advisors and material to transit directly to Africa without the need to refuel in "hostile" or "non-socialist" countries. The airport would have also made it easier for radical regimes such as Libya to support Cuba and its clients with war material from the Middle East and the Soviet Bloc, by

allowing these regimes to transport arms to Latin America without declaring its cargo enroute at "Western" airports.

The captured Grenada documents confirmed that equipment supplied to the Bishop regime was provided by the Soviets, East Germans and North Koreans by formal bi-lateral agreements. Cuba's role was merely that of an agent responsible for re-transferring the equipment to mask its original source. [Ref. 3:p. 6] The Cubans did, however, sign agreements to provide training for Grenadian soldiers, and assist the Marxist leaders of Grenada in finding additional training programs in Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Libya, East Germany and North Korea. [Ref. 3:p. 7] Hence, the loss of Grenada not only cost Cuba a valuable ally in the Caribbean, it also damaged Cuba's image as a regional power.

Prior to the Grenada action, there were indications that Cuba's influence in the Caribbean was on the decline. Public opinion polls conducted in Central America showed that most people believed that Cuba was dominated by the Soviet Union and a threat to peace in the region. [Ref. 54:p. 37] In Jamaica's 1980 election campaign, over 500 people were killed in pre-election violence. Many of the weapons used in the attacks were believed to be from stockpiles in the Cuban embassy. [Ref. 35:p. 9]

After Edward Seaga defeated Michael Manley's pro-Cuban party in the election, the Cuban embassy staff was reduced and the embassy later closed in 1981 by the new Jamaican

government [Ref. 35:p. 11]. Following the violence in Grenada and the discovery of extensive Cuban and Eastern bloc power and influence on that tiny island, many Caribbean Basin nations quickly moved to reduce the number of Cuban personnel in their own countries [Ref. 71:p. 11].

Havana operates within certain parameters in an effort to avoid direct military conflict with the United States. Cuba's location, only 90 miles from the U.S., is a double-edged sword. While it allows Cuba to threaten U.S. security, it also facilitates retaliation should Cuba violate the limits of U.S. patience. Castro, remembering the outcome of the Cuban Missile crisis, cannot rely on Soviet assistance in a Cuban-United States conflict should he provoke Washington. Moscow realizes the inherent limitations of the Cuban armed forces, even as an interventionary force in Africa, should they confront a modern well-equipped foe such as the South Africans. The Cuban defeat in Grenada highlights the limits of Cuban power. Rose E. Gottemoeller describes the Cuban value to the Soviet Union's Third World strategy in the following terms:

The leverage that the Cubans can gain from their relationship with the Soviet Union, however, is limited. The Angolan conflict provided the important example of Cuban failures against the South Africans. While Cuban successes speak well for the military prowess of the Warsaw Pact, defeats against troops carrying advanced Western weapons have the opposite effect.

Based on the Angola experience, the Soviets may perceive the Cubans to be of limited usefulness in any venture where advanced Western military technology and tactics are likely to play a role. Such Soviet

perceptions may in turn lead to controls on Cuban attempts to pursue its own objectives in the Third World. [Ref. 2:p. 17]

This also explains, in part, why the Soviets provide the Cuban armed forces only limited airlift and sealift resources.

Yet, the Cuban armed forces, despite their limitations, are a formidable adversary. Most Western nations have not been involved in combat operations since the Second World War. It would be foolish to underestimate the FAR's improvement and combat experience over the last two decades. The Cubans are especially adept at fighting in low-intensity conflicts. In these types of confrontations, modern technological firepower provides only marginal advantages, with the U.S. experience in Vietnam providing a prime example.

On the other end of the warfare spectrum, Cuban espionage, disinformation, and support for drug traffickers could pose a serious challenge to Latin American governments allied with the United States, and the United States itself. The theft of advance technology and military secrets from the U.S. is only surpassed by the enormous quantities of illegal drugs entering the country. The political leadership of countries such as Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and most importantly for U.S. security, Panama and Mexico, is being challenged by the \$50 billion-a-year drug-related industries in those countries. The costs to the United States'

government in fighting this nation's drug problem is staggering, and is likely to rise over the next decade.

Cuba's growing military power and institutional outreach programs in the Caribbean Basin has taken the United States almost by surprise. Western strategic planners must also take into consideration the incremental nature of the Cuban threat when determining the defense requirements for the Caribbean Basin and NATO resupply over the next fifteen years, into the year 2000.

VII. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CUBA INTERVENTIONS

We have seen Castro's worldwide commitment in support of revolution and revolutionary regimes in Africa, the Middle East and the Caribbean Basin. Presently, Cuba has over 35,000 combat troops supporting friendly regimes in the Third World. Many of these troops are actually involved in fighting, while others are subjected to harsh living conditions and disease in the interest of Cuban and Soviet "proletarian internationalism." The prospects of these forces returning to Cuba in the near future appears extremely remote. The Cuban forces in Angola will continue to support the Marxist MPLA government in their civil war against the powerful UNITA guerrillas, a war which is now in its twelfth year. The Cuban forces in Nicaragua must build up the Sandinista armed forces while fighting with these same troops against the Honduran-based Contra insurgents. Castro believes he must also keep a large number of Cuban troops in Nicaragua to act as a deterrent to any possible U.S. military action against the Sandinista regime. In Ethiopia, the number of Cuban military advisors has decreased from a high of 15,000 to less than 3,000. However, training the Ethiopian Armed Forces to maintain large quantities of sophisticated Soviet military hardware, and fight a variety of insurgencies, will likely require

Cuba to maintain a significant military presence in that country for many years to come. The effects of the bloody civil war that broke out the spring of 1986 in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen are still unknown. However, it is probable that rebuilding the armed forces of that Soviet client will also tax the Cuban Expeditionary Forces. Mozambique, another recipient of Cuban military assistance, is also a potential burden for Havana, since the Maputo government is being seriously challenged by an insurgency supported by neighboring South Africa.

When one considers all of the large-scale military operations in which Cuba is presently involved, the prospects of new Cuban interventions in the Third World appear greatly diminished. Besides the obvious costs and hardships involved in these efforts, Havana is also increasingly concerned by a more self-confident United States. The loss of Grenada in 1983 was a major blow to Cuban foreign policy, in that it exposed Cuba's inability to come to the aid of one of its client states. This lesson was not lost on other Cuban supported regimes in Africa and the Caribbean Basin, specifically Surinam, which quickly expelled all Cuban advisors following the events in Grenada.

Cuba's past successes in military adventures in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East were contingent on many variables working in Havana's favor. The most important of these variables were, and still are: 1) the objective

conditions within the target country; 2) the readiness of the Soviet Union to support Cuban military interventions with substantial political, economic and military resources; and (3) the inability or unwillingness of the United States, or its allies, to challenge Havana politically or militarily. For Havana, none of these variables appear very promising in the late-1980s. Cuba's limited success in Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua was the result of unique internal and external circumstances. Today, all of the above countries are beset by insurgencies, poor economic performance and diplomatic isolation. To the Soviets, the above countries (including the PDRY) have proven to be expensive embarrassments rather than models of Marxism-Leninism in the Third World.

Under Gorbachev the Kremlin has shown little interest in "expanding" the Soviet empire in the same manner as the Brezhnev regime did during the 1970s. To the present Soviet leadership, the excessive economic and political costs implied in such an effort far outweigh whatever political and strategic gains that may result from such ventures. Nicaragua may be an exception, because of its small size, strategic importance, and the relative low cost of the program when compared to Angola or Ethiopia. At a time when the Soviets are trying to reform their own depressed economy, the thought of acquiring new destitute nations in the Third World (which may defect to the West the way Egypt

did in the early 1970s) can hardly be an attractive proposition to Kremlin strategic planners. According to the RAND Corporation's Francis Fukayama:

In addition to the steadily increasing subsidy to Cuba (currently estimated at \$5 billion a year), Soviet activism in the late 1970s saddled Moscow with costly new multibillion-dollar obligations to countries like Vietnam, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Angola. The total cost of the Soviet empire rose, according to one recent calculation, from an estimated range of \$13.6 billion to \$21.8 billion in 1971, to between \$35.9 billion and \$46.5 billion in 1980. At the same time, the growth rate of the Soviet GNP fell precipitously, due to a declining rate of growth in labor productivity. [Ref. 72:p. 718]

By analyzing the singular variable of arms transfers, one understands just how costly Soviet activism in the Third World was in the 1970s. Prior to the 1970s, Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World were less than \$1 billion per year. From 1970 to 1978, the dollar amount has ranged between \$2 billion and \$3.8 billion per year, making the Soviets the second largest supplier of arms in the world with approximately 30 percent of all transfers. [Ref. 73:p. 75]

From 1973-1977, the Soviets exported \$16.5 billion in arms with 50 percent being sent to the Middle East from 1974-1978 (Syria, Iraq and Libya). While the economic motive may have prevailed concerning arms transfers to wealthy Middle Eastern OPEC nations (including Algeria), the Soviets also supplied large quantities of weapons in the 1970s to sub-Saharan African nations. In 1974, the Soviets shipped \$90 million worth of arms to select clients in this

region of Africa. By 1978, the amount of arms involved was \$1.2 billion. [Ref. 73:p. 75] Today, the major Soviet recipients of weapons in Africa south of the Sahara are Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique (the Soviet Union has Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with all three), the Congo Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria and Zambia [Ref. 28:pp. 345-443].

In Asia, the Soviets must take the Chinese threat into consideration when contemplating arms transfers. The major recipients of Soviet arms in Asia remain North Korea, Vietnam and to a lesser extent, Laos. Considering the meager economic resources of these three countries, and the quantity of weapons in their inventories, the costs to the Soviets in supplying their Asian allies with advanced weaponry must be staggering.

Another factor, besides cost, which has also soured Soviet interest in building Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World is the political underdevelopment of its client states. Few of the Kremlin's Third World allies have proven their ability to form stable governments. The bloody civil war in the People's Democratic of Yemen (PDRY) during the spring of 1986 confirmed the Kremlin's worst fears: not only are these self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes economically and politically underdeveloped, they are also inherently unstable. The disappointment in the PDRY and a similar bloody coup in Grenada only three years earlier, has

likely had a profound effect on the direction of Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World. The Soviets have learned the hard way that their enormous expenditures of economic and military aid in the Third World have not yet provided them with either significant economic dividends, or stable allies.

The Soviet outlook towards increased activism in the Third World is beyond the scope of this paper, yet it seems safe to assume that the Kremlin's interest in sponsoring military interventions, with or without the Cubans, in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, is at its lowest point in many years. [Ref. 72:pp. 715-731]

Havana's opportunities for military interventions in the Third World are not much brighter. Few situations exist where the Cuban Expeditionary Forces could achieve a quick and conclusive victory and not suffer severe political and possibly military consequences. In Angola, in 1975, the Cubans were able to intervene on behalf of their established friends, the MPLA. Then the Cuban troops were seen as a "liberating" force by most of the continent, especially after the Cubans engaged the South African forces invading from the south.

The Soviet-Cuban intervention into Ethiopia in 1977 was also a unique case in that the Soviets and the Cubans responded to Ethiopia's request for assistance only after Somalia had invaded the Ogaden desert--which was recognized

as an integral part of Ethiopia by most of Africa and the world. One of the basic tenants of the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) charter is that boundaries between African states are sacrosanct. By responding to Ethiopia's request to expel the Somali invaders, the Soviet and Cuban forces were acting within the legal bounds of the OAU charter. However, the provisions of the OAU can also apply to Cuba and the Soviet Union. By responding to Ethiopia's request, the Soviets and Cubans were also limiting their future involvement in African conflicts to defensive actions. Such limitations are not an ideal starting point for Moscow and Havana if they are trying to expand their influence in Africa by military means.

There is one country in Africa in which the OAU charter would not apply, and therefore, cannot be discounted as a possible target for Soviet-Cuban "cooperative intervention" at a later date. The country is of course South Africa. With decolonization in Africa complete, the Soviets and Cubans would need to target a country outside of the protective framework of the OAU. South Africa has long been a pariah state of not only Africa, but of the entire world. Should the internal situation deteriorate to the point of open civil war, the Soviets and Cubans could intervene with little chance of armed opposition by Western nations. With over 30,000 Cuban soldiers already in neighboring Angola, and another 1,000 in Mozambique, the Cubans have the

necessary infrastructure already in place should they, and the Soviets, decide to act. A decisive military intervention into South Africa to "liberate" that country from imperialism and racism would significantly boost Soviet-Cuban prestige in the Third World.

The prospects for further Soviet-Cuban gains in Central America have also diminished over the past five years. With the elections of civilian presidents in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, the guerrilla option has become less attractive to a majority of Central Americans. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas are on the defensive both militarily and politically, making Cuban efforts to discredit Washington's Central American policy even more difficult. For Havana, Central America has proven to be a much more difficult area to spread revolution than previously thought following the Sandinistas' victory in 1979. The Cubans have become more aware of their limitations: they are no longer able to inspire revolution in the Third World, but can only facilitate it if the objective conditions already exist.

What will Havana's strategy be until, when, and if the above conditions shift back into Cuba's favor? Will Cuba abandon its efforts in the Caribbean Basin and Africa? This is not likely given Havana's commitment towards spreading violent revolution through armed struggle. It is conceivable that Castro will modify his tactics in Latin America.

In the short run, Cuba can be expected to hold on to its revolutionary gains in Nicaragua while it waits for the objective conditions in the Caribbean Basin to change in Havana's favor. Meanwhile, the Cubans will continue to provide their Praetorian guard services for small pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World. Havana may also expand its military's mobile training team (MTT) service to recipients of modern Soviet arms willing to reimburse Cuba for its services. This would not only provide Cuba with desperately needed hard currency, but would also assist the Soviets in its arms sales to Third World clients. Likely recipients for this service are OPEC members such as Libya, Iraq, and Algeria, and possibly, important Soviet clients such as Afghanistan, the PDRY, and Vietnam.

Cuba should be expected to continue its support for guerrilla, terrorist and drug trafficking organizations in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere. Since the early days of the Cuban Revolution, Cuba has assisted revolutionary groups by supplying arms and training in limited quantities. Following the Sandinista's rise to power in Nicaragua in July of 1979, Cuba renewed its efforts to unite, train and supply guerrilla groups in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. These groups have achieved some success, and are far from being completely destroyed by government forces. Yet the Cuban supported insurgencies in Central America are on the defensive and unlikely to achieve victory in the next

few years. The Cubans are aware of this fact and have, as a result, limited their assistance to these groups for practical and strategic reasons.

The third factor which determines the prospects of Cuban intervention in the Third World is the willingness of the United States and its allies to confront Soviet-Cuban interventions. This variable is the hardest to assess. Washington's policy toward Cuba has been anything but consistent. The Carter Administration's efforts to entice Havana into pursuing a more moderate foreign policy in the 1970s was answered by massive Cuban military interventions in Angola and Ethiopia. The Reagan Administration's policy of confronting Havana's efforts (in El Salvador, Grenada and Nicaragua) has made Castro more cautious, but has not solved the overall problem of an aggressive and hostile power 90 miles off of the U.S.'s southern shore. Edward Gonzalez, a consultant for the Rand Corporation on Cuban affairs and U.S. policy, has suggested a policy which combines the two approaches. He calls it the "Finlandization" approach which limits Castro's options to those which do not jeopardize United States' interests in the Caribbean region, but which allows Cuba to maintain a foreign policy independent of Washington. Gonzalez believes that this can only be achieved by a combination of economic and political incentives (carrots), counterbalanced by U.S. military

pressure, and if necessary military action (sticks), should Castro threaten U.S. interests. [Ref. 14]

In the next decade, with Havana's options decreasing, Washington's actions will have a profound effect on the direction of Cuban foreign policy. It is crucial for the United States to follow a policy which will influence Havana to take a non-militant direction in its foreign policy. While Fidel Castro is a relatively young leader and appears in robust health, the United States should begin to plan its strategy for a post-Castro Cuba. Whenever Castro departs Cuba's political scene, a more imaginative United States approach to the Cuban problem may be politically possible.

Discounting Castro's death or ouster in the near future, what do all of these above developments mean for the direction of Cuban foreign policy in the next ten years? Will Castro abandon Cuba's revolutionary zeal in an attempt to improve relations with its neighbors? Can Cuba alter its course after a quarter-century of revolutionary commitment? Today, Cuba's options are probably more limited than at any other time of its revolutionary history. Cuba's continued poor economic performance has made Castro's Cuba a ward of the Soviet Union and CEMA. Twenty-eight years following Castro's rise to power, Cuba's major assets remain its strategic location and capability to export revolution. In a recent article, W. Raymond Duncun describes the current Soviet-Cuban relationship in the following terms:

Despite serious disagreements, both countries continue to perceive the benefits of close collaboration as outweighing the costs. For Castro, the benefits derive from Soviet assistance essential for maintaining Cuba's economy and defense. Hence he is likely to continue accommodating the Soviet line, but only so long as it does not threaten his leadership of the Cuban party and his general standing among Third World revolutionaries, especially in Central and South America. For the Soviets, Cuba's strategic geopolitical position is the main asset. There are also past investments to protect and Moscow's reputation as the "natural ally" of the Third World to safeguard. Even if Gorbachev's emphasis is on cost-effectiveness in domestic and foreign policies, the Soviet leader will probably still consider Cuba a useful investment as Moscow continues to compete with the United States. [Ref. 46:p. 56]

Whether the Soviets, and their Cuban allies, will attempt a militant foreign policy in the Third World in the next few years will depend on Moscow's evaluation of the international political climate, the objective conditions of the target region, and the available equipment and manpower resources of the Soviets and their allies--including the Cubans. While Castro's resources to conduct major operations without the support of the Soviet Union remains limited, it must not be discounted. Castro has surprised his adversaries and allies in the past, and may attempt to do so again in the future. Castro is most likely to act if he feels that Moscow is abandoning Cuban interests in the Caribbean Basin in favor of improved Soviet-U.S. relations. Jaime Suchlicki has noticed that:

Castro's political style and ideology make him more prone to deviate to the left than to the right of the Soviet line, which means that if the Soviets urge restraints, he might either maintain his position or shift to a more radical approach. [Ref. 74:p. 29]

In the past chapters, we have seen the strengths and weaknesses of Cuba's ability to support armed revolution. No one is more aware of these limitations and assets than Fidel Castro and the core of the Cuban government. Therefore we can expect the Cuban government to continue with the revolutionary system it has institutionalized since the 1970s with certain modifications. Castro has always shown the ability to maintain his revolutionary credentials by building alliances with nations or groups which share his goals. The Soviet Union, while the longest and most important Cuban ally, is only one of Havana's supporters. Since the early 1960s, Castro has also worked with international terrorist groups, regional guerrilla fronts, Vietnam, North Korea, radical Middle Eastern regimes, and any other regime or organization willing to support Havana's revolutionary agenda. The United States must be prepared if Castro decides to search out unlikely allies in an attempt to revitalize Cuba's revolutionary credentials. The South African scenario has already been mentioned, but there are other powerful revolutionary forces in the world that are more dangerous for United States' security, such as terrorism in support of Palestinian nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Already we have seen signs of Cuban cooperation with Qhadaffi's Libya and possibly with the Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran [Ref. 75].

In summary, Castro's priorities for the duration of the 1980s most likely will remain as follows. First, protection of revolutionary gains. In both Africa and Latin America, Cuba has invested an enormous amount of resources, manpower and prestige. A reverse in any of these countries, specifically Angola, Ethiopia, or Nicaragua, would be a serious blow to Havana's credibility as a revolutionary power. This is especially true following the loss of Grenada. Second, await new opportunities for military operations in the Third World. While no major overt action by the Cubans is likely to take place until the objective conditions for intervention and revolution improve, that does not mean that the Cuban regime's revolutionary foreign policy will go into hibernation until these changes take place. Cuba will continue to sponsor terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the Caribbean Basin. Castro's target countries in the region can still be destabilized as long as the United States' Central American policy continues to waver. Many of these regimes have only recently become "democratic," and are therefore weak and vulnerable. By encouraging a breakdown of authority in these countries, Castro can hasten the return of military dictatorships, and thus create the proper objective conditions for Cuban-sponsored subversion and intervention. Should the democratic reforms in many of these countries stagnate, the guerrilla alternative will again become attractive. Third,

sharpen Cuba's military skills through low-cost military training missions in Africa, the Middle East, and Nicaragua. The use of small conflicts or training missions maintains Cuba's combat edge while increasing its prestige and pool of future allies. This is mandatory for future Cuban military interventions if and when the conditions for such actions reappear.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Since the Cuban challenge to United States' security interests is unlikely to recede or disappear over the next decade, further research into the Cuban interventionary threat will be required. We should expect Cuba's military, paramilitary, intelligence and logistical ability to improve and expand into the 1990s. Therefore, it is mandatory that the United States improve its long-range intelligence collection and analysis effort in the Caribbean region, in order to monitor future Cuban developments. Such an undertaking could prove invaluable as the Soviet-Cuban presence expands in the Caribbean Basin.

This thesis has tried to demonstrate that the Cuban challenge to Western security interests depends on a combination of internal and external factors. Among the most important of these factors are:

- 1) The composition of the Cuban decision-making process (specifically the Politburo and Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party). Changes in important positions in the FAR, the Ministry of the Interior, and other top security-related positions is also an important indicator of the direction of Cuban foreign policy.
- 2) The Cuban-Soviet relationship. Specifically, Moscow's ability and willingness to subsidize the Cuban economy and support Cuba's foreign policy with the necessary military and economic resources. (Soviet arms supplied to Nicaragua and Grenada, via Cuba, is an example of the military support, while the Nicaraguan and Grenadian multi-million dollar airports and public works projects are perfect examples of the latter.)

- 3) The professionalization, expansion, and modernization of the Cuban Armed Forces (FAR), and of Havana's intelligence services. While the combined Soviet-Cuban effort to transform the Cuban military and security services into the second most powerful military power in the Caribbean Basin has been remarkable, the FAR and DGI will continue to need more modern equipment and training to maintain their proficiency. This will require that both Moscow and Havana continue to divert valuable resources to these organizations, and provide advanced training, in order to maintain their combat readiness.
- 4) The state of Cuba's relations with the United States, Western Europe, and other non-socialist nations in the Third World. Cuba's ability to expand its influence in the Third World, specifically the Western Hemisphere, depends a great deal on Havana not provoking the United States or isolating itself from other Third World nations. Should Castro transcend the limits of Washington's tolerance, Cuban forces or Cuba itself may become the target of military reprisals by the United States. Castro's foreign policy cannot afford another Grenada-type failure, especially in Nicaragua. Castro is aware of this and has tried to improve relations with the United States, and other Latin American nations. With a number of Latin American nations turning towards the democratic alternative, Cuba cannot be seen as an enemy of democracy. Castro has publicly supported these new democracies while privately he sees them as a barrier to his ambitions in the region. Good relations with Western Europe are also important for Cuban foreign policy. Western Europe is an important trading partner with Cuba, and a major source of hard currency. Cuba can therefore ill afford to jeopardize this relationship.
- 5) The Cuban economy must improve its performance and efficiency if it is to survive. There are limits to the amount of economic aid the Soviets are willing to provide Havana. The Gorbachev regime has already put the Cubans on notice that unless they are able to get their economic house in order, Moscow may freeze economic aid at current levels. Castro has taken action by instituting a number of Gorbachev-type reforms and firing top economic planners for past failures. At first glance it appears that the technocrats (pragmatists) are regaining power in the Cuban government, while at the same time these gains have been more than offset by Castro's dramatic recentralization effort over the past two years. [Ref. 52:p. 118]

Since we are not privy to the notes and discussions of the Soviet and Cuban Politburos, we must use alternate methods of analysis to understand how each of these nations develop their foreign policies and strategies, and implement these policies. We are especially concerned with the use of military missions overseas, or power projections, to achieve foreign policy goals. Future research on the Cuban threat should therefore deal with the above five factors. Despite the fact that Cuba is a closed society, the West does receive pieces of information which indicates the direction of Cuban foreign policy, and the extent of Soviet-Cuban cooperation during any given period. The most reliable sources of information on Cuban intentions tend to be the following: 1) announcements of top Cuban officials being fired or promoted; 2) themes of Castro's recent public speeches; and 3) the presence, or absence, of top Soviet or Cuban officials at each other's major political events.

An example of this was Cuban displeasure with current Soviet economic policy towards Cuba and strategy differences regarding Nicaragua. Castro was furious when Moscow threatened to freeze Soviet aid to Cuba at current levels unless Havana put its economic house in order. In March 1984, Castro was again annoyed by the Soviets when the Kremlin refused to let a Soviet naval flotilla make a port visit in Nicaragua after a Soviet tanker had been seriously damaged by a U.S. mine in Puerto Sandino. Castro wanted the

Soviets to go ahead with the port visit to show Moscow's military resolve for the Sandinista government. As a result of these differences, Castro refused to attend the June 1984 CEMA summit meeting and the funeral of Mikhail Gorbachev's predecessor, Konstantin Chernenko in 1985. The Kremlin responded by sending a low-level Soviet delegation to Cuba's 26th of July celebration in 1984. [Ref. 46:p. 49]

The final source of information useful in determining Soviet-Cuban relations and the direction of Cuban foreign policy is the amount, and quality, of Soviet economic and military assistance to Cuba. The above four sources of information are critical in analyzing the five factors of Cuban policies mentioned earlier. This section will now recommend how these sources of information can be used to determine the state and direction of the necessary factors for Cuba's interventionary policy.

First, the composition of the Cuban decision-making process. We have learned that the institutionalized Cuba Government of the 1980s is composed of the fidelistas, raulistas, and pragmatists. Since the mid-1970s, almost 80% of the top positions in the Cuban Politburo, Central Committee, and the Communist Party (PCC) have been controlled by a combination of fidelistas and raulistas. Both of these factions support an aggressive, revolutionary foreign policy. Over the past year, Fidel Castro has fired many of his top administrators, Politburo members, and loyal

followers since the early days of the revolutionary struggle against Batista. Among the victims of the bloodless purges have been the former minister of the interior, Ramiro Valdes, the former minister of transportation, Garcia Frias, the former health minister, Sergio del Valle, and Jesus Montane, a long-time revolutionary leader (although his replacement was believed to have been for health reasons). These dismissals in the Politburo came after the firing of 11 top Cuban officials in 1985, most of whom were involved in economic management [Ref. 46:pp. 52-53]. The exact reasons for these purges, and whether it indicates a realignment of power between the three bureaucratic factions in the Cuban Government is still unclear. It is critical that these developments be followed closely, for they may indicate a fundamental change in the composition of the top levels of the Cuban Government, and a redirection for Havana's foreign policy agenda.

The second factor to be studied is the nature of the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This requires an understanding of both Cuban and Soviet politics and decision-making. Should Moscow find Cuba's policy of exporting revolution to be both too expensive economically and too dangerous politically, it is likely that the Soviets will apply the necessary economic and political pressure to force Havana to desist. The Gorbachev Regime, besides emphasizing economic performance at home, has shown, much to Castro's chagrin,

more interest in East-West strategic matters than in North-South issues. Missing from recent Gorbachev speeches are references to national liberation movements in Africa, the Middle East, or Latin America. Instead of promising Soviet political, economic, and military aid to assist the enslaved masses of the Third World gain their freedom from imperialism (common during the Brezhnev years), today's Kremlin leadership has recently described their commitment to the Third World in far less grandiose terms. Both Mikhail Gorbachev and his predecessor, Yuri Andropov have described the Soviets program to the Third World as one of "profound sympathy for the aspirations of peoples under the heavy and demeaning yoke of colonialism." [Ref. 72:p. 715] Castro's concern that the Soviets might neglect Third World issues (the linchpin of Cuban foreign policy) was evident when he spoke in February of this year to the 27th Party Congress of the Soviet Union. According to W. Raymond Duncan, Castro reminded his Soviet audience:


. . . that national liberation struggles in "Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Western Sahara, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea" were not fought without great costs. He argued that "the fruit of the blood and lives of many of the best sons of our peoples" should not be reduced in world affairs to "so-called low-level conflicts." [Ref. 46:p. 54]

Whether or not Castro is able to convince the Soviets of the need to support Cuba's Third World revolutionary program is yet to be seen. It is known that Soviet support is crucial if Cuban revolutionary programs in the Third World

are to succeed in the long run. Castro can assist small terrorist groups and guerrilla organizations, but these organizations will never be able to achieve or maintain power without substantial military and economic aid from the East bloc. If the Soviets are swayed by Havana as to the utility of Cuban assisted revolution, it remains to be seen what resources Moscow is willing or able to provide to support such a program. Without substantial economic and military support for Cuban interventions in the Third World, these efforts are doomed to fail much like similar Cuban efforts in the 1960s. The United States has been able to measure accurately Soviet military and economic assistance to Havana since the Cuban Missile Crisis. A precipitous drop in Soviet shipments to Havana could signify serious tension between Moscow and Havana, while an increase in economic and military aid could mean the opposite. Re-transfer of this aid, by Cuba, to a third country such as Nicaragua, would likely mean Soviet agreement with Cuba's regional policies.

The development of the Cuban Armed Forces should be of critical concern to the United States. While the FAR and the Cuban intelligence services are easily the second most powerful force in the Caribbean (after the United States), they will require further deliveries of advanced Soviet military hardware in order to maintain their fighting edge and expand their range. In the first five years of this

decade, the Cuban army, navy and air force received more Soviet military hardware than at any time since the 1962 missile crisis (see Figure 6). The more lethal equipment supplied by Moscow to Havana included: three new-construction diesel-powered submarines, two large frigates, two amphibious landing ships, a few batteries of SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, and over 30 MIG-23 fighter-bombers. On the other hand, many of the ships, aircraft, and tanks supplied by the Soviets to Cuba in the 1960s and early 1970s will soon become obsolete (see Appendix D). Should the Soviets continued to supply Havana with numerous advanced weapons, Cuba's ability to threaten the Caribbean sealandes will increase drastically over the next decade. However, should the Soviets slow down the transfer of modern arms to Cuba, the FAR's capability would slowly deteriorate. It is therefore critical that the United States carefully monitor Soviet arms transfers to Cuba. Castro also needs large shipments of less-sophisticated Soviet weapons to replace arms his regime transfers to guerrilla groups and friendly revolutionary governments. Further research should indicate where, how many, and what kind of weapons the Soviets are shipping to the Third World. Appendix B provides the reader with an understanding of where, in the Third World, Soviet weapons have been sent in the past, and the compatibility of these weapons with what Moscow has placed in the Cuban inventory.



Source: U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean, p. 9, March 1985

Figure 6. Soviet Arms Deliveries to Cuba 1970-1984
(in thousands of metric tons)

The direction of Cuba's diplomatic and economic relations with the United States, Western Europe, and other non-socialist countries in the Third World will also be a major factor in the direction of Havana's revolutionary policy. Cuba must avoid provoking Washington to the point that the United States responds militarily. The Western Europeans, besides the economic assistance they provide to the Cuban economy, are powerful allies in preventing Washington from taking military action against either Nicaragua or Cuba. An aggressive Cuban foreign policy may convince the Western Europeans to side with the United States in the Caribbean Basin under the banner of NATO unity.

Cuba must also improve its image in the Third World. Cuba's prestige in the Third World has suffered greatly following Havana's support for the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Diplomatic relations between Cuba and a number of countries in the Caribbean Basin, especially the English-speaking countries, have remained strained in the aftermath of Grenada. Colombia severed relations with Havana in 1981, after evidence of Cuban-sponsored terrorism became irrefutable. Castro cannot afford to be isolated again in the Western Hemisphere as he was in the 1960s. This has created a tremendous dilemma for the Cuban leadership. Prudence dictates that Havana should tone down its revolutionary operations in order to improve relations

with other nations in the Hemisphere. At the same time, Castro feels these operations should be expanded to revitalize Cuba's revolutionary credentials, and justify the sacrifices he has demanded of the Cuban people.

Recently, Cuba has made some inroads in improving diplomatic relations with a number of Latin American countries. Cuba reopened diplomatic relations with Brazil and Uruguay in 1985-86. In the case of Brazil, this occurred after nearly a 22 year hiatus. Ecuador's conservative president, Leon Febres Cordero, visited Havana in 1985, thus becoming the first Latin American head of state to do so since 1960. [Ref. 52:p. 130] Havana's relations with Panama and Mexico remain good, much to Washington's displeasure. Cuba's diplomatic relations with other nations in the world should be followed closely, since it is an indicator of what policies the Cubans are likely to follow.

Finally, the most difficult problem for the Cuban regime will likely be continued poor economic performance. While Castro has tried everything from material to moral incentives, the Cuban economy has shown few signs of improving. The Soviets and other CMEA members are becoming increasingly worried by the burdens of subsidizing the Cuban economy. However, there have been no signs of the Soviets reducing their support for the Cuban economy. On the contrary, the Cuban Press reported in April of 1986 that Ivan Arkhipov, Soviet First Deputy Premier, signed four trade and economic

agreements totaling approximately \$3 billion in new credits. This would represent a 50% increase in Soviet economic aid to Cuba over the 1986-90 five year period [Ref. 46:p. 57]. clearly, the Cuban-soviet economic relationship remains strong. Cuba, as the largest recipient of Soviet aid in the Third World, is one of Moscow's "few super-clients." Havana's future position as one of Moscow's super-clients will depend on Cuba's ability and willingness to actively support Soviet foreign policy objectives. In return for this generous aid, the Soviets may call on Cuba to perform missions ranging from intelligence operations against the United States, NATO members, and select targets in the developing world, to full-scale military interventions in support of other Soviet clients. If the Soviets are unwilling to conduct an aggressive foreign policy in the late 1980s, as they did during the 1970s, it is likely that the Kremlin will demand Cuban assistance on the other end of the warfare spectrum, specifically espionage and influence operations. Either way, the Cubans have the necessary resources, experience, and most importantly, the willingness to perform whatever mission is necessary, along as it coincides with their own strategic interests.

For its part, Cuba must also be reevaluating its situation. In the early 1970s Cuba decided to build up its military forces and security services at the expense of economic programs. The value of this large military

bureaucracy may be limited, and possibly a liability, if the Soviets are unable or unwilling to finance Cuba's economy at home along with its military adventures abroad.

In conclusion, the Cuban revolution is at a critical point of its development. The analogy of the Cuban Revolution in the 1980s and mainland China in the 1970s is thought-provoking and deserves further analysis. Most Cubans have lived through an extended period of revolutionary fervor and Marxist-Leninist indoctrination. On the economic front, Cuba has tried nearly all the "quick-fix" development programs attempted by Beijing including breaking with capitalist trading partners, moral incentives and Havana's version of the "great leap forward" (the 1970 goal of a ten million ton sugar harvest), all to no avail. Cuba is still dependent on sugar, which it is now producing at three times the world price. Havana's membership in COMECON prevents it from any drastic departures from its present trading policy, and many Cubans are resigned to a lower standard of living for many years to come. Jorge Dominguez has noticed a drastic shift by Castro back to the failed economic policies of the 1960s. That is, rather than decentralizing the Cuban economy, Castro has reimposed his authority in several areas. Small market-related incentive programs, which were successful in the 1970s, have been outlawed and replaced by moral incentives. Rather than "bending" the stiffling tenets of Marxism-Leninism, Castro

has reemphasized the correct "ideological" route in building socialism. [Ref. 52:p. 118]

Should these policies fail in the 1980s, as they did in the 1960s, the Castro Regime could face serious challenges to its continued rule in Cuba by more pragmatic members of the PCC. Washington should prepare for such a development in order to be in position to exploit it should it ever occur. Havana, like Beijing, may one day be willing to try a new development strategy, a strategy which is less threatening to the interests of the United States and Cuba's other Caribbean neighbors. Should Fidel Castro be overthrown, the Cuban Revolution could attempt a radically different foreign policy similar to that of the Chinese after the death of Mao. However, since such a shift would be a great victory for U.S. strategic security, and the worst defeat for Soviet foreign policy in a quarter-century, it is the most unlikely outcome. The Soviets have most certainly developed contingencies for a post-Castro Cuba. Soviet influence pervades virtually every sector of Cuban society, especially the economy, military, and security services. It is conceivable that Moscow has already chosen Castro's successor (either Raul Castro or a revolutionary junta made up of pro-Soviet raulistas and pragmatists). Such a development would bring Cuba and Havana's foreign policy more in line with that of other Warsaw Pact surrogates of the Soviet Union. Given Castro's sometimes irrational behavior in the past, the

"Bulgarianization" of Cuba has most likely been Moscow's goal for the past twenty-seven years. If such a scenario does come to pass, we should expect a raulista-ruled Cuba to continue its revolutionary activities around the world, but with foreign policy goals and strategies even more closely parallel to those of Moscow.

APPENDIX A

CUBAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION ABROAD

| <u>COUNTRY</u> | <u>DATE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHED OR RE-ESTABLISHED</u> | <u>REMARKS</u> |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| AFGHANISTAN | 11 SEP 1975 | |
| ALBANIA | 15 DEC 1960 | |
| ALGERIA | 1961 | DESIGNATED MILITARY ATTACHE |
| ANGOLA | 11 NOV 1975 | |
| ARGENTINA | 28 MAY 1973 | |
| AUSTRALIA | 31 OCT 1973 | |
| AUSTRIA | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| BAHAMAS | 30 NOV 1974 | |
| BANGLADESH | 9 FEB 1972 | |
| BARBADOS | 8 DEC 1972 | |
| BELGIUM | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| BENIN | 1 FEB 1974 | |
| BOLIVIA | 11 JAN 1983 | |
| BOTSWANA | 9 DEC 1977 | |
| BRAZIL | JUL 1986 | |
| BULGARIA | AFTER 1959 | |
| BURKINA FASO | PRIOR TO 1984 | |
| BURMA | 12 OCT 1976 | |
| BURUNDI | 2 FEB 1974 | |
| CAMEROON | 31 AUG 1974 | |
| CANADA | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| CAPE VERDE ISL. | 8 SEP 1975 | |
| CHAD | 18 OCT 1976 | |
| CHINA (PRC) | PRIOR TO 1959 | DESIGNATED MILITARY ATTACHE |
| COLOMBIA | - | MAR 1981 RELA- TIONS SUSPENDED |
| COMOROS | 23 DEC 1976 | |
| CONGO | 10 MAY 1964 | |
| COSTA RICA | 21 FEB 1977 | |
| CYPRUS | 1960 | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 16 MAY 1960 | MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR ATTACHE |
| DENMARK | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| DOMINICA | - | RELATIONS INAC- TIVE SINCE 1983 |

| | | |
|---------------|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ECUADOR | 24 AUG 1979 | DOWNGRADED TO CHARGE d'AFFAIRS APR 1981. RAISED TO AMBASSADOR LEVEL AGAIN ON 24 JAN 1984 |
| EGYPT | CIRCA 1960 | |
| EL SALVADOR | 18 OCT 1979 | |
| EQUATORIAL | | |
| GUINEA | 27 DEC 1972 | |
| ETHIOPIA | 18 JUL 1975 | DESIGNATED MILITARY ATTACHE |
| FINLAND | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| FRANCE | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| GABON | 1 APR 1974 | EMBASSY CLOSED ON 13 AUG 1980 |
| GAMBIA | 19 MAY 1979 | |
| GDR | JAN 1963 | DESIGNATED MILITARY ATTACHE |
| FRG | 18 JAN 1975 | |
| GHANA | MAY 1974 | |
| GREECE | | |
| GRENADA | 14 APR 1979 | RELATIONS INAC- TIVE SINCE MARCH 1984 |
| GUINEA | 1960 | |
| GUINEA-BISSAU | 1 OCT 1973 | |
| GUYANA | 8 DEC 1972 | MILITARY ATTACHE |
| HONG KONG | - | C O N S U L A T E GENERAL |
| HUNGARY | 18 DEC 1960 | |
| ICELAND | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| INDIA | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| INDONESIA | - | |
| IRAN | AUG 1979 | |
| IRAQ | 1960 | |
| ITALY | PRIOR TO 1959 | CONSULATE IN GENOA |
| JAMAICA | 8 DEC 1972 | SEVERED ON 29 OCT 1981 |
| JAPAN | PRIOR TO 1959 | CONSULATE IN GAIMUSHO |
| JORDAN | 7 SEP 1979 | |

| | | |
|---------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| KAMPUCHEA | CIRCA 1975 | |
| KOREA (NORTH) | 24 SEP 1960 | MILITARY ATTACHE |
| KUWAIT | MAY 1974 | |
| LAOS | 4 NOV 1974 | MILITARY ATTACHE IN HANOI |
| LEBANON | CIRCA 1960 | MILITARY ATTACHE |
| LESOTHO | 14 JUN 1979 | |
| LIBERIA | 19 APR 1974 | |
| LIBYA | 1 MAR 1976 | |
| LUXEMBOURG | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| MADAGASCAR | 11 APR 1974 | |
| MALAYSIA | 16 FEB 1975 | |
| MALDIVES | 29 JAN 1977 | |
| MALI | 13 NOV 1972 | |
| MALTA | 17 MAR 1977 | |
| MAURITANIA | 15 AUG 1972 | |
| MAURITIUS | 15 OCT 1976 | |
| MEXICO | PRIOR TO 1959 | MILITARY ATTACHE AND ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE. CONSULATE IN MERIDA |
| MONGOLIA | 9 DEC 1960 | |
| MOROCCO | 12 JAN 1964 | SEVERED ON 22 APR 1980 |
| MOZANBIQUE | 25 JUN 1975 | |
| NEPAL | 25 MAR 1975 | |
| NETHERLANDS | PRIOR TO 1959 | CONSULATE IN ROTTERDAM |
| NICARAGUA | 27 JUL 1979 | CONSULATES IN BLUEFIELDS, CHINANDEGA, AND MATAGALPA |
| NIGER | 26 APR 1976 | |
| NIGERIA | 28 JUN 1974 | |
| NORWAY | APR 1968 | |
| PAKISTAN | - | |
| PLO | 2 JUN 1982 | |
| PANAMA | 22 AUG 1974 | |
| PERU | 8 JUL 1972 | DOWNGRADED TO CHARGE d'AFFAIRS LEVEL IN 1980 |
| PHILIPPINES | 27 AUG 1975 | |
| POLAND | 15 | MILITARY ATTACHE |
| PORTUGAL | PRIOR TO 1959 | |

| | | |
|------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ROMANIA | OCT 1960 | |
| RWANDA | 6 SEP 1979 | |
| ST. LUCIA | 24 AUG 1979 | |
| SDAR* | - | |
| SAO TOME | 11 APR 1976 | |
| SENEGAL | 10 AUG 1974 | |
| SEYCHELLES | APR 1978 | |
| SIERRA LEONE | 24 APR 1972 | |
| SPAIN | PRIOR TO 1959 | CONSULATES IN BARCELONA, CANARY ISLANDS, AND MADRID |
| SRI LANKA | CIRCA 1960 | |
| SUDAN | 29 JUN 1979 | |
| SURINAME | 1981 | CUBAN PERSONNEL WITHDRAWN IN OCTOBER 1983 |
| SWEDEN | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| SWITZERLAND | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| SYRIA | 29 JUL 1965 | MILITARY ATTACHE |
| TANZANIA | JUN 1964 | |
| THAILAND | CIRCA 1963 | |
| TOGO | 22 JAN 1979 | |
| TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO | 8 DEC 1972 | |
| TUNISIA | - | |
| TURKEY | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| UGANDA | 10 MAY 1974 | |
| USSR | 8 MAY 1960 | MILITARY ATTACHE CONSULATES IN ODESSA, KIEV, AND LENINGRAD |
| UNITED KINGDOM | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| UNITED STATES | 1 SEP 1977 | SPECIAL INTER- ESTS SECTION ONLY WITH AT LEAST 22 CUBAN DIPLOMATS |
| URUGUAY | 17 OCT 1985 | |
| VANUATU | - | AMBASSADOR RESI- DENT IN MANILA |
| VATICAN CITY | PRIOR TO 1959 | |
| VENEZUELA | 29 DEC 1974 | |
| VIETNAM | DEC 1960 | MILITARY ATTACHE |

| | | |
|---------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| YEMEN (NORTH) | - | AMBASSADOR RESI- DENT IN KUWAIT |
| YEMAN (PDRY) | 15 MAY 1972 | |
| YUGOSLAVIA | CIRCA 1960 | MILITARY ATTACHE |
| ZAIRE | 15 APR 1974 | SUSPENDED APR 1977, RE-ESTABLISHED AUG 1979 |
| ZAMBIA | 19 JUL 1972 | |
| ZIMBABWE | 19 APR 1980 | |

*SDAR is the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic also known as the Polisario Front. This group has been fighting Morocco since 1976 for its independence.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba,
CR 85-13573, November 1985

APPENDIX B

COMPATIBILITY OF CUBAN WEAPONS WITH OTHER SOVIET THIRD WORLD CLIENTS

TABLE 12

MAJOR SOVIET ARMS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED TO OTHER SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD

CUBAN INVENTORY

| TYPE OF EQUIPMENT | ANGOLA | ETHIOPIA | NICAR. | PERU | MOZAMB. | PDRY | LIBYA | IRAQ | CONGO |
|----------------------------|--------|----------|--------|------|---------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| ARMY | | | | | | | | | |
| T-34 (325) | 175 | 40 | - | - | 195 | P | - | - | P |
| T-54/55 (350) | 200 | 800 | 120 | 250 | 90 | 450 | 2,500 | 2,900 | 35 |
| T-62 (160) | 90 | 30 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| PT-76 (55) | 50 | - | 30 | - | - | - | - | 250 | 3 |
| BRDM-1/-2(75) | 200 | 150 | 50 | - | 30 | P | 200 | P | 25 |
| BMP 1 (50) | - | 40 | - | - | - | 100 | 700 | 500 | - |
| BTR -40/-60/ -152 (500) | 225 | 600 | 172 | - | 200 | 300 | 900 | PLN | 74 |
| FROG -5/-7(65) | - | - | - | - | - | 12 | 48 | 19 | - |
| NAVY | | | | | | | | | |
| FOXTROT (3) | - | - | - | - | - | 6 | - | - | - |
| YEVGENYA (10) | - | - | 2 | - | - | - | - | 3 | - |
| OSA 1/I1 (18) | 6 | 4 | - | - | - | 8 | 12 | 10 | - |
| POLNOCNY (2) | 3 | 2 | - | - | - | 3 | 3 | 3 | - |
| ZHUKA (25) | 1 | 2 | 3 | - | 5 | 2 | - | P | - |
| AIR FORCE | | | | | | | | | |
| MIG 23/27(51) | 25 | 35 | - | - | - | - | 175 | 48 | - |
| MIG 21 (184) | 70 | 100 | * | - | - | 48 | 55 | 200 | - |
| MIG 17 (15) | 20 | 10 | - | - | 18 | 30 | - | - | 20 |
| L-39(SOME) | - | 10 | 6 | - | P | - | 100 | 20 | 4 |
| ZLIN 326(30) | - | - | - | - | 7 | - | - | - | - |
| MI-8 HIP (40) | 40 | 32 | 12 | 5 | 4 | 30 | 150 | 60 | - |
| MI-24 HIND(18) | 12 | 24 | 6 | 42 | R | 15 | 30 | 45 | - |
| AN 24/26 (25) | 16 | - | 2 | - | 4 | 3 | 5 | 2 | - |
| IL-76 (1) | - | - | - | - | - | 9 | 13 | - | - |
| SA-2 (28) | - | 18 | - | - | - | 54 | 72 | 120 | - |
| SA-3 (9) | 40 | 18 | - | P | 10 | 3 | 4 | 150 | - |
| SA-6 (12) | 72 | - | - | - | - | P | 350 | - | - |
| ZSU-23-4 | 20 | P | - | 23 | - | P | 450 | PLN | - |

P/PLN = Present/Present in Large Numbers
 * = Included in Above Total
 * = On Order

Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986

TABLE 13

MAJOR SOVIET ARMS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED
TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

| CUBA TYPE OF EQUIPMENT | ALGERIA | SYRIA | PDRY | LIBYA | IRAQ |
|------------------------------|---------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| ARMY | | | | | |
| T-34 (325) | - | - | P | - | - |
| T-54/55 (350) | 300 | 1,800 | 450 | 2,500 | 2,900 |
| T-62 (160) | 300 | 1,300 | - | - | - |
| PT-76 (55) | - | - | - | - | 250 |
| BRDM-1/-2(75) | 150 | 800 | P | 200 | P |
| BMP 1 (50) | 650 | 600 | 100 | 700 | 500 |
| BTR -40/-60/ -152 (500) | 550 | 1,600 | 300 | 900 | PLN |
| FROG -5/-7(65) | - | 18 | 12 | 48 | 19 |
| NAVY | | | | | |
| FOXTROT (3) | - | - | - | 6 | - |
| YEVGENYA (10) | - | 1 | - | - | 3 |
| OSA I/II (18) | 11 | 12 | 8 | 12 | 10 |
| POLNOCHNY (2) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| ZHUK (25) | - | 6 | 2 | - | P |
| AIR FORCE | | | | | |
| MIG 23/27 (51) | 62 | 120 | - | 175 | 48 |
| MIG 21 (184) | 95 | 180 | 48 | 55 | 200 |
| MIG 17 (15) | 80 | 85 | 30 | - | - |
| L-39 (SOME) | - | 90 | - | 100 | 20 |
| MI-8 HIP (40) | 35 | 125 | 30 | 150 | 60 |
| MI-24 HIND(18) | 35 | 40 | 15 | 30 | 45 |
| AN 24/26 (25) | - | 11 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| IL-76 (1) | - | 4 | 9 | 13 | - |
| SA-2 (28) | 24 | 370 | 54 | 72 | 120 |
| SA-3 (9) | 20 | - | 3 | 4 | 150 |
| SA-6 (12) | 18 | PLN | P | 350 | - |
| ZSU-23-4 | 130 | PLN | P | 450 | PLN |

P/PLN = Present/Present in Large Numbers

* = Included in Above Total

Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986

TABLE 14

MAJOR SOVIET ARMS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED
TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN ASIA

| CUBA (NUMBER) TYPE OF EQUIPMENT | VIETNAM | NORTH KOREA | LAOS |
|------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|------|
| ARMY | | | |
| T-34 (325) | 1,600 | 300 | 30 |
| T-54/55 (350) | * | 2,500 | * |
| T-62 (160) | * | - | - |
| PT-76 (55) | 450 | - | 25 |
| BRDM-1/-2 (75) | P | - | - |
| BMP (50) | 1,500 | - | - |
| BTR -40/-60/ -152 (500) | * | 1,000 | 48 |
| FROG -5/-7(65) | - | 54 | - |
| NAVY | | | |
| FOXTROT (3) | - | - | - |
| YEVGENYA (10) | - | - | - |
| OSA I/II (18) | 8 | 10 | - |
| POLNOCHNY (2) | 4 | - | - |
| ZHUK (25) | 7 | - | - |
| AIR FORCE | | | |
| MIG 23/27(51) | - | 4* | - |
| MIG 21 (184) | 225 | 160 | 20 |
| MIG 17 (15) | - | 280 | - |
| L-39(SOME) | P | - | - |
| ZLIN 326(30) | - | - | - |
| MI-8 HIP (40) | 36 | 20 | 10 |
| MI-24 HIND(18) | 30 | - | - |
| AN 24/26 (25) | 62 | 10 | 7 |
| IL-76 (1) | - | - | - |
| SA-2 (28) | 60 | 45 | - |
| SA-3 (9) | * | - | - |
| SA-6 (12) | - | - | - |
| ZSU-23-4 | P | P | P |
| P/PLN = Present/Present in Large Numbers | | | |
| * = Included in Above Total | | | |
| * = More On Order | | | |

Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986

TABLE 15

MAJOR SOVIET ARMS NOT IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED
TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN AFRICA AND ASIA

| <u>ASIA</u> | <u>ARMY</u> | <u>NAVY</u> | <u>AIR FORCE</u> |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| NORTH KOREA | NONE | 4 WHISKY S 3 SHERSHEN FAC | 20 SU-7 160 MIG-19 |
| VIETNAM | NONE | 6 PETYA FFL 12 SHERSHEN FAC | 45 SU-20/-22 ? AN-12 2 AN-30 17 KA-25 15 MI-6 |
| LAOS | NONE | NONE | 2 MI-6 |
| <u>AFRICA</u> | | | |
| ANGOLA | NONE | 4 SHERSHEN FAC 2 POLUCHAT | 5 SU-22* |
| ETHIOPIA | NONE | 2 PETYA FFL | 10 AN-12 |
| MOZAMBIQUE | NONE | 1 POLUCHAT | 1 TU-134 |
| THE CONGO | NONE | 1 SHERSHEN | NONE |
| * MORE ON ORDER | | | |

Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986

TABLE 16

MAJOR SOVIET ARMS NOT IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED
TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

| | <u>ARMY</u> | <u>NAVY</u> | <u>AIR FORCE</u> |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| SOUTH YEMEN | 100 BMP-1 6 SCUD B | 1 ROPUCHA LST | 25 SU-20/-22 |
| SYRIA | 1,100 T-72 600 BMP-1 18 SCUD B 18 SS-21 ? SA-8 ? SA-13 AT-4 SPIGOT | 2 PETYA FFL 1 T-43 MSF 2 VANYA MSC 4 NANUCHKA II* | 18 SU-7 40 SU-20 30 MIG-25 10 MIG-25R ? MIG-23G 30 MI-17 (MOD MI-8) 3 KA-25 48 SA-5 |
| LIBYA | 300 T-72 ? SCUD B ? SA-8 ? SA-13 | 4 NANUCHKA II 7 NATYA MSF | 9 TU-22 BLINDER 50 MIG-25 100 SU-20/-22 20 MI-2 ? SA-5 |
| ALGERIA | 100 T-72 650 BMP-1 | 2 R-CLASS SS 4 NANUCHKA 1 T-43 MSF | 20 SU-7 18 SU-20 15 MIG-25 6 MIG-25R 8 AN-12 CUB 4 MI-6 |
| IRAQ | ? T-72 9 SCUD B | ? POLUCHAT 2 T-43 MSF | 7 TU-22 8 TU-16 25 MIG 25 40 MIG 19 50 SU-20 75 SU-7 5 MIG-25R 10 AN-12 5 MI-6 |

Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986

TABLE 17

MAJOR SOVIET ARMS NOT IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED
TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

| | <u>ARMY</u> | <u>NAVY</u> | <u>AIR FORCE</u> |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|
| GRENADA (UNTIL 1983) | NONE | NONE | NONE |
| NICARAGUA | NONE | NONE | NONE |
| PERU | NONE | NONE | 48 SU-22 |

Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986

APPENDIX C

CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR SOVIET AIRCRAFT AND GROUND WEAPONS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY

TABLE 18

CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR SOVIET GROUND AND AIR WEAPONS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY

| EQUIPMENT | FIRST DEPLOYED | GUNS | NUMBER IN (1984) SOVIET INVENTORY | | |
|------------|-------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|
| INVENTORY | | | | | |
| ARMY | | | | | |
| T-54/55 | 1961 | 100 mm | 19,800 | | |
| T-62 | 1962 | 115 mm | 13,800 | | |
| PT-76 | 1952 | 76 mm | 1,200 | | |
| BMP | 1966 | 73 mm | 24,000 | | |
| BTR | 1959-1965 | 14.5 MG | 23,000 | | |
| BRDM 1 | 1960 | 14.5 MG | | | |
| BRDM 2 | 1965 | 14.5 MG | | | |
| FROG | 1963 | 35 NM RANGE | 700 | | |
| SA-3 | 1964 | | | | |
| SA-6 | 1967 | | 875 | | |
| ZSU-23-4 | 1966 | 4/23mm | 2,000 | | |
| AIR FORCE | | | | | |
| | FIRST DEPLOYED | COMBATRADIUS (N. MILES) | MAX SPEED (MACH) | ARMAMENT | # IN SOVIET INVENTORY |
| MIG 23 | 1972 | 700 | 2.3 | GUN/AAM | 2,510 |
| MIG 21 | 1956 | 500 | 2.1 | GUN/AAM | 720 |
| MIG 17 | 1953 | 225 | SUBSONIC | GUNS/AAM | 0 |
| MI-8 HIF | 1961 | 120 | 160 MPH | GUNSHIPS | 120 |
| MI-24 HIND | 1975 | 100 | 200 MPH | GUNSHIPS | 830 |
| AN 24/26 | | 1,295 | 245 MPH | POSS ROCKETS | ? |

Source: John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military
Balance 1980-1985, Pergamon-Brassey,
London, 1985, pp. 209-221

APPENDIX D

TYPES OF SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERRED TO CUBA (1960-1985)

TABLE 19

SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS TRANSFERRED TO CUBA DURING THE
PRE-INTERVENTIONARY PERIOD (1960-1971)

ARMOR TANKS (T-34, JS-2, T-54, PT-76);
 APCs (BTR 40, 60, 152)

AIRCRAFT (MIG-15, -17, -19, -21, AN-2, IL-14, MI-4)

NAVAL UNITS

| # | UNIT | YEAR BUILT | DATE OF TRANSFER | SOVIET INVENTORY | REMARKS |
|----|-------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|
| 6 | KRONSHSTADT | 1950's | 1962 | - | 2 DISCARDED |
| 12 | SO-1 | 1957-69 | 1964 (6) 1967 (6) | (45) | 3 DISCARDED |
| 12 | P-4 PT | PRE-1955 | 1962-64 | - | POOR CONDITION |
| 4 | P-6 PT | POST-1955 | 1962 | - | POOR CONDITION |
| 18 | KOMAR PTG | 1962-63 | 1962 (12) 1966 (6) | - | ONLY 5 ARE STILL OPERATIONAL |

Source: IISS, and Jean Labayle Couhat, Editor,
Combat Fleets of the World 1984/85,
Naval Institute Press, 1984

TABLE 20

SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS TRANSFERRED TO CUBA DURING THE
INTERVENTIONARY PERIOD (1972-1985)

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------|
| <u>ARMOR</u> | | TANKS (T-55 AND T-62); APCS (BMP, BRDM SCOUT CARS and ZSU-23/4) | | | |
| <u>AIRCRAFT</u> | | (MIG-23, AN-24/26, IL-62, TU-154, MI-8, -14, and MI-24) | | | |
| <u>NAVAL UNITS</u> | | | | | |
| # | UNIT | YEAR BUILT | DATE OF TRANSFER | SOVIET INVENTORY | REMARKS |
| 2 | SONYA MSF | 1973- | 1980 (2) | (35) | |
| 10 | YEVGENYA MSC | 1969- | 1978-83 | (36) | INSHORE MSC |
| 6 | OSA I PTG | 1960-65 | 1972-74 | (70) | 1 DISCARDED |
| 13 | OSA II PTG | 1965-70 | 77(2)78(3) | (50) | |
| 9 | TURYA PTH | 1970'S | 79(2)80(2) 81(2)83(2) | (30) | CUBA WAS 1ST RECIPIENT |
| 3 | FOXTROT SS | 1958-71 | 79/80/84 | (60) | NEW CONSTRUCTION |
| 2 | KONI- CLASS FF | 1976 | 1981/84 | (1+) | NEW CONSTRUCTION |
| 2 | POLNOCNY- LSM | 1963-72 | 1982 (2) | (52) | CONFIGURED FOR TROOP TRANS- PORT |
| 25 | ZHUK PATROL | 1976- | 1975-83 | (30) | |

Source: IISS, and Jean Labayle Couhat, Editor,
Combat Fleets of the World 1984/85,
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